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ABSTRACT 
 The West's understanding of causation has changed drastically from the 
premodern to the modern period. The argument to follow shall focus on one premodern 
interpretation of causation as representative of the Neoplatonic period: that of Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite. For Dionysius, formal and final causation have metaphysical 
superiority over efficient and material causation. By contrast, beginning in the early 
modern period, efficient causation begins to be seen as the metaphysically supreme type 
of causation. The historical and philosophical reasons for this shift in perceived 
supremacy shall be traced. After this historical overview, the philosophical hypothesis 
that the premodern understanding of causation is more persuasive than the modern 
understanding will be defended. More specifically, this defense will compare three 
approaches to resolving the conflict between ancient and modern notions of causation (a 
modern approach, a postmodern approach, and a traditional approach) by weighing the 
following core philosophical issue uncovered during the historical overview: the primary-
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secondary quality distinction, Forms, and teleology. The epilogue will draw one 
implication from this conclusion, namely, it will invite a revival of natural philosophy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
You pour out light over the darkness, Lord, and colors and shapes emerge. You bend Your face 
over the abyss, whose name is Nothingness, and the abyss tries to depict the beauty of Your 
face in shadows. All creation expresses You the way the abyss dreams of You. 
My lake is also beautiful while the peaceful face of the sun remains bent over it. And all those 
who pass by praise the beauty of my lake. But as soon as the sun hides its face, my lake 
becomes dark and abysmal. And no passerby ever offers any praise for the lake except in the 
presence of the sun or the sun's radiant companions.1  
 
 It is no secret that the way the West understands the world has changed 
dramatically over the past 500 years (so much so, it seems, that when modern Westerners 
without any background in—what modern thinkers have dubbed as—“ancient” or 
“medieval” thought, they find such thought perplexing, if not irrational and dogmatic). 
The popular narrative of associating the so-called “medieval” period with the “Dark 
Ages” and the “modern” period with “Enlightenment” has done little to aid in 
understanding premodern thought. 
 Realistically, any attempt at a complete recovery of the premodern worldview is 
impossible. That said, various dimensions of the premodern worldview could perhaps be 
reconstructed, however fragmented, for the sake of bridging the gap between modern and 
premodern interpretations of reality. In effect, the difficulty is the same as that with 
                                                 
1 Nikolai Velimirovich, Prayers by the Lake, trans. Todor Mika and Stevan Scott (Grayslake, IL: 
Diocese of New Gracanica and Midwestern America, 2010), XXXI, lines 1-11.  
2 
translation: slippage is inevitable, and there is no perfect one-to-one mapping from 
premodern to modern ideas or vice-versa.2  
 Acknowledging the limitations of putting premodern thought in contact with 
modern thought, the project in the pages that follow aims to open a dialogue between the 
premoderns and moderns over the issue of causation. Why bother to open a dialogue 
between premodern and modern thought? Modern philosophical assumptions all too 
easily creep into any topic (including the topic of causation), and these assumptions are 
dangerous precisely because they are assumptions—they have not earned their place as 
“facts” or “axioms.” Any reasonably deep philosophical topic has enough complicated 
intricacies without the need to introduce unnecessary complications or problematic points 
(such as unwarranted assumptions). Part of the aim of this project's dialogue between 
modern and premodern thought over the issue of causation is to achieve better 
understanding of causation by bringing to light hidden assumptions that come so 
naturally to the modern mind. Put another way: if the goal is to understand the nature of 
causation, how do uncontested and untested modern assumptions aid in this 
understanding rather than hinder it? Why stack the deck in favor of what modern 
Westerners already believe? 
 Similarly, the scope of the dialogue has been restricted to Western thought, 
certainly not because Chinese or Indian schools have nothing to contribute, but simply 
                                                 
2 In fact, Nicholas Constas, Introduction to the Ambigua, Volume I (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2014), xxiv, has remarked, in his translation of Maximus the Confessor, that 
English is “uniquely inapt” at capturing the nuances of Greek thought found in the Ambigua. 
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because a dialogue with the West's own premodern thought is fruitful enough to bring to 
the surface hidden assumptions in modern thinking. Furthermore, a dialogue between 
modern and premodern Western thought is easier to facilitate than either Chinese or 
Indian thought due to the fact that this dialogue historically took place during the early 
modern period. In other words, compared to Chinese and Indian philosophy, premodern 
Western philosophy holds the same promise of uncovering modern assumptions, but 
unlike Chinese and Indian philosophy, premodern Western philosopher historically 
squared off against modern Western thought, allowing for the premodern-modern 
dialogue that follows to be more than purely hypothetical or constructed. 
 And why causation? Because in various ways one's view of causation says much 
about one's interpretation of reality; there is high philosophical yield in studying 
causation as opposed to other metaphysical topics. For instance, asking someone what 
they see to be happening when they act, when they are a cause in the world, also 
succinctly asks them by implication questions such as: “What forces do you consider to 
be real?”, “What do you consider to be a sufficient explanation of an event?”, “To what 
extent is reality relational?”, “In what way is causation to be accounted for?”, etc. People 
live the way they interpret reality—the issue of causation is not merely an abstract 
exercise but entails lived experience. From arriving at an appointment on time, to 
cooking dinner, to playing an instrument, causation is lived. And, by asking about the 
world one lives in, answers emerge about one's metaphysical worldview. In short, 
causation is a fundamental metaphysical question to which virtually everyone, out of 
4 
practical necessity, has an answer. 
 With the central issue (causation) selected, the next step involves choosing 
interlocutors. Since the goal is to put premodern and modern thought into dialogue, some 
of the interlocutors must be premodern and others modern. Pseudo-Dionysius the 
Areopagite has been chosen as the premodern interlocutor. “Dionysius” is a pseudonym 
for an unknown Christian (most likely a bishop) writing around the 5th or 6th century.3 He 
took on the name “Dionysius,” which is the name of a convert of the Apostle Paul 
according to the book of Acts in the New Testament.4 He almost certainly adopted this 
name due to the intrigue and credibility it would give his writings, leading historians to 
believe that he was Syrian; the Syrian Church was embroiled in the Christological 
controversies and writing under a pseudonym would enable a bishop to dodge these 
controversies while communicating to the larger Church.5 Although the name 
“Dionysius” is apocryphal, this project will call him “Dionysius” rather than “Pseudo-
Dionysius” in order to avoid the negative connotations associated with the prefix 
“pseudo.”6  
 Dionysius works as an ideal premodern candidate to study for several reasons. 
First, he represents mature Neoplatonic philosophy. He had read Plotinus, Proclus, 
                                                 
3 John D. Jones, Preface to The Divine Names and the Mystical Theology (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2011). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Jaroslav Pelikan, “The Odyssey of Dionysian Spirituality,” in Pseudo-Dionysius the Complete 
Works (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1985). The word “Church” is capitalized to avoid 
confusion between a bishop communicating with the “church” of which he is the hierarch, 
and the “Church” of which he is but a hierarch. 
6 This practice is standard in the Dionysius literature. 
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Iamblichus, and other key Neoplatonists. His work shows great depth because he built on 
the shoulders of giants. Second, he has influenced both Western and Eastern Christian 
thought, making him a historically important thinker.7 From Symeon the New 
Theologian, to Maximus the Confessor, to John Scotus Eriugena, to Thomas Aquinas and 
Gregory Palamas, Dionysius laid a foundation upon which theologians following him 
would build (again, since some scholars believe that Dionysius was Syrian, he would 
then also have influenced the so-called “Oriental Orthodox Churches”8). Third and 
finally, causation plays a pivotal role in Dionysius's writings. From his Divine Names to 
his books on hierarchy and his Mystical Theology, Dionysius employed a premodern 
view of causation to articulate the relationships between God and the world, beings to 
each other, and beings to God in the divine ascent. As with all generations, and as shall be 
seen with the contemplative practice he advocated, Dionysius lived his understanding of 
causation, an understanding that is salient throughout his works. 
 As for choosing a modern interlocutor, the situation is much messier. While 
Dionysius fits more or less neatly into a well-established tradition, modern thinking in 
many ways continues to be a work in progress. As such, rather than centering attention on 
one figure and expounding that figure's influences (as is the case with Dionysius), a 
variety of influential modern figures shall be explored, each of whom has contributed 
significantly to modern notions of causation. More specifically, discussing how 
                                                 
7 Gersh, Jones, Pelikan, Perl, and others have argued for Dionysius's influence in both the East 
and West. 
8 For example, Pelikan makes this argument. 
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contemporary notions of causation came to be (notions which now have scientific 
connotations) requires studying the early modern natural philosophers, who redefined the 
notions of causation they inherited into what would become a critical component of the 
modern scientific enterprise. The early modern period provides the best vantage point 
from which to bridge the gap between premodern and modern thought for that was 
precisely when the shift from premodern to modern thought occurred. Early modern 
thinkers were forced to confront premodern philosophy and explicitly did so, greatly 
facilitating a premodern-modern dialogue. 
 With the topic selected and the interlocutors chosen, the dialogue will proceed by 
investigating whether there is a conflict between notions of causation as found in 
premodern thinkers such as Dionysius and as found in modern scientific thought. If there 
is no conflict, then the compatibility between Dionysius's philosophy and modern science 
will be further explored, showing how ancient theology and modern science are more or 
less harmonious. However, if there is a conflict, then the best way to resolve the conflict 
shall be examined. Regardless of whether conflict is found, a more robust view of 
causation will be gained through the dialogue of premodern and modern perspectives. 
 The structure of this investigation is as follows. The first chapter, as seen, 
introduces the topic at hand. The second chapter will examine Dionysius's theology with 
a focus on the importance of causation. Starting with Presocratic influences and moving 
to Plato and the Neoplatonists, the beginning of chapter two will provide the necessary 
background information for Dionysius. The middle of chapter two will look at his central 
7 
doctrine, commonly known as “theophany,” which requires understanding his doctrines 
of God, symbols, hierarchy, evil, and the Divine Names. Chapter two will end by 
explaining how Dionysius (and the premoderns in general) viewed causation through 
Aristotelian lenses, prioritizing formal causation above the other types of causation, 
resulting in a theology highly dependent upon formal causation. 
 Chapter three will explore the early modern philosophers. Here the historical and 
philosophical reasons for why the early moderns rejected formal (and final) causation in 
favor of building a natural philosophy solely off of efficient (and sometimes material) 
causation will be elucidated. The impetus for this rejection, as will be argued, is the 
quantification of reality, resulting in the primary-secondary quality distinction. From this 
distinction springs a variety of ideas hostile to formal causation, namely: materialism, 
atomism, and mechanism. Likewise, the prevalence of the primary-secondary quality 
distinction led to philosophical reforms in the study of knowledge, Forms, and teleology. 
With these various new ideas competing with the old, the way in which efficient 
causation came to replace formal causation will be made evident. 
 In the fourth chapter, the conclusions of the second and third chapters will be 
synthesized to show that there is a conflict between Dionysius's notion of causation and 
modern scientific notions of causation. Three approaches for resolving the conflict will be 
offered: a modern approach, a postmodern approach, and a traditional approach; each 
approach shall first be summarized as its own philosophy, and then it will be 
demonstrated how it resolves the conflict. Before proceeding to decide between the three 
8 
approaches, the arguments for and against the core philosophical issues that underlie and 
create the conflict, as determined by the findings of previous chapters (namely, the 
primary-secondary quality distinction, nominalism, and teleology), will be evaluated. 
With the conclusions regarding the aforementioned arguments at hand, the three 
approaches for resolving the conflict will be compared. Ultimately, it will be argued that 
the traditional approach best resolves the conflict among the three, but even that approach 
can be improved by staying close to the theology of Dionysius. That said, the 
postmodernist position will be conceded, as it is impossible to refute postmodernism. 
 Finally, the epilogue will accentuate one interesting byproduct of the dialogue: a 
revival of natural philosophy. In between science and metaphysics there remains a 
philosophical space that has been neglected for centuries, and its viability will be argued. 
 Preceding each of these chapters is an excerpt from the same poem. The poem 
foreshadows the conclusions of the pages to follow. The hope is that the reader will enjoy 
a reading of the conclusions in a form that this author is utterly incapable of creating. 
9 
CHAPTER 2: DIONYSIUS AND FORMAL CAUSATION 
 
The face of the abyss intoxicates those who do not see the sun bent over the abyss. The beauty 
of things begins when an onlooker bends his face over them. There is no mirror if there is no 
face in front of the mirror. But even a face in front of a mirror means nothing if there is no 
light. 
In the light of Your face I pay no attention to any creature. Without You, creatures and I 
would not be mirrors of one another, but rather darkness, and an abyss, and an opaque chill. 
Creation distorts Your beauty the way a dream distorts reality. Creation torments me just as 
dreams torment me. For what is creation except dreams of Your inexpressible Reality?9 
 
 Times have changed. In fact, so radically is the modern worldview different from 
the ancient one that a direct comparison of formal causation with modern notions of 
causation is not possible without first thoroughly explaining what exactly Dionysius 
meant by “causation.” This requires understanding his theology, which in turn requires 
understanding Neoplatonic philosophy. Hence, the structure of this chapter starts with the 
necessary philosophical background for Dionysius's theology, then dives into Dionysius's 
theology directly, and finally ends by considering the importance and role of formal 
causation in his thought. Critically, this chapter does not argue for these positions except 
where such arguments will help clarify the concepts being presented. Chapter four will 
properly evaluate the arguments. 
                                                 
9 Nikolai Velimirovich, Prayers by the Lake, trans. Todor Mika and Stevan Scott (Grayslake, IL: 
Diocese of New Gracanica and Midwestern America, 2010), XXXI, lines 12-24.  
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Philosophical Background 
 Before detailing Dionysius's theology, the philosophical foundation upon which it 
builds must come to the fore. Many books have been dedicated to this task alone, and so 
this section focuses on those philosophical arguments that are ultimately relevant for 
understanding formal causation. In order to understand the thought of Dionysius, thought 
which is quite foreign to modern ways of thinking, it is philosophically helpful to start at 
the beginning, in the Presocratic Era.  
 What follows is not a historical overview of key pre-Dionysian figures, but a 
philosophical overview of them from the perspective of Dionysius's Late Antiquity 
Neoplatonic standpoint, so as to assist in making sense of Dionysius. Modern scholars 
question how closely the Neoplatonists interpreted Plato, and so they see radical 
differences between a properly “Platonic” and “Neoplatonic” school of thought. Whereas 
it would be an interesting project to evaluate the debates as to how Dionysius and other 
Neoplatonists read Plato rightly or wrongly, for the purpose of this project an 
interpretation of how the Neoplatonists understood their antecedents and history shall be 
presented, discussing their texts where relevant. In other words, the summaries of 
Parmenides, Plato, and to some extent Plotinus present these three figures as Dionysius 
would have understood them rather than as modern historians would (there is no 
contemporary consensus regarding the Neoplatonists' interpretation of their own 
antecedents). The interpretation here is oriented to the forthcoming discussion concerning 
formal causation. 
11 
Parmenides and Plato through the Eyes of the Neoplatonists 
 What is the nature of reality? What does it mean for a thing to be? Such questions 
consumed the energies of the Presocratics. Answers varied from arguing that one of the 
four elements makes up the other three (e.g., the fire of Heraclitus, the water of Thales, 
the air of Anaximenes), to saying that atoms or matter constitute reality (Democritus), to 
asserting that reality is mathematical in nature (Pythagoras).10 Yet none of these answers 
achieved widespread acceptance (at least not during this era). Against making one 
element fundamental, philosophers argued that any “one element” theory would 
necessarily deny any real difference in the world, and, more problematically, would lead 
one to expect a perfectly uniform world (since everything is made of the same element). 
Against atomic theory, they argued that ordering principles cannot come from atoms, yet 
atoms already are ordered structures. Finally, while many agreed that reality is 
mathematical, it also seemed to consist of more than the mathematical. 
 A history-altering breakthrough to the problem of reality occurred in the thought 
of Parmenides. Parmenides argued that “thinking is the same as being.”11 Starting with 
Plotinus,12 Neoplatonists interpreted this phrase to mean, quite literally, that “all thinking 
                                                 
10 For a brief, recent history of the Presocratics, see David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western 
Science, Second Ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 27ff. For the primary texts, 
see Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, trans. and ed. Kathleen Freeman (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1983 [1948]). 
11 Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, 7th Ed. (Berlin: 
Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1954), B3.  
12 See Plotinus, Enneads, ed. and trans. A. H. Armstrong, 7 Volumes (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1966-1988), see, e.g., V.9.5, V.1.8, etc.  
12 
is being and all being is thinking.”13 Put yet another way, to be is to be intelligible. The 
conclusion that “all thinking is being” is not as controversial as it first appears.14 Take 
any thought. What is the content of that thought? The thought consists of something(s), 
some thing(s); that is, the content of that (or any and every) thought is being(s). Thus, 
Neoplatonists believed that Parmenides argued that thought works by thinking beings, 
real or imaginary, and so without the ability to think beings, there would be no thought.15 
One cannot think without thinking something, and thus one cannot think without thinking 
a being. Put another way, to affirm that “thinking is limited to being” literally excludes 
nothing.16 
 More controversial it seems is the conclusion that “all being is thinking,” or, 
alternatively, “all being is intelligible.” Hopefully, the latter phrasing is less offensive. In 
any case, at least three arguments philosophically (as opposed to historically) support the 
Neoplatonists' conclusion that “being is intelligible.” First, contemporary Neoplatonist 
Eric Perl argues that the mind (yes, even the human mind) does grasp beings. The mere 
capacity of thinking a being empirically demonstrates that said being is an intelligible 
one. If a being were unintelligible, then it would in fact be unintelligible, i.e., one could 
                                                 
13 Eric Perl, Theophany (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 6f, and Eric Perl, Thinking Being (Boston: 
Brill, 2014), 11ff. Of course, according to Perl and the ancient Neoplatonists, this is indeed 
what Parmenides meant. Again, what Parmenides historically meant is not relevant for how 
he actually impacted Dionysius's thought. 
14 Perl, Theophany, 5, notes that philosophy itself, as the project of thinking reality as a whole, in 
its entirety, presupposes this. 
15 Perl, Theophany, 6. 
16 Perl, Thinking Being, 14. 
13 
not think it.17 Thus any being that comes to mind, precisely because it comes to mind, is 
intelligible. Second, and similarly, Perl reasons that one cannot posit an unintelligible 
being, because the moment one does so, one has actually instead posited something 
intelligible (by virtue of positing it).18 Thinking “a being that one cannot understand” 
turns out to be a very intelligible thought. The notion makes perfect sense. However, it 
only “makes sense” as a thought in the same way that a “square circle” does—as a 
concept (in this case, a contradictory one), but not as an entity (precisely because it is 
contradictory). And this leads to the third and final argument in favor of the thesis that 
“all being is intelligible:” to posit an unintelligible being is utterly meaningless. That is, 
any being that truly exceeded all intelligibility would be indistinguishable from a being 
that did not exist at all. No mind could register it, or its effects on the world. If even its 
effects were intelligible, then, at least in some sense, it itself is intelligible, for it could be 
accurately defined by its effects.19 To be clear, to posit an unintelligible being is the same 
as positing an intangible, invisible, undetectable gnome that is dancing on the table right 
now. Such a creature not only is indistinguishable from nothing, but actually is more real 
than an unintelligible being because at least one can think of this gnome, whereas one 
literally cannot think of something unintelligible by definition. However, in the hands of 
the Neoplatonists, Parmenides's “thinking is being” faced an obvious objection: what of 
                                                 
17 Perl, Thinking Being, 14: “To thinking being at all is thus already to have affirmed its 
intelligibility. To think being is to think it as thinkable.” Emphasis original. 
18 Perl, Thinking Being, 14. See also Perl, Theophany, 6. 
19 See C.S. Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” ed. Nathan Houser et alia, in The Essential 
Peirce, Volume I (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 
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imaginary ideas such as dragons and fairies? Surely these ideas possess intelligibility, yet 
they do not exist. 
 To answer this objection, Neoplatonists synthesized their Parmenidian principle 
(“thinking is being”) with their interpretation of Plato. For them, Plato explicitly equated 
thinking and being in his theory of Forms, thereby beginning to answer the “imaginary 
ideas” objection. For the Neoplatonists, a Form is both (a) the whatness of a thing that 
enables it to be what it is,20 and (b) the intelligible “look” or “appearance” a thing has to 
an intellect.21 “Look” and “appearance” have connotations of illusion which do not 
belong here. The intelligible appearance of a thing is precisely what that thing is. Perhaps 
more clearly, Forms are the real presentation of a thing and the truly real reality.22 This 
presentation is precisely what that thing is, and without any presentation no thing could 
exist because then it would not be present in reality—in other words, in order for a thing 
to be, it must be some thing, that is, have whatness, and thus have a presence in reality so 
that it is something rather than nothing.23  
 Thus, if Forms operate as conceived by the Neoplatonists, they do not “exist” as 
something in addition to things or reality, but are themselves the real things and true 
reality.24 This does not mean that every thing encountered in everyday life is a Form. 
                                                 
20 Perl, Thinking Being, 24. 
21 Ibid., 23. 
22 Ibid., 39. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Perl, Thinking Being, 25n9. Plotinus, VI.6.13.28-32: “...but just as when we predicate substance 
of each individual sense-object, and also predicate it of the intelligibles, we predicate it more 
appropriately of the intelligibles....” 
15 
Quite the contrary, everyday things image Forms, are a trace of Forms, or are a Form's 
shadow.25 Things reflect the pattern of, and instantiate, their Form.26 Therefore, true 
knowledge and real reality consist not of individual things but in their Forms.27 
 Yet, Forms alone do not suffice for metaphysics or epistemology. For Neoplatonic 
interpreters of Plato, this would have been as if saying that all one needs in order to see 
an object is the object itself. Similar to the way that light provides the by which eyes can 
see objects, the Good provides “light” by which the intellect can apprehend Forms.28 The 
Good is the principle of intelligibility, the precondition by which anything is intelligible 
at all. In order to understand some being, the intellect must first answer “What is this 
being's way of being good?” that is, “What is this being's telos?”29 Asked yet another 
way, “How does that being form an intelligible whole or unity?”30 Once the intellect 
tackles this question, it will understand that particular being because then, through the 
Good, it will grasp that being's identity, without which that being could not be.31 As such, 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 30. 
26 Ibid., 33. See also Perl, Theophany, 117n5. 
27 Perl, Thinking Being, 28. J.N. Findlay, “The Logical Peculiarities of Neoplatonism,” ed. R. 
Baine Harris, in The Structure of Being (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), 1, calls this Plato's “Eidetic 
Turn” because particulars are demoted to instantiations (Ibid., 2), whose true causes consist 
in that which gives them intelligibility. 
28 See Plato, Republic, VI, 505a-509c. Perl, Theophany, 8. This light is the Divine Light—see Eric 
Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy in Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” Greek Orthodox 
Theological Review 39 (1994), 330. See also Plotinus, VI.7.16-17. 
29 Perl, Theophany, 35. 
30 Perl, Thinking Being, 55. Plotinus, VI.5.1, adds that, consequently, one does not seek the Good 
outside of oneself. Wholeness and unity, of course, are the telos of a being. 
31 Perl, Thinking Being, 56. Plotinus, VI.8.7.3-6: “...but the nature of the Good is the very goal of 
the striving and that through which the others have what is in their power, when one is able 
to attain it without hindrance and the other to have it.” Plotinus here does not use the Greek 
16 
a being’s goodness is what makes that being intelligible and thus, given the 
interchangeability of intelligibility and being, also make that being a being at all. In this 
way, so Neoplatonists concluded, the Good yokes together truth and being.32 
 Since Neoplatonic Forms constitute the whatness of beings, the content of 
knowledge, and the presentation of beings, Perl argues that philosophically this theory of 
Forms rejects the subject/object distinction.33 Forms equate thought with truth and 
reality.34 That is, the whatness of a thing bridges the “gap” between thought and reality 
(otherwise there would be nothing for thought to think35) because the whatness of a thing 
is simultaneously the content of thought.36 More accurately, the theory of Forms denies 
the very existence of such a “gap.” At last, the Neoplatonic theory of Forms answered the 
objection of imaginary creatures by maintaining that the “thinking” in “thinking is being” 
refers not to any whimsical thought on the part of humans but to Ideas or Forms.37 
 Instead of the subject/object distinction, the Neoplatonic theory of Forms led to an 
epistemology rooted in Plato's synousia: knowledge results from the ontological union of 
knower and known.38 Synousia indicated an erotic togetherness of thought and reality to 
such an extent that the intellect possesses Forms within itself, and Forms determine the 
                                                                                                                                                 
telos. 
32 Perl, Thinking Being, 57. 
33 Perl, Thinking Being, 47. See also Plotinus, V.3.5. 
34 Perl, Thinking Being, 25. 
35 Ibid., 26. 
36 Ibid., 25-6. 
37 “Idea” or “Forms” would also later be called (making their connection to thinking even 
clearer) “intelligibles.” See also Plotinus, III.5.7.49-56, on “false thoughts” and I.1.9 on 
“thinking falsities.” See also Dionysius, CH, IX.3, 260C-D. 
38 Perl, Thinking Being, 47. Dionysius, DN, VII.4, 872C-D. 
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content of the intellect.39 Simultaneously, the “knower” communes “outwardly” with the 
Forms, and the “known” communes “inwardly” with the intellect (forming the intellect's 
very content).40 “Knower” and “known,” intellect and Form, transparently interpenetrate 
one another: all that the intellect sees, experiences, and knows results from its 
apprehension of Forms. If anything, knowledge is not found in an “external” world but in 
the very interior of the intellect because “intellect” means the intellectual apprehension 
of, and therefore the possession of, Forms, which, as the true content of reality, are by 
definition inside the knower insofar as the knower has intellect.41 Beings cannot be 
“external” objects, for as Form, they are the content of intellect.42 For example, no thing 
qua thing could be known without the Idea of Identity (or Equality): to recognize a thing 
as what it is already requires knowledge of identity, and so all possible knowledge 
presupposes knowledge of the Idea of Identity.43 
 If being/knowledge constitute Forms, which are found in one's interior, then what 
of sense perception? Contrary to popular misconceptions of Neoplatonism, Forms do not 
add anything to the everyday world of the senses (or to reality more generally);44 rather, 
the content of what one finds in the everyday world of the senses precisely is the 
                                                 
39 Perl, Thinking Being, 54. 
40 Ibid., 47. 
41 Perl, Thinking Being, 51. 
42 Perl, Thinking Being, 52. 
43 Perl, Thinking Being, 49f, argues that this is the entire point of the Phaedo. 
44 Eric Perl, “'The Power of All Things:' the One as Pure Giving in Plotinus,” American Catholic 
Philosophical Quarterly LXXI 3 (1997), 301n1. Plotinus, I.2.8.7-9: “So we also possess the forms 
in two ways, in our soul, in a manner of speaking unfolded and separated, in Intellect all 
together.” 
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appearance of Forms. Sense objects (qua intelligible) image their Form.45 By imaging 
their Form, they participate in It and thereby have both whatness and presentation in 
reality. At the same time, Forms are different from sense objects because they do not 
reduce to any particular sense object, yet every sense object instantiates a Form (and thus 
Forms are both immanent and transcendent46). The senses make many what is really one 
(the Form)47 and so occupy the realm of opinion.48 Thus, for the Neoplatonists, the senses 
and the intellect grasp the same reality but in different modes: the senses in an inferior, 
multiple mode, and the intellect in a superior, unified mode.49  
  Since the senses and the intellect apprehend the same reality in different modes, 
Neoplatonism posits different levels of participation in being.50 The higher mode 
(intellect) apprehends more being because it apprehends Forms qua Form (that is, as 
                                                 
45 Perl, Thinking Being, 30, 36. Plotinus, I.1.7. 
46 Perl, Thinking Being, 30-1. 
47 Perl, Thinking Being, 28. See also Plotinus, VI.5.10. 
48 Perl, Thinking Being, 31n15. Perl, Thinking Being, 35-6, argues a better translation of “opinion” 
would be “seeming” or “appearance.” Plotinus, V.5.1, argues that the senses do not 
apprehend the thing itself but only images, and thus the senses only have opinion because 
what they receive differs from that which they receive. Plotinus concludes that if truth is not 
in Intellect, it is nowhere. In V.5.11, he goes so far as to say that if one only believes the 
senses, one disbelieves what is most real, for the Principle of Existence is what is most real. 
49 Perl, Thinking Being, 28. For Plotinus, VI.5.8, Form and matter cannot be opposed because 
then Form could not illuminate matter—instead, matter receives as much Form as it can 
while Form remains in itself the same. See also Plotinus, VI.7.7.30-32: “...so that these sense-
perceptions here are dim intellections, but the intellections there are clear sense-perceptions,” 
VI.7.11.3-5: “Does then the world there have everything that is here? Yes, everything that is 
made by forming principles and according to form,” and V.3.9.31-33: “...let him take sense-
perception which acquires the forms in broader extension and sense-perception by itself with 
its power which is already in the forms.” See also Dionysius, DN, VII.2, 868C, where he calls 
sense perception an “echo of wisdom.” 
50 Perl, Thinking Being, 35. 
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unity), while the lower mode (sense perception) apprehends less being because it 
apprehends each Form as a multiplicity. Participation in being directly relates to the 
intellect because the content of the intellect is reality—the more the intellect apprehends 
being, the more it is intellect. Therefore, participation in being at once means both greater 
apprehension of being and greater fullness of the intellect. Put another way, by grasping 
being (reality) in a higher mode, the intellect itself becomes more real. Again, the 
Neoplatonists would have rejected Descartes's subject/object distinction: “knower” and 
“known” mutually define each other.  
 The different levels of apprehending being enabled the Neoplatonists to explain 
how people can commit knowledge errors. Simply put, by mistaking the image of the 
Form for the Form itself, people fail to grasp reality correctly. Sense objects make a 
perfectly fine starting point for knowledge, but one must go beyond them to that which 
they point.51 
 Consequently, given that sense objects instantiate Forms, reality consists only of 
Forms—Neoplatonists denied the ultimate reality of the material world.52 As Perl argues, 
the real difference, for example, between a heap of wood and wooden chair, consists not 
in matter but in Form.53 Obviously, sensible things exist, but a “sensible thing” merely 
means “a thing as perceived by the senses.” Again, sense perception refers to a mode of 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 71. 
52 Ibid., 70. 
53 Perl, Thinking Being, 74. In context, Perl uses this example to explain Aristotle's matter-Form 
composite, where matter is seen as something positively real. That said, Perl interprets 
Aristotle as arguing that only in Form does true reality consist and matter without Form is 
nothing. 
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apprehending reality, the same reality whose content is Forms.54 According to Perl's 
Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato, sense objects exist in the Receptacle of Becoming.55 
In the Receptacle, sense objects really do display the Forms and thus provide 
knowledge.56 
Plotinus and Proclus 
 Plotinus inherited the works of Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, and synthesized 
them into what became Neoplatonism. Rather than simply accepting synousia, the 
communion of intellect and being, Plotinus argued for the identity of intellect, the act of 
intellect (intellection), and being: intellect qua intellect is indistinguishable from 
intellection (if intellect engages in an activity other than the act of intellect, that act by 
definition is not an act of the intellect qua intellect57),58 and, consequently, the intellect 
must in some way already possess all intelligible beings (because intellection is the 
apprehension of beings),59 and thus the intellect itself is precisely the beings that it 
thinks.60 
                                                 
54 Plotinus, II.7.2, for instance, classifies “corporeity” as a quality. This also is why John of 
Scythopolis, The Divine Names, trans. Paul Rorem and John C. Lamoreaux, in John of 
Scythopolis and the Dionysian Corpus: Annotating the Areopagite (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 272.1, argues that while sensible reflection requires matter, it is ontologically 
greater than matter because it participates in Form. 
55 Perl, Thinking Being, 70f. 
56 Ibid., 71. 
57 Ibid., 107. 
58 Plotinus, V.3.5.43-44. See also Proclus, The Elements of Theology [henceforth El Th], trans. E.R. 
Dodds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), Prop. 169, and Dionysius, DN, XI.2, 949D. 
59 Plotinus, III.4.6. Proclus, El Th, Props. 170, 194-5. 
60 See also Plotinus, V.9.8 and V.1.4. In Plotinus, VI.7.41, he explicitly applies Parmenides's 
“being is the same as thinking” to the Intellect, and shortly before this equates intellect, 
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 In other words, Plotinus advocated for an identity theory of knowledge: thought 
and reality are one because intellect is simply the apprehension of being, and being is 
simply what the intellect apprehends.61 Intellect and being occur with ontological 
simultaneity,62 and have one nature whose separation is an artifice of the human mind.63 
Intellect is the union of thought and reality, and knows being as its own content.64 Perl 
offers an analogy: just as the acts of seeing and being seen are one without reduction, so 
too for intellect and being.65 For example, any written word, such as the current text. On 
the one hand, one's mind goes “out” to the words and is present with them, which is the 
only way it could grasp their intelligibility (otherwise it would never know of them). On 
the other hand, the words are “in” one's mind as its content—as one reads, one's intellect 
becomes identical with that which one reads.66 Again, the subject/object distinction is 
                                                                                                                                                 
thinking, and the object of thought. 
61 Plotinus, VI.6.15.18-20: “How then is knowledge not in something else? It is because the 
knower, the known and the knowledge are the same and all together....” See Plotinus, III.8.6, 
and especially III.8.8, for the union of knower and known in contemplation such that the 
known is identical with the knower. Plotinus, V.8.10.32-40, suggests that this union is greatest 
in those in whom the beauty of the intelligible world has penetrated. See also Plotinus, VI.7.9. 
Plotinus, V.3.5.43-44, argues that Intellect, intellection, and the intelligible are all one. See also 
Proclus, El Th, Prop. 169, and Dionysius, DN, XI.2, 949D. 
62 Plotinus, VI.6.6, makes clear that he does not think that thinking somehow creates being, 
because then thought would be both posterior and prior to being, which is absurd. Instead, 
thinking grasps a being's essential nature, for in thought, a being is perceived without matter, 
and so the object of thought is the same as the thought itself. 
63 Plotinus, V.9.8. 
64 Proclus, El Th, Props. 167-168. Note that Intellect is an activity not a substance. Plotinus, 
IV.6.3.12-13: “...for it [the soul] knows them [the intelligibles] by being them in a way....” 
65 Perl, Thinking Being, 112. 
66 Plotinus, III.8.6.4-7: “For, again, when they reach what they want, the thing which they 
wished to exist, not so that they should not know it but so that they should know it and see it 
present in their soul, it is, obviously, an object set there for contemplation.” Plotinus, V.8.2.25-
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rejected—if one separates a knowing subject from the object known (i.e., if they are not 
identical), then, Plotinus argued, knowledge is impossible, for whatever a subject 
“knows” will not be reality.67 In its place, Plotinus reasoned that since each intellect truly 
has intelligible content—the Form68—“within” it, the intellect must possess the same 
nature as every Form (otherwise the Form would be alien), but this means that every 
intellect already has every Form (and so all reality) within it.69 Seen another way, as 
Proclus would later put it, every being is the entirety of being (because it possesses the 
entirety within itself) in its own distinct way.70 Therefore, Plotinus concluded that every 
soul is the entire intelligible universe.71  
 A modern epistemologist may read this Neoplatonic notion of the “union of 
thought and reality” and wonder about reference.72 That is, modern philosophers believe 
                                                                                                                                                 
27: “...we do not yet see a thing while it is outside us, but when it comes within, it influences 
us. But it comes in through the eyes as form alone: or how could it get through something so 
small?” Proclus, El Th, Prop. 174. 
67 Plotinus, V.3.5. 
68 By “Form,” Plotinus, II.5.2, means the actuality of a thing. In IV.1[2].1, he makes clear that 
Form can be divided and many while remaining whole and the same. 
69 Plotinus, VI.5.7. Plotinus, V.8.10, follows through on the implication that insofar as one 
penetrates the intelligible world, one is no mere spectator of beauty for the distinction 
between looker and looked upon ceases. Proclus, El Th, Prop. 177. In Prop. 176, Proclus draws 
the additional conclusion that since Forms exist in an undifferentiated unity in every intellect, 
the Forms themselves must therefore interpenetrate each other without confusion. 
70 Proclus, El Th, Prop. 170. 
71 Plotinus, III.4.6. See Plotinus, IV.4.2-3, V.1.2, V.7.1, and especially VI.5.7. Plotinus, IV.6.2.19-
22: “...sense objects are observed from outside, but the intelligibles in reverse come out, one 
can say, from within; and they are activities in a higher degree and more authentically: for the 
object belongs to the knowledge, and the knowledge in its active exercise is each of its 
objects.” See also Proclus, El Th, Props. 170, 194-5. 
72 See Robert Cummings Neville, The Truth of Broken Symbols (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 35ff, 
for an excellent treatment on reference in regards to truth and interpretation. 
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that there can be mental reference to a being without that reference being that being's 
Form. At this juncture, a key difference between modern and Neoplatonic epistemology 
has appeared: for the modern, all knowledge is what the Neoplatonists would have called 
“discursive reasoning,” meaning that it is knowledge that a mind thinks via a temporal 
sequence of thoughts; such knowledge certainly requires reference. But for the 
Neoplatonist, there was a higher mode of knowledge, that is eternal. As such, “reference” 
does not play a role in the atemporal union of intellect and being because there is no 
determinate or discrete sense in which a knower relates to the known, for the knower is 
the known. 
 Since intellect and being are two aspects of the same reality, they are already two, 
and so they presuppose otherness and unity, and thus cannot work as First Principles.73 
Indeed, given that “to be” is “to be intelligible,” a critical property of being emerges: 
finitude.74 To be intelligible is to be bounded, for if something were unbounded or 
infinite, no mind could grasp it, and hence it would not be intelligible.75 Seen in this way, 
“intelligibility” is interchangeable with “determinacy,” and is why a being cannot be 
partially intelligible and partially unintelligible (because it would thereby also be partially 
determinate and partially indeterminate, which is clearly a contradiction in terms—a 
contradiction that is less clear in the word “intelligible” due to the word's subjective 
connotations in English). By its nature, being, as interchangeable with intelligibility, is 
                                                 
73 Plotinus, V.1.4. 
74 Plotinus, V.1.7. However, as Proclus, El Th, Prop. 89, argues, Being is infinite in potency. 
75 Hence, Perl, Theophany, 12, argues that an “infinite being” is a contradiction in terms. 
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limited and finite, and therefore every being depends on unity.76 No being could be 
without possessing unity, meaning that unity enables a being to be what it is. This leads to 
another critical property of being: dependence. Since every being depends on unity in 
order for it to be, the First Principle must contain unity. A thing only has intelligibility 
and existence insofar as it has unity: as has been outlined, a thing's unity is its intelligible 
content and that which enables it to be at all.  
 Counterintuitively, the principle of unity simultaneously must be the principle of 
difference.77 To have unity, to be a thing, only makes sense in relation to other things 
with other unities. One cannot imagine the existence of several unities without also the 
existence of difference—if all the unities were one unity, then they would not be 
“several.” Since being is limited (and finite), there are many beings, and thus there is real 
difference in the world. Difference indicates the relationality of all beings,78 and implies 
much more than that difference follows as a mere byproduct of unity, but goes beyond 
that because beings preserve the unique identity of each other in their differences with 
each other.79 Again, the unity of any being becomes clear through the difference between 
it and another being; without difference, beings would be indistinguishable or 
unintelligible.  
                                                 
76 Plotinus, VI.9.1, V.1.4. See also Dionysius, DN, IX.4, and Proclus, El Th, Props. 47, 89-90, 100, 
115. 
77 Plotinus, V.1.4, VI.4.4, VI.7.13. Dionysius, DN, IX.5. 
78 Plotinus, VI.7.13, argues that it is impossible for beings to exist without the activity of 
Intellect, but Intellect cannot be an active actuality distinguishable from non-actuality without 
otherness, and therefore Intellect is both Sameness and Otherness. 
79 Dionysius, DN, IX.5, says that God as Other (or Difference) preserves beings in their identity. 
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 One of the core outcomes of classical Neoplatonism now emerges: if being is 
finite, then it is secondary, derivative, and dependent. But secondary, derivative, and 
dependent on what? More problematically, asking “on what?” is immediately the wrong 
question because any what, by definition, must be a being, and hence fails to address the 
problem.  
 The Neoplatonists found the answer in their reading of Plato:80 this “what” is 
what Plotinus called the One, the principle of both unity and difference.81 The One is 
neither numerically one nor the number one itself, but the measure of all number,82 and 
so the “measure of all things.”83 That is, the One measures all reality. Since the One 
births all beings, it itself is not a being, but must be beyond being (and therefore also 
beyond intellect and intelligibility), and yet all being must depend upon it.84 The One 
resolves the dilemma of answering the question “on what does being depend?”, given that 
its answer cannot be a being, for the One cannot be a being.85 Plotinus made this point 
                                                 
80 This “answer” is what Plato calls the Good. From a Neoplatonic perspective, Neoplatonists 
are not reading this metaphysically sophisticated notion of the Good into Plato, but Plato had 
already foreshadowed it. 
81 And thus the One is the principle of Being—see Plotinus, VI.6.9. See also VI.7.13, for the way 
in which Plotinus calls Intellect both Unity and Difference. Eric Perl, “Neither One Nor Many: 
God and the Gods in Plotinus, Proclus, and Aquinas,” Dionysius XXVIII Dec. 2010, 170, and 
“'The Power of All Things:' the One as Pure Giving in Plotinus,” 301, ultimately interprets 
Plotinus as seeing the One as the final principle of Unity and Difference. 
82 Plotinus, V.5.4. See also Dionysius, DN, 588B. 
83 Plotinus, VI.8.18.2-3. See also Dionysius, DN, V.8, 824A, V.10, 825B, XIII.2, 977C-980A, and 
Proclus, El Th, Props. 12-3, 92. Proclus, El Th, Prop. 117: for the gods/henads are measures that 
measure by bringing unity and limit to their manifolds, hence making them determinate. 
84 See, for example, Plotinus, V.5.6 and I.7.1. See also VI.7.38 for why the Good does not need 
the “is.” 
85 See Plotinus, V.3.11.23-24: “It must not be one of the things before which it is....” See 
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clear: “This phrase 'beyond being' does not mean that it [the One] is a particular thing—
for it makes no positive statement about it—and it does not say its name, but all it implies 
is that it is 'not this'.”86 
 As the principle of unity/difference, the One grounds the boundaries of all beings: 
their unity, finitude, existence, intelligibility, and consequently also their difference from 
all other beings. As Plotinus put it, the One is the “productive power of all things.”87 As 
the power of all instantiation, the One is eminently actual and real.88 From the One, all 
things flow, although this imagery walks on dangerous territory by treating the One as a 
thing. That is, it appears to say that from this thing called “the One” all other things flow, 
but to say this defeats the entire point of the Neoplatonists' argument. More accurately, 
the One is Overflow Itself, the principle of production, the generator of being, which are 
all different ways of saying that the One “produces all things.”89  
 Many mistake this to mean that the One must produce by some higher law of 
necessity.90 Or, equally problematic, that the One thinks in an anthropomorphic manner, 
considering various possibilities and then choosing one.91 Positing a law of necessity 
                                                                                                                                                 
Dionysius, DN, V.4, VII.3, 869C, XI.6, 953C. 
86 Plotinus, V.5.6.11-14. 
87 Plotinus, III.8.10. V.4.2. V.1.7. Plotinus also says, in V.2.1.1-2, the One “is the principle [archē] 
of all things.” 
88 Findlay, 7. 
89 Plotinus, V.2.1. This of course means that the One is all things yet none of them, but more on 
that in the section on theophany. 
90 Plotinus, VI.8.10.32-35, explains that the One is not bound by necessity but “...is itself the 
necessity and law of the others.” 
91 Plotinus, III.9.7, 9, says that the One is beyond thinking. See also V.6.2 for why thinking 
implies a thinker and thought and therefore is already two. In Plotinus, IV.4.36, the All Soul 
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above the One ruins the explanation because now this law requires accounting for, and if 
the One is beyond being and this law is above the One, what could such a law possibly 
be? Treating the One anthropomorphically renders the One into a being, and so 
undermines the Neoplatonists' entire point.  
 The solution to this dilemma has two parts. First, metaphysically, one must 
identify the One with the Principle of Production Itself. The One does not produce 
because of some other force or because It ponders about Itself in some anthropomorphic 
way, but because that is what It is.92 Asking why the One produces would be as if asking 
what compels motion itself to move. Motion is movement, so the “dilemma” makes no 
sense. At the same time, the One “must” produce because being the Principle of 
Production makes little sense apart from products produced.93 Perhaps tautologically, the 
One produces because this is its “nature.”94 Of course, even this is inadequate language, 
for it presupposes that the One is subject to a principle higher than itself—that beings act 
according to their nature—whereas the One is the author of that principle as well. For this 
                                                                                                                                                 
also is older than choice. Plotinus, VI.7.1, argues that reality seems planned but this is only 
because it is one and is unfolded. This unfolding creates the illusion of planning, but 
planning requires choice, and there is no choice when there is only one. 
92 Proclus, El Th, Props. 26-7, 174. Plotinus, VI.8.8-9, makes clear that the Good is before 
natures/substances, happenstance, and necessity, but is defined by Its uniqueness. Plotinus, 
VI.8.9.45-48: “...but you will affirm that it is none of these, but, if anything at all, that it is all 
power. Really master of itself, being what it wills to be, or rather throwing 'what it wills to be' 
away to the beings, and being itself greater than all willing, setting willing after itself.” 
93 Findlay, 7. 
94 And if God's nature is Love, God reveals Himself. See Dionysius, DN, IV.13, 712A-B and 
IV.14, 712C. In other words, for Dionysius, God creates because God is Love. See also EH, I.3, 
373C, where the reason for being is Goodness. 
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reason, Neoplatonists called the One pure “Giving” and “Love.”95 In any case, one 
cannot ask “Why?” of the One, for “Why?” requires an appeal to another principle, but 
there is no higher principle than the One Who is the universal principle.96 
 The second part to the solution directly concerns the person asking the question.97 
Since the One is unintelligible, it is by definition impossible to think how or by what 
mechanism It creates. Every possible mechanism treats the One as determinate, and, 
equally problematic, subjects It to a higher principle or force (i.e., that mechanism). The 
classical Neoplatonists found the core answer in themselves ascending to the One, which 
requires transcending discursive reason, because discursive reason treats the One as a 
thing; they called this ascent “contemplation.” In contemplation, as Perl notes, reason 
does not deny itself but fully realizes itself98 by uniting with that which is beyond all 
intelligibility. Contrary to popular belief, the apophaticism of the Neoplatonists was not 
an empty silence, but a full silence informed by the ineffable personal experience of, and 
encounter with, the One.99 A more direct method reduces the One to the realm of beings, 
effectively denying Its transcendence. Much to the dismay of modern philosophy, the 
                                                 
95 E.g., the previous note, and Perl, “'The Power of All Things:' the One as Pure Giving in 
Plotinus.” See also what Plotinus, VI.7.14.19-20, says concerning the Intellect: “But the 
division which is in Intellect is not of things confused, though of things existing in unity, but 
this is what is called the love in the All....” Plotinus, VI.7.41 and VI.9.6, makes clear that the 
Good is good only for others—it is not even good for itself as if it needed itself. See also 
Dionysius, DN, IV.10, 708B, EH, I.3, 373C. 
96 Plotinus, VI.8.11. 
97 Indeed, Plotinus, V.1.6.9-12, says the first thing that one should do is pray to God. 
98 Perl, Theophany, 119n19. 
99 Plotinus, VI.7.34. See also John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 413.3, and Gregory Palamas, 
The Triads, trans. Nicholas Gendle, ed. John Meyendorff (Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 
1983), I.iii.4, 18-19, 22-3. 
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Neoplatonists' full answer to the question “Why is there something rather than nothing?” 
demanded putting theology into practice.100 
 In Plotinus, Plato's notion of the Good as beyond being reached new levels of 
sophistication, and the same occurred for Plato's theory of Forms. As far as the 
Neoplatonists were concerned, Plato explained all of reality directly and only with Forms. 
For instance, the whiteness of a swan would be a part of the very Form of that swan, 
implying that the swan's color plays a central role in determining what a swan is. Clearly, 
while swans must have color, that color need not be white. Furthermore, Plato failed to 
provide sufficient detail as to how exactly Forms are instantiated.101 Why does reality 
contain swans as well as the Form of Swan rather than just the latter? 
                                                 
100 Plotinus, VI.7.36.7-10: “We are taught about it [the knowledge or touching of the Good] by 
comparisons and negations and knowledge of the things which come from it and certain 
methods of ascent by degrees, but we are put on the way to it by purifications and virtues 
and adornings and by gaining footholds in the intelligible and settling ourselves firmly there 
and feasting on its contents,” VI.9.4.1-4: “The perplexity arises especially because our 
awareness of that One is not by way of reasoned knowledge or of intellectual perception, as 
with other intelligible things, but by way of a presence superior to knowledge,” and 
V.3.17.21-29: “The soul runs over all truths, and all the same shuns the truths we know if 
someone tries to express them in words and discursive thought; for discursive thought, in 
order to express anything in words, has to consider one thing after another: this is the method 
of description; but how can one describe the absolutely simple? But it is enough if the intellect 
comes into contact with it; but when it has done so, while the contact lasts, it is absolutely 
impossible, nor has it time to speak; but it is afterward that it is able to reason about it.” Perl, 
Thinking Being, 1, notes that this question was not directly asked in antiquity, although he 
believes it was indirectly answered by Plato. Plotinus, VI.9.3.11-15: “But when the soul wants 
to see by itself, seeing only by being with it and being one by being one with it, it does not 
think it yet has what it seeks, because it is not different from what is being thought. But all the 
same this is what one must do if one is going to philosophise about the One.” See also 
Dionysius, DN, 585B-588A, III.1, 680D, and VII.3, 872A. 
101 In fact, the Parmenides, under certain interpretations, leads scholars to believe Plato was not 
that attached to his theory of Forms. 
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 Plotinus addressed both of these problems (how qualities relate to Forms and how 
Forms are instantiated). For Plotinus, the “qualities” of a thing (e.g., the whiteness of a 
swan), that is, that which a thing has but does not determine that thing's essence, are the 
activities of that thing's Form. A swan's color comes not directly from its Form but from 
the activity of its Form. This distinction allows the same “quality” to be essential for 
some beings (and hence of their Form) and inessential for others (hence the activity of 
their Form). Precisely because the same “quality” can be essential for some beings and 
inessential for others, Plotinus denied the existence of qualities altogether because he 
found the phenomenon of “qualities” better explained by the activities of a Form. The 
denial of qualities further denies the subject/object distinction: one cannot conceive 
reality as subjects that have certain qualities because there are no qualities to be had!102  
 In order to answer the problem of how Forms are instantiated, Plotinus 
synthesized Plato and Aristotle. Interpreting Plato, he denied the existence of material 
reality,103 and incorporating Aristotle, he affirmed that beings are matter-Form 
                                                 
102 Plotinus, II.6. See also VI.1.10-12. Plotinus would allow for qualities for the purposes of logic, 
but for Plotinus, I.3.2, logic deals with language, dialectic with reality (in IV.4.5 he explicitly 
says logic does not apply to the intelligible realm). See also Armstrong's commentary, 158-
9n2. 
103 E.g., Plotinus, I.2.2, mentions this practically in passing. To be clear, Plotinus does not reject 
sense perception or posit a mind/body dualism, but in fact in IV.5.1 asserts that knowledge 
comes from sense organs because only these provide the bridge by which the soul can have 
“a sort of communion of knowledge” with sense objects. However, in V.9.7, he argues that 
sense objects are mere opinion, not genuine knowledge, because they are posterior to their 
object. For Proclus, El Th, Prop. 195, souls are all things because they pre-embrace all sense 
objects as their cause, and souls are images of intelligibles. In other words, here also there is 
no mind/body dualism but a continuum. 
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composites.104 At first this seems impossible: how can anything be a matter-Form 
composite if there is no material reality? Plotinus answered by saying that matter is the 
privation of Form (and therefore is pure privation).105 For example, in any given swan, 
the Form Swan really is present, but present in a less rich way compared to the purity of 
the Form Swan. The senses can grasp this lesser way, but only the intellect can grasp the 
purer way. Plotinus defined matter in opposition to Form: whereas Form provides the 
intelligibility of things, matter is inherently unintelligible (because in order to have 
intelligibility, matter must have Form).  
 Plotinus undoubtedly extended the thought of Plato in a constructive way, but he 
left several problems inadequately solved. Perhaps the most obvious of which is “How 
can the One be called 'Love,' 'Overflow,' or 'Production' when all of these are determinate 
descriptors?” That is, any talk of the One reduces the One down into the realm of being, 
yet, in order for the One to have relevancy for beings, there must be some connection or 
some way to name how the One interacts with being.106 In answer to this problem, 
Proclus turned the dyadic relationship between the One and beings into a triadic 
                                                 
104 Plotinus, II.4.6, II.5.2. 
105 Plotinus, II.4.13, 16. In other words, as Plotinus, II.4.10.30-32, explains, matter is “...that which 
reason leaves over, this is what it thinks, a dim thing dimly and a dark thing darkly, and it 
thinks it without thinking.” Plotinus, VI.7.28.1-5: “For if everywhere what comes as a good is 
form, and one single form is the good for matter, would matter wish, if it had the power of 
wishing, to become only form? But if so, it will wish to perish;....” More accurately, Plotinus, 
II.4, distinguishes between two kinds of matter: intelligible and material. The former is not 
relevant for the current discussion. 
106 Plotinus, VI.8.19.20, even goes so far as to say, “He does not then even make being in 
accordance with his being.” Plotinus recognizes the need to preserve the divine 
transcendence, but in the previous chapter his circle analogy fails to do the work of 
preserving both God's radical transcendence and radical immanence. 
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relationship between the Unparticipated (the One), participants (beings), and the 
Participated.107 The Participated is that in and by which participants participate in the 
One. As E. R. Dodds suggests, the Participated is the One qua immanent (thus beings can 
directly participate in It) while the Unparticipated is the One qua transcendent.108 Of 
course, since the One is indeterminate and unintelligible, the Participated cannot and do 
not reveal the One's “essence” (because there is literally nothing to reveal). The 
Participated enable participants to partake of the One while preserving the One's radical 
transcendence.109 
 Proclus seemed merely to replace one problem with another. Offering the 
Participated as a solution appears only to make the contradiction explicit rather than 
resolving it. How can the Participated possibly both be the means of participation in the 
One and also maintain the One's ineffability? A fully developed answer to this question 
would not occur until Gregory Palamas.110 Palamas solved the problem by making the 
Divine Activities111 (what Proclus would have called “the Participated”) the very 
                                                 
107 Proclus, El Th, Props. 22-4. See also Dionysius, DN, XI.6, 956A-B, XII.4, 972B. 
108 E.R. Dodds, Commentary to The Elements of Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992), 211. 
109 Dionysius, DN, XII.4, 972B. Perl, “Neither One Nor Many: God and the Gods in Plotinus, 
Proclus, and Aquinas,” 179f. 
110 Stephen Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena: An Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of 
the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1978), 167n84, notes that there 
was no true Essence/Activities distinction until the 14th century. However, as seen, this 
distinction was foreshadowed by thinkers such as Proclus and Dionysius. 
111 According to Gersh, 213, “energia” has two main aspects: act (end of a process) and the 
process itself (actualization). 
33 
ontological act of creation.112 As the act of creation, the Divine Activities are themselves 
Uncreated by definition: they do not result from the act of creation but are the creating. 
At the same time, the Divine Activities have intelligibility and determinacy: they are how 
the unintelligible, indeterminate God (what Palamas called the Divine “Essence”) is made 
manifest in creation.113 Consequently, God rightly can be called “Love,” not as a 
predicate of God's Essence (which is beyond all predication) but as an Activity of God. 
To say that God is Overflow means that “Overflow” is how God is expressed in creation 
at the ontological (not temporal) act of creation. The Divine Activities are traces, 
shadows, or images of the Divine Essence but never disclose the Essence (again, because 
the Essence is not a thing, and therefore cannot be disclosed).114 Apart from creation, 
there would be no Divine Activities (because it makes no sense to have an act of creation 
without a creation). The Activities truly express (but do not reveal) God, but in a way 
specific or relative to the creation—in other words, not in a way that expresses God's 
Essence in its purity, for such an expression is impossible. 
Theophany 
 With the above Neoplatonic background in mind, Dionysius's theology can begin 
to make some sense. Dionysius relied on pagan Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and 
                                                 
112 See Eric Perl, “St. Gregory Palamas and the Metaphysics of Creation,” Dionysius, Vol. XIV, 
Dec. 1990, pp.105-130. 
113 In fact, John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 205.2, says that theologians do not dare to 
praise God's Essence because “this” is unknowable. Instead, he continues, they praise God for 
His Providence, that is, the existence and subsistence of reality. 
114 Dionysius, DN, IX.6, 916A. 
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Proclus115 but also Christian ones such as Gregory of Nyssa.116 He offered a synthesis of 
both philosophies, which, although the word only gains importance in the works of 
Eriugena centuries later,117 is best described as “theophany.”118 
God 
 Dionysius fully agreed with the Neoplatonic tradition that God is beyond (and 
before119) being.120 God transcends being as its Source: all being flows from God. 
Following Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius also emphasized the Divine Darkness, the fact 
that God transcends being as well as nonbeing, knowledge as well as unknowing.121 
Again, true theology is the experience of God in contemplation (the only path that goes 
beyond knowing and unknowing), which then grounds all experience and all knowledge. 
                                                 
115 John of Scythopolis, Prologue, 17D, comments that in Dionysius “...the bastard teachings of the 
Greek philosophers have been restored to the truth.” At the same time, in his commentary on 
The Celestial Hierarchy, 113.10, John says that saints are not embarrassed to use their Greek 
titles (e.g., Dionysius the Areopagite). 
116 Gersh, 1, 10, argues that Dionysius goes beyond both Gregory of Nyssa and Proclus. 
117 Perl, Theophany, 122n24. 
118 Although, as seen in Dionysius, CH, IV.3, 180C, Dionysius himself does not use the term that 
way. 
119 Dionysius, DN, V.5, 820A. John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 316.4, comments: “(Being is 
like a certain reflection of a cause which subsisted beforehand.) Now then, God is called both 
pre-existent and existent, and this, in so far as he is the cause of all and in so far as all things 
are from him.” 
120 Dionysius, DN, VII.3. A. Hilary Armstrong, “Plotinus and Christianity,” in Platonism in Late 
Antiquity, 119, argues that unlike Plotinus, Christians thought of God as the Supreme Being. 
However, he does not state who exactly he has in mind, and, as will be seen shortly, such an 
interpretation makes zero sense of the Dionysian tradition. Furthermore, Karl Praechter, 
“Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca,” in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient 
Commentators and Their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 
35, notes that in the third century, there was no clear boundary between pagan and Christian 
schools of thought. 
121 Dionysius, DN, VII.3. See John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 216.10. 
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Such a claim seems like mystical nonsense, but in fact results from Dionysius's doctrine 
of creation as theophany.122 
 “Theophany” describes the God-world relation: as Perl eloquently puts it, God is 
the enfolding of creation while creation is the unfolding of God.123 That is, as the 
“enfolding” of creation, God is the reality of all creation in pure concentration,124 as the 
complete comprehension and anticipation of being (and knowledge125),126 or as an 
undifferentiated unity.127 Since the unity is without differentiation, God remains beyond 
being, indeterminate, and Difference Itself, and hence is transcendent.128 God as the 
Creator has “content,” in a sense, but this content is completely unintelligible because it 
has no limit or being—it is the fullness of all reality and, as such, is paradoxically 
                                                 
122 Gersh, 283, credits “theophany” as a distinctly Christian doctrine. Perl would likely disagree. 
123 Perl, Theophany, 25. See also Perl, Thinking Being, 124-8. See Plotinus, VI.6.9, where he 
describes Being as unified number and beings as its unfolding, and III.2.17. See also 
Dionysius, EH, III.1, 424C-D. 
124 Dionysius, DN, I.7, 596D-597A. And thus God can be named by beings. See also Plotinus, 
V.3.16.14-16. 
125 Dionysius, DN, VII.2, 869A. 
126 Dionysius, DN, V.4, 817C, XIII.2, 980A, XIII.3, 980B. See also V.5, 820A. Even this language is 
inadequate because in V.5, 820B, God prepossesses even Preexistence. 
127 Dionysius, DN, II.11, 649C, V.7, 821B, V.9, 825A, V.10, 825B, XI.2, 952A, XIII.2, 980A, XIII.3, 
980B. See also his examples of all numbers preexisting and unified in a unit and all lines 
unified in the center of circle at V.6, 820D-821A and V.6, 821A respectively. See also Plotinus, 
VI.2.9.10. Plotinus, V.3.15.28-32: “But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because 
as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them exist? Yes, and because it 
brought them into existence. But how did it do so? By possessing them beforehand. But it has 
been said that in this way it will be a multiplicity. But it had them in such a way a not to be 
distinct: they are distinguished on the second level [Intellect], in the rational form.” Note that 
this quote is from one of Plotinus's later treatises, meaning that Perl is almost certainly correct 
in making the One the principle of Unity/Difference rather than the Intellect. 
128 Dionysius, DN, V.8, 824A and V.10, 825B. Perl, “'The Power of All Things:' the One as Pure 
Giving in Plotinus,” 308, adds that thus what distinguishes each being from each other is also 
that which distinguishes it from God. 
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indistinguishable from nothing.129 No common term without qualification applies to God 
and any being (and so Perl points out that the idea of a “Supreme Being” is a 
contradiction in terms).130 As for creation being the “unfolding” of God, creation is God 
made determinate. The content or whatness of creation is God.131 God, Who is beyond 
being, is revealed in creation as the being of all things.132 In other words, creation renders 
God multiple, intelligible, and “existing” (God transcends being so one cannot properly 
say God “exists”133).134  
 Further, every creature expresses the undifferentiated reality of God in a 
differentiated way, according to its mode of being.135 Put simply, a creature reveals God 
                                                 
129 Dionysius, DN, V.4, 817D. See John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 204.4. The reason why 
God is not nothing is because of the Aristotelian distinction between difference and diversity: 
difference is a difference by some thing whereas diversity is sheer difference that is not 
different by any determinate thing. More on God as nothingness in chapter four. 
130 Perl, Thinking Being, 117-8. Eric Perl, “Signifying Nothing: Being as Sign in Neoplatonism and 
Derrida,” in Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern, volume 11, ed. R. Baine Harris 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2001), 133. 
131 Dionysius, DN, 589B. Hence, 596B, where the wise can name God with many Names from 
every created thing. See also V.7, 821B and V.8, 824B. 
132 Dionysius, DN, 593D, II.11, 649B, V.1, 816B, V.4, V.9, 825A, VIII.6, 893D, and CH IV.1, 177D, 
XIII.4, 304C. Gersh, 276n75, adds that this is why for the Cappadocians and Maximus the 
Confessor a being can only be known by its accidents: its substance is the unknowable Divine 
Immanence. Plotinus, V.5.5, argues that since all beings come after the First, they have the 
Form of the First in them, and thus are traces of the One. Plotinus, VI.8.13.22-24: “...it is by 
this Good that its [an individual's] substance is defined by and by this that it belongs to 
itself.” See also Plotinus, VI.2.3 and Proclus, El Th, Props. 98, 131. 
133 Dionysius, DN, II.8, 645D, V.4, 817D. 
134 Dionysius, DN, II.11, 649B, IX.5, 913B. See Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A 
Theological Aesthetics, Volume II, tr. Andrew Louth et alia (San Francisco and New York: 
Ignatius Press, 1984), 158. 
135 Dionysius, DN, 588C-D, V.5, 820B-C. See also Plotinus VI.4.11, where he argues that even 
though the Intelligible is present everywhere as a whole, beings do not participate in the 
Intelligible as a whole but according to their capacity of reception. See also Proclus, El Th, 
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in an intelligible manner.136 Creatures multiply God according to the various modes of 
participation, and so the difference between creatures occurs ontologically.137 Creation 
derives its whatness from God and therefore God has immanence because He is every 
being. God is everywhere present and fills all things (with His own being).138 God is (and 
becomes139) the “all in all” or “all things in all things”.140 Yet, no one being in creation is 
God, and for this reason God is transcendent:141 God is also the nothing in none.142 
Putting the pieces together, God is transcendent because God is immanent.143 God is no 
where in creation (no created thing is God) and also everywhere (every created thing 
manifests God).144 Thus, while no being is God, God is not other than all being;145 that is 
Who He is.146 Perl goes so far as to say that God is nothing but the manifestation and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Props. 72, 125, 142, 145, 173. 
136 Dionysius, DN, 1.3, V.5, 820A, V.6, 820D, and II.11, 649B where the Divine made determinate 
shows God. 
137 Dionysius, DN, II.11, 649B. Gersh, 271. 
138 Dionysius, DN, V.9, 825A, Epistle IX.3, 1109C. Plotinus, III.9.4. Proclus, El Th, Prop. 131. 
139 Dionysius, DN, IX.5, 912D, Epistle IX.3, 1109C. 
140 Dionysius, DN, I.7, 596C, VII.3, 872A. 
141 Dionysius, DN, I.6, 593C, 596C. 
142 Dionysius, DN, VII.3, 872A, Epistle IX.3, 1109C. 
143 See Dionysius, DN, VII.1, 865C. See Dionysius, DN, IX.7, 916A, for how God is both 
similar/like and dissimilar/unlike beings. 
144 See Dionysius, DN, V.8, 824B, MT, 1.2, 1000B, Epistle IX.3, 1109C. See also Plotinus, III.8.9, 
V.5.9, 10, VI.8.16, 21. 
145 Dionysius, DN, V.4. Plotinus, VI.7.32.13-14, has a similar position: “Therefore it is none of 
these things and all of them: none of them because the real beings are later, but all of them 
because they come from it.” See also Plotinus, VI.9.8.34-37: “That One, therefore, since it has 
no otherness is always present, and we are present to it when we have no otherness and the 
One does not desire us, so as to be around us, but we desire it, so that we are around it.” 
146 Dionysius, DN, IV.13, 712A-B, further specifies that God's coming out and revealing Himself 
is due to Eros and Goodness. Plotinus, III.9.4. See also Plotinus, V.5.9.11-13: “But in 
encompassing [beings] [the One] is not dispersed into them and it possesses them without 
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contents of beings147—creation is not the appearance of some thing (for God is not a 
thing) but is simply God Himself made intelligible.148 
 Employing terms more specific to Dionysius, God contains the paradigms (logoi) 
of all beings in unity.149 A paradigm for Dionysius is similar to a Form: it is a determining 
principle by which beings come to be.150 Consequently, God as Logos is the by which all 
beings are because each being has a paradigm or logos.151 Conversely, one knows God in 
every being's logos.152 Again, God is everywhere present and fills all things (“all in all”) 
because God's presence by definition makes a being be what it is because what a being is 
is God-in-it.153 God is the very being of beings and yet none of them (and so is beyond 
being).154 
 To be clear, God is not some sort of cosmic container that holds all beings and 
                                                                                                                                                 
being possessed. But certainly, if it possesses and is not itself possessed, there is nothing in 
which it is not...” 
147 Perl, Theophany, 33. See Dionysius, DN, V.2, 816C. 
148 Similarly, creation is God made differentiated. God in Himself, as opposed to as manifest, is 
Unintelligible and Undifferentiated. 
149 Dionysius, DN, V.8, 824C. John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 353.3, comments that since 
as Logos, God has all logoi and paradigms (which are the causes of all beings), they are not 
different from God, and God extends through and encompasses all beings. 
150 Dionysius, DN, V.8, 824C. For Proclus, Platonic Theology, 231, a paradigm is Being understood 
as monad and triad. See also Gersh, 99. 
151 For a masterful treatment of logoi, see Maximus the Confessor, Ambigua, Volume I, trans. 
Nicholas Constas (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), Ambiguum 7.15-25. 
152 Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy in Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” 316. 
153 Or, as Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy in Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” 315-6, 
puts it “God-for-it.” Again, see Dionysius, DN, 593D, II.11, 649B, V.1, 816B, V.4, V.9, 825A, 
VIII.6, 893D, and CH IV.1, 177D, XIII.4, 304C. See also John of Scythopolis, The Celestial 
Hierarchy, 52.7. 
154 Dionysius, DN, 872A. Again see I.6, 596C, and V.4. 
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then divvies them out in creation.155 Neither does God create by negation.156 It is not as if 
God “takes away” most of Himself, leaving a determinate creature. There are several 
problems with this. First, whence the negations? If God is pure plenum, where could 
negations derive from? Second, where would the finite “slices” of God be or go? God 
“takes away” from Himself and then where exactly does He put this removed piece? 
There is literally nowhere else for God is all and everywhere. 
 The main fault with these misinterpretations lies in their treating God as a 
determinate entity. Only determinate entities can have something taken from (or added to 
for that matter). Each thing is not like a puzzle piece from which God is the whole puzzle 
because a puzzle is certainly not an undifferentiated unity. A puzzle is perfectly 
determinate, as it is distinct from the table it rests on, the room it is in, the person who put 
it together, etc. Furthermore, the unity of a puzzle is easily differentiated: just consider 
the borders of each puzzle piece. To manifest God is not to take away from God or to be a 
determinate “slice” or “piece” of God, but simply to be God as determinate or 
intelligible. Again, creatures are not God qua transcendent because no creature is the 
enfolding of all reality, but creatures are God qua immanent because every creature's 
being is God. God is the sole source of whatness. The slice and puzzle piece analogies 
deny God's transcendence, and consequently also deny His immanence; for if God is not 
                                                 
155 Dionysius, DN, II.11, 649C. John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 209.1 and 232.3, calls this 
view “absurd.” Perl, “'The Power of All Things:' the One as Pure Giving in Plotinus,” 311, 
adds that the One is different from “all beings.” See also Plotinus, III.8.9, V.5.12, 13, and in 
III.8.8.46-49, he makes clear that even the Intellect is “...not something made out of pieces put 
together.” See also Proclus, El Th, Props. 27, 126. 
156 For an explicit argument against this, see Maximus the Confessor,  Ambiguum 7. 
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indeterminate, unintelligible, undifferentiated, etc., then God is determinate, and therefore 
cannot be truly immanent.  
 At the same time, God's transcendence prevents theophany from devolving into 
pantheism. The doctrine of theophany differs from pantheism because while both agree 
that beings are not something in addition to God,157 theophany does not stop there but 
goes one step further and argues that in order for there to be any being whatsoever, beings 
must be grounded in that which is beyond being, that which holds all beings and all 
reality together without distinction. Pantheism affirms God's immanence in the same way 
theophany does but denies God's transcendence.158 For the pantheist, God simply is the 
creation. The pantheist faces at least two problems. First, the entire point of having a 
doctrine of God is defeated. The point, it may be recalled, was to explain the dependence 
of beings. The answer for explaining the dependence of beings demands that which 
transcends all being, and thus by denying transcendence, one returns to the original 
problem. Secondly, as a finite expression of the infinite, unintelligible, unbounded reality 
of God, each created thing has whatness or existence only in reference to God. To deny 
God's transcendence leaves one without explanation for the whatness of beings. In short, 
unlike pantheism, theophany affirms God's utter transcendence, a transcendence of such 
magnitude that God “is” literally beyond being. 
 Theophany also bars theology and philosophy from devolving into the 
                                                 
157 Perl, Theophany, 34. 
158 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 
[1957]), 7. 
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theism/atheism debate. Both the theist and the atheist agree that God is a being, but 
disagree as to whether that being exists.159 The doctrine of God drastically changed from 
theophany to modern theism in Western Europe, beginning with the work of John Duns 
Scotus.160 Lamentably, the theist and the atheist commit the same error by ignoring 
practically the entire Western theological (and for that matter philosophical) tradition, 
essentially reverting the discussion back to the Presocratic period when the philosophers 
of Milan debated whether the gods controlled the weather in the 5th century BC (they 
concluded that the gods did not).161 Against the theist, the God who is a being is subject 
to the structures of being and thus is not transcendent, and against the atheist, God “not 
existing” is a critical premise for God in the Western theological tradition and so in no 
way functions as an argument against it.162 
 By rejecting both pantheism and the notion of God as the Supreme Being, 
Neoplatonic thought came dangerously close to a serious dilemma: what is the difference 
between the indeterminate One and the determinate many? As seen, the difference cannot 
be by negation, but then the difference would seem to have to be by something positive, 
and therefore something determinate, and therefore an absurdity is reached where there is 
the indeterminate One, the determinate many, and a determine “third thing” whereby the 
One is differentiated from the many. The answer involves Aristotle's distinction between 
                                                 
159 Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy in Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” 348n153, notes 
that once all agree that God is a being, even the Supreme Being, secularism is inevitable. 
160 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, second edition (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2008 [2006]), 305f, for an excellent summary. 
161 Lindberg, 29. 
162 Again, see Dionysius, DN, V.4. 
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difference and otherness: “For the other and that which it is other than need not be other 
in some definite respect (for everything that exists is either other or the same), but that 
which is different from anything is different in some respect, so that there must be 
something identical whereby they differ.”163 Put simply, “difference” means distinction 
whereby two beings are distinct in some determinate respect, whereas “otherness” is 
distinction without some determinate respect. The dilemma of a “third thing” presupposes 
that all distinction must be difference, but the distinction between the undifferentiated, 
enfolded One and the differentiated, unfolded many is a distinction of otherness, for there 
is no third determinate entity which distinguishes them. 
Symbols and Hierarchy 
 Theophany, then, defines creatures as the content or revealing of God—revealing, 
in a differentiated manner, and so God qua transcendent is never and can never be 
revealed. As Perl puts it, every being is a being only insofar as it is a symbol of God,164 
and as such, one can move from every and any being to God.165 
 Consequently, all knowledge is knowledge of and union with God.166 Knowledge 
concerns understanding reality and all reality merely manifests God. Every thing, every 
being, has being and is some thing because it expresses God. The content of reality, and 
therefore the content of knowledge, begins and ends with God. To know a thing is to 
                                                 
163 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W.D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volume II 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), X.3, 1054b1. Emphases added. 
164 Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy in Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” 320. See 
Dionysius, CH, I.3, 121C, Epistle IX.1, 1105A.  
165 Dionysius, DN, V.7, 821B. 
166 Dionysius, DN, VII.1, 865C-868A, VII.3, 872A-B. See also Perl, Theophany, 93f. 
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know what that thing is, and because all whatness comes from God, as the content of 
God, to know a thing is to know God-in-it.167 After knowing God-in-a-thing, nothing 
remains to be known about that thing for that is all any thing ever is. Furthermore, since 
knowledge is the union of knower and known, and because there is no distinction 
between thought and being, knowledge would be union with God, except that this 
paradoxically requires the inactivity of knowledge.168 Every being, no matter how high or 
low, is a symbol of God, and so in affirmative theology (descent), a knower gathers as 
many symbols (beings) as is proper to that knower's mode of being, and then in negative 
theology (ascent) is unified (more unification means higher ascent), thereby unifying all 
that was gathered, and thus is united to God.169 In other words, greater union with God 
means greater knowledge, but a knowledge above knowledge. 
 However, due to the transcendence of God, no thing, not even the collection of 
every single thing, can directly reveal God. God's transcendence means that the closest 
literal phrase one can say of God is that God is “undifferentiated unity,” and no 
differentiated thing can be undifferentiated unity by definition. This explains why 
creatures act as symbols rather than literal knowledge of God and why the knower must 
become a unity.170 No creature, as differentiated, as a being, as intelligible, etc., can 
                                                 
167 Plotinus, VI.9.7.1-2, 3-4: “But if because it is none of these things you become indefinite in 
your thought of it, stand fast on these and contemplate it from these;.... For it does not lie 
somewhere leaving the other things empty of it....” 
168 Dionysius, MT, I.3, 1000D, III, 1033C. 
169 Dionysius, MT, III, 1033C. As Plotinus, V.6.6, points out, there is something greater than 
knowledge of God: abiding in Him. See also Plotinus, VI.9.10-11. 
170 Dionysius, CH, I.3, 121C-D. 
44 
possibly reveal God qua God. That said, since every creature is God made manifest, it 
does reveal God in some way. Again, God is not other than creatures but creatures are 
other than God.  
 As symbols of God, each creature reveals God only by simultaneously concealing 
God: the sensible hides the intelligible and being hides the beyond being.171 For a 
creature to reveal without concealment would mean for that creature to exist as an 
undifferentiated unity, but then that creature would cease to be by definition. For 
creatures to exist and persist as creatures, that is, for creatures to have real identity and 
integrity, they can only reveal God by concealing God and conceal God by revealing 
God. As the content of God, every creature reveals God. Yet, however much it reveals, it 
conceals infinitely more because it conceals (1) all of the reality that is not it, and (2) all 
of reality as unity without distinction. To stop learning after seeing one creature is to miss 
the (undifferentiated) forest for the trees. On the other hand, every creature conceals by 
revealing. Each creature conceals God by being a creature, that is, by not being 
indeterminate, undifferentiated, unintelligible, etc., but it is not any of these 
characteristics precisely because it is determinate, differentiated, and intelligible—that is, 
precisely because it is a being. In this way, creatures conceal God only by revealing 
God.172 Paradoxically, full concealment would be a full revealment and vice-versa (if 
                                                 
171 Dionysius, DN, 592B, V.5, 820A, VII.3, 869D, XIII.3, 981A, CH, I.2, 121B-C. As von Balthasar, 
173, puts it, “All is a sacred veil....” 
172 Dionysius, CH, X.1, 272D. Hence, in Dionysius, CH, IX.2, 260A, the middle angelic hierarchy 
leads those below it more clearly than those above it, but this clarity comes at the cost of more 
hiddenness, and how the angels are more manifest to us yet are more worldly. 
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such were possible). 
 “Concealment as revealment” and “revealment as concealment” poses an 
interesting problem, for how can one attain knowledge of God?173 This problem has 
special poignancy since all knowledge ultimately is knowledge of God (although a 
knowledge beyond knowledge), and so asking how one can attain knowledge of God is 
the same as asking how one can attain knowledge. As suggested already, Dionysius 
answered this problem with the ascent of the soul or contemplation. Since God comprises 
the whatness of reality, beings too have something in Him within themselves and thus a 
likeness of Him; there is nowhere where He is not.174 During this ascent, symbols, 
whether sensible or intelligible, must both be fully penetrated and transcended, that is, the 
soul must fully get into them yet also move beyond them.175 
 Every soul is an intelligible universe, and so any soul can act as the center of the 
universe for the purposes of unification (as Perl provocatively puts it, the center is 
everywhere and nowhere).176 In contemplation, the soul unifies all of reality (which is 
already within itself): the more it unifies, the more it imitates God because the more it 
becomes an enfolding of reality.177 The unification of the soul means the unification of all 
reality which is the same as unifying with God, Who Is undifferentiated reality.178 Union 
                                                 
173 Dionysius, DN, VII.3. But again, see Plotinus, V.6.6. 
174 Dionysius, DN, VII.3, 869D. Plotinus, III.8.9. 
175 Dionysius, VII.3, 872A. Von Balthasar, 169. As such, von Balthasar notes that apophaticism 
and kataphaticism are complementary in Dionysius. 
176 Eric Perl, “Signifying Nothing: Being as Sign in Neoplatonism and Derrida,” 137. 
177 See John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 193.5. 
178 Dionysius, EH, III.1, 424C-D. 
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of the self is union with God.179 At its peak, through symbols, the soul can attain an 
undifferentiated unity so similar to God's that it can become one with God (theosis for 
Christians, henosis for pagans).180 In this moment of contemplation, the soul becomes as 
like God as metaphysically possible, achieving a positive “knowledge” of God (and thus 
of all reality). This “knowledge” of God is knowledge that transcends knowing and 
unknowing because it transcends the very limits of being and, as such, is better than mere 
knowledge because it is true union with God.181  
 Taken out of context, this epistemology seems like “mystical” foolishness, but, 
taken as an implication of the unity of intellect and being, whose common Source is the 
God beyond and before being, this epistemology cannot be casually dismissed without 
first tackling its metaphysical underpinning directly.182 In fact, as von Balthasar points 
out, “mystical” experience here is simply the realization of what is real, and hence, in this 
                                                 
179 Dionysius, EH, III.1, 424C-D. Plotinus, V.6.5, argues that insofar as a being thinks the Good, it 
thinks itself because it thinks itself in actual activity and all actual activity is directed towards 
the Good. Already, God as final cause is implied (more on that below). Plotinus, VI.9.10.9-12: 
“When therefore the seer sees himself, then when he sees, he will see himself as like this 
[greater than, before, and above reason], or rather he will be in union with himself as like this 
and will be aware of himself as like this since he has become single and simple.” See also 
chapter 11.8-9: “He was one himself, with no distinction in himself either in relation to 
himself or to other things....” and 38-43:“But if it [the soul] runs the opposite way [away from 
evil and non-being], it will arrive, not at something else but at itself, and in this way since it is 
not in something else it will not be in nothing, but in itself; but when it is in itself alone and 
not in being, it is in that; for one becomes, not substance, by 'beyond substance' by this 
converse.” 
180 Dionysius, MT, III, 1033C. 
181 Dionysius, MT, I.3, 1000D, III, 1033C. Plotinus V.6.6.33-36: “...for [God] gives them something 
better and greater than that they should know him—he is the Good of the others—he gives 
them rather to be it the same place with him and to lay hold on him, as far as they are able.” 
See also John of Scythopolis, The Epistles, 528.2. 
182 Analyzing these metaphysical underpinnings is a task for chapter four. 
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sense, is mundane.183 If God is beyond being and the source of all being, then union with 
God means transcending the realm of being (and intellect) and becoming absolute 
unity.184 As von Balthasar puts it, “...everything is essentially holy and therefore 
essentially secret[;] it can only be misunderstood, fundamentally and necessarily, by the 
profane, the uninitiated, and greeted by them 'with roars of laughter.'“185  
 Given that all beings are symbols of God and that a being moves towards greater 
godlikeness in unifying reality, different beings have different degrees of unity and thus 
exist in a hierarchy.186 According to Neoplatonism, being is a dynamic activity with an 
infinite number of degrees.187 Importantly, God as transcendent is not at the top of the 
hierarchy but grounds the entire hierarchy because the entire hierarchy reflects and 
expresses God.188 At the same time, God as immanent fills the entire hierarchy at every 
level: the hierarchy is a hierarchy of beings and beings are nothing but God made 
manifest. God is present in the highest angelic orders as well as in the lowest worms.189 
In this way, God is directly present to every being at every level of the hierarchy in a 
mode appropriate to that being.190 Put more directly, creatures participate in God insofar 
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as they occupy their appropriate position in the hierarchy191 because each being is what it 
is (i.e., has being—manifests God) and has its own particular perfection by fulfilling its 
place in the hierarchy.192 For Dionysius, this meant that the same exact perfection (God) 
works throughout the hierarchy in accordance with beings at each different level of the 
hierarchy, rendering the lower levels, far from devoid of God, merely less intense 
versions of the higher levels.193 In this way, whatever the lower levels produce are, in 
fact, more truly produced by the higher levels.194 (Perl notes that since all knowledge is 
knowledge of God and since greater unity means more content and therefore more 
knowledge, a being's place in the hierarchy also indicates its degree of knowledge.195) 
 Greater unity means greater participation in God,196 a higher or more intense 
mode of being,197 and thus more existence.198 For example, an angel participates in God 
to a greater degree than a worm because it unifies reality to a greater degree: it has 
intellect, life, and being. A worm, on the other hand, lacks intellect, and only has life and 
                                                 
191 Dionysius, DN, VIII.5, 892C, CH, III.2, 165A, IV.2, 180A. 
192 Dionysius, CH, III.2, 165A-B. See also Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy in Saint 
Dionysios the Areopagite,” 346. 
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“The lower orders participate in the gifts of God by way of those orders which are higher and 
nearer to God. It is like a bowl which 'overflows' and gushes forth.” Emphasis added. See also 
Proclus, El Th, Props. 18, 56, 150. 
195 Perl, Theophany, 74. 
196 Von Balthasar, 193. See also Plotinus, VI.2.11 and V.3.15.16f, Dionysius, DN, 589D-592A, CH, 
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being. A rock, also a manifestation of God, has only being.199 All beings in the hierarchy 
have some degree of unification, otherwise they would cease to be beings. Life unifies 
being to a greater degree than, say, a rock (Perl provides a clear illustration of this: if one 
splits a rock in two, one gets two rocks, but if one splits an organism in two, something is 
lost200), and intellect unifies life to a greater degree than, say, a worm (intellect enables 
life to act for high level, abstract purposes, and so bring life into contact and unity with 
Forms). Just as a computer can function as a paperweight but a paperweight cannot 
function as a computer, intellects can be seen as beings and more, but not just any being 
(like a rock) cannot work as an intellect.201  
 The fact that higher modes of being include lower ones in a more perfect manner 
(and conversely lower modes do not utterly lack the higher but possess them in a less 
perfect way) is called the “principle of inclusion.”202 Consequently, while God is beyond 
intellect, He is certainly not less than intellect; in fact, intellect, by virtue of its strong 
unity, is a more accurate reflection of God than an impersonal object.203 One must not 
forget that any revealing of God also conceals; yet, after acknowledging the inadequacy 
of any given symbol, it remains true that intellects and living things manifest more of 
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God than non-intellectual, non-living things. Since God is undifferentiated unity, the 
more a being is like undifferentiated unity, the more it is like God. For those who worry 
that Neoplatonism renders God impersonal,204 nothing further could be from the truth: 
God is more personal than you are.205 
 Another misunderstanding occurs when scholars interpret Dionysius's hierarchy 
as creating intermediaries between God and creature. Hierarchy cannot possibly place 
barriers between a creature and God because the hierarchy expresses God (to different 
degrees).206 That is, each being in the hierarchy is God as immanent, and so it makes no 
                                                 
204 See A. Hilary Armstrong, “Plotinus and Christianity,” in Platonism in Late Antiquity, 122, for 
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sense to say that God as immanent poses a barrier between God and a creature. God qua 
transcendent is indeterminate and so cannot be expressed in the hierarchy, while nothing 
but God as immanent is expressed in the hierarchy.207  
 Additionally, as already implied, every creature imitates God by unifying reality 
with itself only by including all other creatures (symbols) in its own unification. As such, 
hierarchy denotes not a hierarchy of isolated beings, but a hierarchy of intrinsically 
related beings—hierarchy is inherently relational.208 Each being moves towards God 
insofar as it brings all other beings with it in its movement towards God. Just as God is 
Named Love, so too all creatures act in a loving way towards all other creatures so that 
these other creatures, too, can move towards God. Far from being individualistic, 
hierarchy suggests a communion of all reality with itself for the purpose of reaching God, 
Who Is this reality as the purest possible communion: undifferentiated unity. 
 Finally, hierarchy reveals that the very being of a being consists in imitating 
God,209 and thus knowing God and making God known.210 As a symbol of God, the only 
content of a being is God, and so a being is a being by virtue of the fact that it makes God 
known. At the same time, due to the relationality of the hierarchy, beings come to be not 
in isolation but through each other;211 and since beings are symbols of God, as one being 
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influences another, it does so as knowledge of God. In other words, everything a being 
encounters in reality is a symbol of God, and therefore knowledge of God, and insofar as 
reality affects the very being of a being, that being is affected and made what it is by its 
knowing God. 
Evil and the Nature of Reality (The Divine Names) 
 But if every creature expresses God, then if a creature abuses another, does this 
not mean that God Himself abuses that creature? Should not God be called Evil, 
Falsehood, and Ugliness as well as Good, Truth, and Beauty? Indeed, since God is 
indeterminate, God would have to be both Good and Evil, otherwise, if God were one 
thing rather than another, God would be determinate and the entire Neoplatonic solution 
to the problem of being would collapse. 
 Fortunately, the Neoplatonic tradition rejected this problem because it argues that 
evil is not real. Evil does not exist.212 In fact, evil partakes of neither being nor nonbeing, 
for even nonbeing exists in the Good, and therefore evil “is” not even nonbeing but 
absolutely nothing (and not in the way the Good is nothing).213 As such, anything that 
exists has some share in the Good.214 Rather, evil merely connotes a lack of existence and 
a privation of Good.215 In contrast to some of his predecessors (e.g., Proclus), Dionysius 
applied evil as the privation of Good to the entirety of reality (not just to, for instance, the 
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human soul).216 Evil is parasitic on the Good just as a hole is parasitic on a wall.217 A hole 
has no positive reality but simply indicates the lack of reality in something (in this case, a 
wall). If the hole ever fully overtakes the wall, not only does the wall cease to exist, the 
hole does as well (it makes no sense to find an empty space and assert that there is a wall 
that is all hole there).218 Without something to be a hole in, holes could not exist, and 
hence their “existence” is not existence in a positive sense, but a lack of existence in 
some other thing. 
 Evil as privation can be seen in three ways. First, any evil presupposes being in 
the sense of taking away of some good.219 Murder, theft, or any form of destruction are 
quite clear examples of Goodness being taken away. Similarly, evil can take something 
that exists for a good purpose (e.g., reproductive organs, by which more beings are made) 
and corrupt it (e.g., rape). If there was no Goodness, there could be no evil because there 
would be nothing to corrupt or destroy. Secondly, any evil presupposes Goodness in the 
sense of needing Goodness to commit evil.220 For example, a murder needs a healthy 
(good) body and a properly functioning (good) weapon. Again, no Goodness means no 
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evil. Any evil act must be committed by some good being and therefore requires 
Goodness. A being without any Goodness would not be able to act at all, and in fact 
would not exist at all because Goodness and Being are interchangeable. Recall that 
intelligibility and being are also interchangeable. Well, what makes a being intelligible? 
Its Goodness! When answering what a being is, one really answers by saying what it is 
good for or what good it is. A being's Goodness is that by which it is intelligible and thus 
a being at all (nothing could exist without intelligibility). On the other side, Goodness is 
the measure of being.221 For instance, what makes a farmer a farmer? The ability to farm. 
The Goodness of farming defines the very being of a farmer. In this way, Goodness is 
Being qua Being, or Being at its purest. Since evil requires Goodness and Being, just as 
there cannot be all hole and no wall, so too evil has no independent, positive existence of 
its own. Third and finally, evil has good, albeit distorted good, as its end.222 For example, 
lust, while evil, faintly echoes the goodness of unity and friendship.223 Likewise, anger, 
again evil, faintly echoes the goodness of justice.224 Even murder, in the murderer's mind, 
participates in some way in the Good, whether by justice, love, self-survival, etc. In sum, 
evil is not a part of reality but does no more than connote a lack, destruction, or 
corruption of reality.225 
 At first, this seems merely to shift the problem from “Why is there evil in the 
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world?” to “Why is there a privation of Goodness/Being in the world?” As before, the 
answer lies in the interchangeability between Goodness, Being, and intelligibility. As Perl 
points out, since Goodness is that by which being is intelligible, any intelligible answer to 
the question “Why privation?” presupposes Goodness.226 In other words, insofar as one 
answers this question, one leans on Goodness and Being, the very opposite of evil. 
Explanation requires intelligibility, but intelligibility belongs to Goodness and Being and 
not to evil.227 Put another way, any answer to the question “Why a privation of 
intelligibility?” must itself be intelligible, and so be self-defeating.228 More positively 
phrased, evil is unjustifiable. There is literally no reason for evil. Its “basis” comes not 
from Being, Goodness, or Intellect, but from a lack these. Evil should not occur, and 
insofar as one can think of reasons why it does occur, it is in fact not evil by definition. In 
other words, evil has no rational cause.229 This answer does not dodge the question but 
works out the implications of evil as privation: as privation, it does not participate in the 
Good, and any rationalization creates the illusion that it does. At most, one could say that 
evil occurs when beings fail to engage in their proper mode of being, that is, refuse to 
engage in activities appropriate to their rank in the hierarchy.230 
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 In other words, beings have autonomy. They do not simply manifest God as 
controlled robots or as a painting manifests a painter's vision, but actively can choose to 
participate or not to participate in and with God. Perl goes so far as to say that God 
fundamentally cannot create beings without their cooperation because every being has an 
interior unity by which it is, that is, that gives it its own determinacy and without which it 
could not be (because being depends on unity).231 God's transcendence (is not any being) 
preserves the creation's autonomy.232 God's immanence does not override creaturely 
autonomy because of God's transcendence. In the Christian Neoplatonic tradition, this 
cooperation of creature and God is called synergia, and a being's reversion, whereby it 
moves in accordance with its proper activities, is the same as God's own activity within 
that being, and is known as God's Providence,233 which therefore is also the hierarchy.234 
 Not surprisingly, then, God is not called evil.235 Dionysius affirmed the triadic 
relationship between God and creation. Rather than calling the determinate modes in 
which God is present in the creation “the Participated” or “Divine Activities,” Dionysius 
called them “Divine Names.”236 In other words, the Divine Names are the activities (or 
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Providences) by which God is present in and to beings,237 and bear the Name that they do 
because the Name indicates what appears through God (e.g., Life, Intellect, Being, 
etc.).238 On the one hand, the Names express God's activities (or Providences) in the 
world; on the other hand, the Names do not express God qua beyond being.239 Through 
participation in the Divine Names, creatures participate in God—not God qua beyond 
being but God qua determinate.240 While every creature directly manifests the enfolded 
God, it does so by manifesting the Divine Names.241 For instance, creatures manifest God 
insofar as they partake of the Beautiful. The Beautiful, by its nature, is determinate yet as 
a Divine Name also is Divine.242  
 Goodness and not evil, is a Name of God because the Names of God display God 
as manifesting in reality;243 evil has no reality, and therefore evil is not a Name of God 
(or anything at all). By contrast, since reality is intelligible and has being, Wisdom,244 
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Being, and Goodness are Names of God. To the degree that a creature participates in 
God's Goodness, Wisdom, Being, etc., it will not be doing evil because evil is exactly the 
opposite of these. Hence, creatures in the hierarchy who resist love and commit evil acts 
move away from God (and Being) rather than express Him. 
 Importantly, the Divine Names refer to God as nameable, that is, as immanent. 
God as transcendent and indeterminate transcends Goodness, Being, Intellect, etc. Insofar 
as Goodness, Being, Intellect, etc. are determinate, God as transcendent is beyond them, 
yet as immanent, these Names name God as immanent because these name the nature of 
reality (which is the manifestation of God).  
 In short, God is Good and is not evil or determinate for two reasons. First, God 
transcends Goodness, preserving God's indeterminacy. Second, evil is not real, and so 
cannot be a Name of God for the Names of God express modes of reality, but evil has no 
reality and so cannot be a Name (in fact, evil, as a privation of the Good and of reality, is 
directly opposed to God).  
Formal Causation 
 With the philosophical background and theology of Dionysius briefly expounded, 
the importance of formal causation for Dionysius can be explained. “Formal causation” is 
an Aristotelian expression referring to what Aristotle describes as the “form or pattern, 
i.e. the formula [logos] of the essence and the classes which include this… and the parts 
of the formula.” Aristotle defined what would be termed “efficient causation” as “that 
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from which the change or the freedom from change first begins.”245 In other words, 
formal causation concerns the general, intelligible shape something has—it asks, “Why 
this rather than that?”246 By contrast, efficient causation explains how a thing acquired 
that shape. Aristotle illustrated the difference with the example of a statue. The formal 
cause of a statue is whatever the statue is supposed to resemble (e.g., a person, animal, 
event, etc.), whereas the efficient cause of a statue is the artist who chisels it. Aristotle 
completes his system of four causes with final and material causation. Final causation 
describes the end (telos) to which a being is directed or finds completion. In other words, 
final causation asks “What for?” or “What is the good of the being?”247 Final causation is 
not about anthropomorphizing the universe, giving rocks and such human-like 
intentionality. Rather, final causation says even rocks act, that is, they act by being a rock, 
which is their end. Lastly, material causation states the material a being is made of; 
returning to the statue example, this would be whatever the statue is made of, be it rock, 
ivory, metal, etc. 
 The Neoplatonists interpreted Aristotle's notion of causation as based on his 
notion of potency.248 Unlike Aristotle, the pagan Neoplatonists applied Aristotelian 
causation beyond physics to theology and metaphysics, and they synthesized it with their 
                                                 
245 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V.2. 
246 Perl, Thinking Being, 78. 
247 Ibid., 79. Perl argues that formal and final cause are one, and ultimately, Ibid., 81, argues that 
final (and efficient) causation reduce to formal causation. 
248 Gersh, 28. 
60 
doctrine of emanation.249 “Emanation” describes an “automatic” kind of causation where 
the effect automatically follows from the cause, such as fragrance from perfume or heat 
from fire.250 Continuing with the analogy, even though the source (e.g., perfume, fire) 
remains unchanged, its effect (fragrance, heat) has less potency than its source; in other 
words, causation moves from strength to weakness.251 Seen from the perspective of the 
effect, an effect receives its potency from its cause and this potency reduces to the 
activity of its cause.252 In contrast to the pagan penchant for the emanation metaphor, 
Christian Neoplatonists preferred the mixture metaphor, which emphasizes the cause's 
ontological priority over its effects.253 For Christians, the metaphor of mixture showed 
the reciprocity between cause and effect.254 They preferred to think of creation as a 
deliberate act.255 
 By the time of John of Scythopolis, Aristotle's four types of causation received 
different definitions.256 According to him, “formal causation” describes that in relation to 
which beings are generated, referring either to an Idea or to an eternal Paradigm. “Final 
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causation” can mean (1) that for the sake of which beings are perfected, (2) that which is 
inseparable from its effect, or (3) something immanent from which beings are generated 
(e.g., matter), that is, final cause qua source. “Efficient cause” simply refers to any cause 
that is separable from its effect. Finally, John said little about “material cause,” likely 
because he thought that matter is nonbeing and thus devoid of true being.257 
First among Aristotle's Causes 
 For Dionysius, as for most philosophers, not all four of Aristotle's causes are 
equal. An ancient philosopher typically prioritized the four causes based on how well 
they describe the fundamental nature of reality. That is, causes that are epiphenomenal or, 
worse yet, assert something of reality that is not really there, rightly take a back seat to 
causes that reveal the heart of reality. Dionysius's Neoplatonic conception of reality has 
been described above, but before turning to how he prioritized the Aristotelian causes, 
first his understanding of causation itself must be made clear. 
 For Dionysius, beings exist in a hierarchy where the “higher” principles (those 
closer to God) function as the cause of the beings “beneath” them.258 The Form of every 
being pre-exists in its cause,259 which bestows its characteristics upon its effects (the 
Forms),260 which in turn produce beings as its own effects.261 As Perl succinctly puts it, a 
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cause is the determination while an effect is the determined.262 Put another way, causation 
reduces to Neoplatonic participation: that which is participated in is the cause and that 
which participates is the effect. Following Plotinus and Proclus, Dionysius would have 
agreed that a cause always appears in its effect as an effect is a likeness or image of its 
cause.263 One can easily see this in the case of formal causation: the effect simply 
instantiates its Form in a limited way, meaning that its whatness and what it displays in 
reality is its Form. Form as cause provides intelligibility and being to its effects, not in a 
clockwork-style way in which the cause merely begins a series of effects and then 
disappears, but in an ever-present way, as the very existence and whatness of its effects 
(past, present, and future).264 To borrow another phrase from Perl, an effect is the 
differentiated presence or unfolding of its cause, whereas cause is the undifferentiated 
containment or enfolding of effects.265 Or, as Gersh puts it, effects develop what is 
indistinctly unified in their cause.266 Consequently, a cause exists everywhere its effects 
exist (because a cause fills its effects with its own potency) and thus is transcendent 
relative to its effects, and yet a cause exists nowhere because the unique characteristic of 
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its effects pre-exist in it in unity,267 and thus it is immanent in its effects.268 Contrary to 
contemporary notions of cause-effect relations, cause for the Neoplatonists did not 
precede its effects temporally, first existing independently of its effects and only 
afterward producing them, but rather ontologically: cause means communicating its 
unified contents via derivation into a manifold or series of effects.269 Cause is the 
production of its effects (possessing whatever the effects have in a superior mode),270 and 
causes its effects by its mere existence.271 Perl goes so far as to say that Neoplatonism 
denies the difference between a cause and its causing.272 
 Furthermore, Dionysius followed two Neoplatonic principles about the nature of 
causation: (1) like comes from like, and (2) cause and effect have dynamic relations with 
each other.273 “Like comes from like” means that an effect will be like its cause.274 For 
example, in reproduction, the offspring (effect) is like its cause (its parents). This applies 
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even to less obvious instances. A painter makes a painting, yet clearly the painter is not a 
painting. In this case, the principle applies because the painter takes the image or form 
from his or her mind and then instantiates it in some artistic medium. The “like” in his 
instance is the Form: the painting is like what the painter envisioned. Effects, then, 
imitate their cause. 
 This leads to the second Neoplatonic principle of causation: effects and their 
cause persist in dynamic relations, which can be summarized in three moments: 
remaining, procession, and reversion (effect remains in its cause in all three of these275). 
To return to the painting example, the cause (the image the painter had when painting) 
remains in the effect. That is, the painting evinces similarity and likeness to its cause.276 
For Christians, remaining implied both the unity of cause and effect, and the immutability 
of cause.277 At the same time, the painting proceeds from its cause because it differs from 
it.278 Obviously a painting and the image relied on to paint that painting are not the same 
thing. Effects are distinct from causes and this distinction is called “procession.” As the 
cause is made differentiated, effects differ from their cause and from each other. While 
“remaining” emphasizes the likeness between cause and effect given their 
undifferentiated/differentiated relationship, “procession” points to that same 
relationship,279 only emphasizing the differences between the undifferentiated and the 
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differentiated (as Perl notes, one could say “effects proceed from their cause” and “cause 
proceeds to its effects” with equal validity280). For Christians, procession described the 
ascent of beings to their Cause, for although procession implies the effect moving away 
from its cause, it also means that the cause moves to and through its effects.281 
Importantly, that which proceeds from its cause has less potency than its cause.282 Finally, 
“reversion” perceives this same exact relationship in yet a third way. In reversion, effects 
return to their cause as their proper mode of being.283 Cause grounds what its effect ought 
to be, and so by reverting to their cause, effects become what they truly and fully are. 
Again in the painting example, a painting is truly what it is insofar as it reverts to that 
image it is a painting of—the more it does so, the better a painting is. Beings that merely 
exist, revert simply by existing, organisms by living, minds through consciousness of 
causes (cognition), and in general every being reverts by performing its proper 
activities,284 i.e, activities conducive to its well-being.285 Put simply, a being's most basic 
function is nothing more than to be, and what “to be” means varies given the hierarchy of 
beings. Cause acts as the telos and Goodness of its effects, towards which its effects ever 
strive.  
 With these two Neoplatonic principles of causation in mind, one can see why 
Dionysius, and the Neoplatonists in general, ranked formal causation first among the four 
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causes. Formal causation explains how a cause gives Form or whatness to its effect.286 As 
Perl defines it, formal causation describes how a being receives the determinate features 
that it has, making it the being that it is distinct from all other beings.287 For this reason, 
“like causes like” via remaining because the same Form in the cause transfers to the 
effect, and in doing so, the effect remains in its cause (it displays its cause in its own 
particular way).288 Transferring whatness hardly necessitates cloning or merely recreating 
the cause, because effects proceed from their cause and so have their own independence. 
Lastly, since Form defines the true nature of beings, every effect reverts to its cause 
because it wants more fully to participate in its Form and so be what it is. Only formal 
causation adequately accounts for all of these factors. Final causation only explains 
reversion,289 while efficient and material causation only explain the “like causes like” 
principle, leaving effects isolated from their cause.290  
 Michael Wagner wonders how exactly formal causation provides the whatness of 
beings. He answers that just as God is the measure of all reality, so too Forms (Being) are 
the measures of their respective beings.291 In other words, Forms provide the ordering 
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principles by which any content is possible at all.292 Perl would add that Forms provide 
whatness by providing the structure by which there can be any whatness and therefore by 
which any being can have intelligible identity.293 To the degree that a being matches its 
structure (participates in it), that being is real (otherwise it would quite literally be 
nothing). Forms produce beings, then, simply by producing what is already implicit 
within the Forms themselves (similar to the of working out what is implicit in a 
geometrical theorem294).295 The entire Form is present in what it produces,296 even 
though what it produces (beings) have a limited mode of reception and expression.297 In 
other words, as Plotinus put it, being and cause are the same thing: “And in general the 
harmony of all the parts with each other is their reciprocal cause; and the reason why this 
part is, is that this is [Form]; so that the being and the cause are one and the same.”298  
 Ultimately, asking “how?” is the wrong question because the Neoplatonists 
argued that “what?” is the fundamental question to ask of reality. Since God is Love and 
reality is a theophany, the nature of reality is to produce—this simply characterizes reality 
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at its most basic ontological level. Again, to be is to be as cause, and to be a cause 
requires being. Furthermore, any “how?” presupposes a “what?” Take Wagner's 
geometrical theorem metaphor. The problem with this metaphor is that it does not explain 
where the agency of working out the geometrical theorem comes from. A “what” is 
missing. Better to say that the theorems implicit in a more general theorem have reality 
because of that general theorem. In other words, the general theorem already makes real 
the more specific theorems by nothing other than its very being. As Dionysius argued, the 
Good is like the sun: it enlightens simply by its being not by any sort of agency.299 So too 
for the Forms that spring forth from It. To put a “how?” before the “what?” already 
assumes a mechanical worldview—a worldview which may be correct, but its correctness 
should be shown through argument not assumption.300 
 Key to this argument that formal causation reigns supreme among the causes, 
formal causation provides the basis for all the other types of causation. As seen in 
reversion, what a being is determines its telos. Different beings have different ends by 
virtue of being different beings. Additionally, teloi do not exist somehow independently, 
but beings have teloi. Of course, telos provides the determination of a being, which 
means any being qua being also depends on a telos for existence. Formal causation 
provides a way out of this infinite loop of dependency: while being depends on telos and 
telos on being, both ultimately depend on Form for Form gives the whatness of being and 
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thus also its telos via reversion.301 Seen from another perspective, final causation cannot 
ground formal causation because it presupposes rather than provides whatness. 
 Formal causation also provides the basis for efficient causation. In order for a 
being to bring about change, it must first be. In other words, it must have whatness. Perl 
points out that a being's very whatness determines exactly what kind of changes it can 
and cannot bring about, and so the whatness (Form), as the principle of a being's activity, 
is the true mover.302 For instance, all of the changes a person can bring about versus those 
a planet can bring about, differ simply because a person and a planet are different beings 
with different whatnesses participating in different Forms. Form determines all the acts a 
being can take, thereby completely covering the realm of efficient causation. Seen from 
the other side, efficient causation cannot ground or account for formal causation because 
it already presupposes whatness in two ways: the being doing the changing and the being 
that undergoes change. Merely describing the mechanical interaction of “being x alters 
being y through mechanism z” can only go on for so long before one must ask what 
exactly are being x, being y, and mechanism z, for all three are beings and possess 
whatness. To end the infinite regress of how x changes into y, one must eventually posit a 
“what” that defines x and y. Efficient causation is like a mathematical function in that it 
describes how certain inputs map onto certain outputs; for this function to have any sort 
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of coherence, there must be a what that maps on to the same kind of what; mapping 
presupposes a matching of similar kinds of things, which implies whatness (additionally, 
in order for a function to terminate, there must be actual inputs in order to have actual 
outputs—there must be determinate things and hence whatness). 
 As for material causation, Dionysius barely considered this type of causation real 
at all. Remember that Form not matter provides the whatness of beings. Going back to 
Aristotle's statue example, from a Neoplatonic perspective one would not say that the 
statue's material cause was, say, bronze (assuming it is a bronze statue), but that bronze is 
part of the statue's Form because “bronze” has intelligibility.303 Where a thing is 
intelligible it is Form because Form is its being, that is, is its intelligibility. Any “matter,” 
then, insofar as it is intelligible, is not actually matter but Form.304 This is why Plotinus 
could dismiss the Epicureans with a one-line argument: any proposed basis of reality 
must be intelligible (otherwise it would not be proposable), and by being intelligible it is 
ordered in some way, and by being ordered it has an ordering principle, and therefore 
depends on Form.305 Since the Neoplatonists, unlike the Gnostics, did not want to assert a 
dualism with matter, they simply deny that matter has any true reality.306 A Neoplatonist 
could still value Aristotle's material causation, and his hypothesis that particular entities 
consisted of Form and matter, by showing that Aristotle himself suggests that Form by 
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itself has more reality than a Form-matter composite.307 Such Neoplatonists, in denying 
the reality of matter, did not necessarily abandon Aristotle or cherrypick his four causes, 
but read him as a Platonist (an interpretation that is certainly defensible308). Insofar as 
material causation gives a positive explanation, it reduces to formal causation, and where 
it does not reduce to formal causation, it refers to a lack of Form, that is, a lack of reality. 
 Importantly, like Plato, Dionysius did not hold the senses in low regard.309 Far 
from it. While the senses do not detect material reality (because there is no material 
reality) they do genuinely detect Forms (which is true reality). This is why Dionysius 
could say that the intelligible is hidden in the sensible.310 The senses perceive reality, but 
as a multiplicity, and so in a less real way than the mind perceives reality (for the mind 
perceives the unity of beings and can directly see their Forms). A denial of material 
causation should not be misconstrued as a denial of the reliability of the senses or the 
value of sense-data. As with Plato, the grounding of reality in Forms provides a way by 
which the senses can indeed have contact with reality; given that the world of the senses 
is ever-changing and that truth is never-changing,311 the senses would be completely 
devoid of and divorced from truth if not for Forms. 
 Technically, what is called “formal causation” here Neoplatonists would have 
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310 Dionysius, DN, I.4, 592B. Plotinus, VI.5.10, agrees. Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy 
in Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” 327, lauds Dionysius on this point as one of the few 
during this time period who affirm knowledge of God via sense-perception. 
311 As before, the validity of these assumptions will be considered in chapter four. 
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instead called “paradigmatic causation.” Paradigmatic causation refers to the real cause in 
the effect, while formal causation is how the paradigm appears in the effect.312 In other 
words, paradigmatic causation deals with reality while formal causation deals with mere 
appearance. 
Importance in Dionysius 
 Needless to say, formal causation has paramount importance in the thought of 
Dionysius. Formal causation metaphysically undergirds his theology of theophany by 
explaining the God-world relation. God relates to the world as its formal cause (of course, 
calling God “cause” indicates nothing more than beings' dependence on God313). The 
content and reality of the world comes from God for the world is nothing but the 
manifestation and revealing of God. Formal causation now allowed Dionysius to give a 
complete account. Since “like comes from like,” the world is inherently sacramental and 
divine. Far from having a natural/supernatural dichotomy, the world exists only as it 
persists in God. Again, every being is a symbol of God.  
 Put in terms of remaining,314 God remains and abides in a being to the extent that 
it has being. The God-in-a-being is what that being is, and so all beings are living 
instances of a cause remaining in an effect.315 “Living” here should not be taken too 
literally—obviously rocks too are instances of God abiding in them by virtue of the fact 
                                                 
312 Perl, Theophany, 125n26. 
313 Dionysius, DN, II.8, 645C-D. 
314 Again, as Gersh 200ff, for how “remaining” often reduces to “reversion” under Christian 
critique (e.g., Maximus the Confessor, Ambiguum, 7.1-5). 
315 Dionysius, DN, VII.2, 869A-B. 
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that they exist at all. Insofar as beings display their whatness, they evidence God 
remaining in them. 
 As for procession, while beings symbolize God, no being is God. Beings 
differentiate the ineffable, undifferentiated unity that is God (although this too is broken, 
inadequate language because it is intelligible whereas God, beyond all intelligibility, is 
not). As differentiated, finite, intelligible, and determinate, beings proceed from and are 
dependent upon316 God and are different from God and from each other. 
 Regarding reversion, all beings revert to God because only in God do they have 
completeness (the Divine Beauty lures them from nonbeing to being317). Since God gives 
a being its whatness and is undifferentiated unity, a being becomes more like itself, has 
more whatness, the more it itself moves towards undifferentiated unity. To the degree that 
beings act properly to their nature they revert to God. As seen in the case of evil, beings 
do not always act properly to their nature, in which case they fall into nonbeing (for there 
is no where else to go).318 In this way, even a rock, by being a rock, reverts to God in a 
way appropriate to its being. All beings, according to their mode of being, revert to God 
and move towards God, and by reverting to God all beings gain ontological direction and 
so gain determinacy,319 and for this reason God as formal cause means also that God is 
ultimate final cause. All reality naturally reverts to God because that is what it naturally 
                                                 
316 See Perl, “'The Power of All Things:' the One as Pure Giving in Plotinus,” 303f. 
317 Dionysius, DN, IV.7, 704B. Perl, Thinking Being, 135, notes that beauty is Form as such. 
Plotinus, V.8.13, says that beauty comes from the intelligible world. In Plotinus, I.6.6, he 
argues that goodness and beauty are the same in God, from Whom stems all beauty. 
318 Plotinus, III.9.3, of course agrees, but only applies this concept to humans. 
319 See Plotinus, III.4.1. 
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is. God is the telos of being. Combined, every being finds fulfillment in the circular 
motion of procession and reversion.320 In fact, von Balthasar breaks down Dionysius's 
entire theology into procession and reversion.321 In this way, one can see that despite 
Forms constituting reality, beings do not live statically but, to borrow a phrase from 
Plotinus, “always were and always will be in process of becoming….”322 Furthermore, 
although true being is immutable,323 Forms are dynamic and living not static.324 
 As ultimate final cause, God relates to beings in some determinate way, and these 
determinate ways by which God relates to beings are the Divine Names. Formal 
causation, then, through final causation, provides the basis for the Divine Names. Insofar 
as beings revert (and remain) in determinacy, the Divine Names act as their cause. The 
Divine Names provide the beginning/principle (archē) and end (telos) of every being.325 
In this way, all beings come from and move towards the Good, True, and Beautiful.326  
 Since God is the paradigms of all beings (undifferentiated), God is also both the 
beginning and end of every being. In other words, the dynamic relations between cause 
                                                 
320 E.g., Dionysius, DN, VIII.5, 892A. Von Balthasar, 166. Note the absence of remaining. 
321 Von Balthasar, 185-6. 
322 Plotinus, II.9.3.13-14. 
323 Plotinus, V.9.5. 
324 Armstrong, 277n2. Plotinus V.6.1 argues that thinking is a pair of what is thought and one 
who thinks (although in V.6.2 he says that not everything that is thought also itself thinks). In 
VI.5.7 he is even more explicit that since we think the Intelligibles, we are them, because we 
really possess them. See also VI.6.18. 
325 E.g., Dionysius, DN, IV.7, 704A, Beauty. Dionysius, DN, II.10, 648C, says that the divinity of 
Jesus is precisely this. See also Plotinus, III.8.7.14-17, for the equivalency of archē and telos. 
Plotinus, VI.9.9.20-22: “It is these [beauty, righteousness, virtue] the soul conceives when 
filled with God, and this is its beginning [archē] and end [telos]; its beginning because it comes 
from thence, and its end because its good is there.” 
326 See Dionysius, DN, IV.7, 704B, for the equation of the Good and the Beautiful. 
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and effect applies to God and beings, for God as cause caused all beings (which are His 
effects). As archē, God imbues all beings with being, and as telos, all beings strive to be 
by realizing their Form, which is their being (and how exactly they do so is determined 
by their being).327 God provides the beginning and end of all things, and as such, all 
beings strive for and toward God. God is ultimate formal and final cause.328 
 Additionally, in the thought of Dionysius, “God is Love,” a theological point 
whose importance cannot be overestimated for Christians, critically relied on formal 
causation for its justification. Dionysius understood God as Love (for God Himself is the 
act by which creatures come to be and share in Him329) in the sense of both Eros and 
Agape. Perl articulates “Eros” and “Agape” within a Neoplatonic framework as follows: 
understanding God as Eros depends on formal causation because Eros describes God's 
love for beings and their love for God, both of which depend on reversion, and as Agape, 
God selflessly moves all creatures towards Him, and this concept depends on 
                                                 
327 Dionysius, DN, IV.4, 700B. Plotinus, VI.2.11.27-29: “...for nothing whatever among real beings 
could have come to exist or endure in existence if its striving was not directed towards the 
One.” See also Perl, Theophany, 36f. 
328 Dionysius, DN, IV.4, 700A-B. Plotinus, VI.8.14.32-33, agrees: “It [the Good] is the source 
therefore of being and the why of being, giving both at once;....” Technically, as seen in 
Dionysius, DN, VII.4, 872C, God anticipates all causes within Himself without distinction. 
Ammonius Hermiae would argue that God is also supreme efficient cause because the 
essence of the Good is to give being—see Koenraad Verrycken, “The metaphysics of 
Ammonius son of Hermeias,” in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their 
Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 210. Plotinus, VI.2.11.25-
27: “And the One is on both sides of them; for it is that from which they come and to which 
they go; for all things originate from the One and strive towards the One.” 
329 Von Balthasar, 186. 
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procession.330 As seen, both reversion and procession assume formal causation, and 
therefore God as either Eros or Agape depends on formal causation. 
 Furthermore, formal causation intimates the connection between the Divine 
Names and the God beyond every Name. Formal causation treats effects as 
differentiations of their cause, which is the same relationship the Names have to God. 
The Names are the least differentiated presence of God: any less differentiation would 
mean God as undifferentiated unity and so as incomprehensible. Formal causation shows 
how the Names can be God made determinate while still being truly God. From the 
Names, the rest of reality (Forms) follows in the same process: Forms are the Names 
differentiated, and this is the act of creation.331 
 Even the relationality of Dionysius's hierarchy depended on formal causation. 
Recall that beings higher up on the hierarchy exist in more unified mode of being than 
beings lower down on the hierarchy. From the perspective of a lower being, when it 
reverts, it not only reverts to God (the source and end of all being), but also to beings 
above it on the hierarchy.332 For example, when humans move towards God, they become 
more angelic: their reversion is towards God and thereby also inevitably towards 
angels.333 As before, angels do not pose a barrier between humans and God, but exist as 
higher beings, meaning that as beings (such as humans) approach God, they consequently 
                                                 
330 Perl, Theophany, 47. John of Scythopolis, The Divine Names, 268.4, comments that God is the 
Eros (or charity) that unifies all because all living and natural motion reverts to God 
according to its own eros. 
331 This is how Gregory Palamas interprets the Names in relation to creation. 
332 Perl, Theophany, 78. 
333 See also Plotinus, III.4.3 
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also approach the angels. In this way, beings proceed from and revert to God precisely by 
proceeding from and reverting to higher beings, and thus the very being of beings 
consists of and is defined by its place in the hierarchy.334 Again, God's direct activity in 
the hierarchy cannot be forgotten: the hierarchical activity of a being is nothing but God's 
presence in it, working through it.335 Formal causation makes this living, relational 
hierarchy possible. 
 Finally, and perhaps most relevant for the modern era, formal causation enabled 
Dionysius to address nihilism. Whereas nihilism asserts that no objective, true reality 
underlies the perceived reality, Dionysius answered that every being has reality by being 
an expression of God. Beings, then, have infinite value and find rootedness in 
“something” that is not merely an objective reality but is the measure itself—the measure 
of reality. Beings have meaning precisely because they are not the measure, but are 
measured, and thus point beyond themselves to the Measure, viz., God. For Perl, this 
means that every creature, merely by being, is sacred for its being manifests the presence 
of God (and since the only reality that exists is the theophany, the world is infinitely 
meaningful336).337 Hence, Dionysius answered nihilism by providing the objective 
measure that nihilism insists does not exist: God. Of course, Dionysius would have 
agreed that God does not exist, but would do so precisely because God is the measure of 
existence! Formal causation accounts for the whatness of beings (God), the very 
                                                 
334 See the discussion on hierarchy above. 
335 Perl, Theophany, 79, calls this “immediate mediation.” 
336 Perl, “Signifying Nothing: Being as Sign in Neoplatonism and Derrida,” 144. 
337 Perl, “Symbol, Sacrament, and Hierarchy in Saint Dionysios the Areopagite,” 323. 
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whatness nihilism denies. 
 As seen, formal causation was pivotal for Dionysius in practically every way. 
Formal causation grounds his doctrine of God, explaining how that which is beyond 
being can yet be expressed in being (remaining). It also grounds his doctrine of creation 
by explaining how creation is possible: causes become differentiated in their effects. This 
applies to the Divine Names, Forms, and all beings. Finally, formal causation provided 
Dionysius with an account of reality by showing what creatures are: a theophany of God. 
Creatures are not God (procession) yet find fullness by returning to God (reversion).  
 Deprived of formal causation, Dionysius would likely have lacked a coherent 
account of God, creation, and reality, and would certainly have no tools with which to 
address nihilism. Modern followers of Dionysius could appeal to the magical in order to 
fill in the void left by formal causation, but such an approach would betray the 
intellectual rigor with which Dionysius operated. Those wanting to stay true to the 
intellectual-spiritual precedent set by Dionysius (and followed by scholars such as 
Maximus the Confessor, John Scotus Eriugena, Thomas Aquinas, and Gregory Palamas) 
must either find a way to make formal causation tenable in light of modern science, or try 
to rework his thought such that it is based on modern scientific rather than Neoplatonic 
principles. Before a decision can be made, first the modern scientific principles of 
causation must be explored. Only then can it be determined whether these principles 
conflict with formal causation as Dionysius depended on it, and if so, what should be 
done to resolve this conflict. 
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CHAPTER 3: EFFICIENT CAUSATION IN EARLY MODERN NATURAL 
PHILOSOPHY 
 
My neighbors say: “We have dreamed beautiful dreams.” The universe is my witness when I 
tell you that you are more beautiful than your dreams. The universe also dreams, and cannot 
dream enough about its own beauty. O my sleepy universe: as long as a dream dreams a 
dream, one dream is afraid of another, even if one dream seeks an interpreter and comforter in 
another. Who is prophesying to whom: the dream to reality or reality to the dream?338  
 
 Although Neoplatonic and Scholastic philosophy held dominance in Europe for a 
significant period, their time came to an end. In early modern thought, Neoplatonic and 
Scholastic formal and final causation was replaced by efficient causation. While criticism 
of formal causation had its origins in the late Scholastic era,339 formal causation's coup de 
grâce did not occur until the early modern and modern periods. Just as the rise of formal 
causation did not occur in a metaphysical vacuum, neither did the rise of efficient 
causation: drastic intellectual shifts occurred that stirred a change in worldview such that 
efficient causation alone could be seen as sufficient for natural philosophy. As such, this 
chapter will trace the philosophical implications of mathematizing and quantifying the 
universe, demonstrating how the perceived sufficiency of efficient causation fits within a 
larger metaphysical worldview. 
                                                 
338 Nikolai Velimirovich, Prayers by the Lake, trans. Todor Mika and Stevan Scott (Grayslake, IL: 
Diocese of New Gracanica and Midwestern America, 2010), XXXI, lines 25-32.  
339 For an excellent treatment of this, see Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of 
Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
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 Unlike the systematic and coherent nature of Neoplatonism, early modern natural 
philosophy exhibited a wide diversity of ideas and thinkers. In order to accommodate this 
diversity, various avenues relevant for the rise of efficient causation will be explored, 
regardless of logical fit or cohesion. The first section of this chapter, then, will describe 
the near universal agreement of the quantification of reality, investigate how the primary-
secondary quality distinction came to defend reality's quantification, and navigate 
through three different approaches to doing natural philosophy in light of the primary-
secondary quality distinction: materialism, atomism, and mechanism. In the next section, 
three areas of philosophy that reformed due to the rise of the primary-secondary quality 
distinction (and the quantification of nature more generally) will be analyzed, 
specifically, the standings of knowledge, Forms, and teleology. In the last section, it will 
be argued that the reformed metaphysical views of Forms and teleology, (and, to a lesser 
extent knowledge), along with the primary-secondary quality distinction itself, explain 
the waning of formal (and final) causation and its replacement by efficient causation, and 
hence efficient causation's eventual monopoly in the natural sciences. 
The Quantification of Reality 
 Galileo famously declared that the language of the universe is mathematics,340 and 
                                                 
340 Galileo, The Assayer, trans. Stillman Drake, in Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (New York: 
Anchor Books, 1957), 238: “But the book [of nature] cannot be understood unless one first 
leans to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written in 
the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometric 
figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without 
these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth.” 
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that nature is fundamentally mathematical.341 This metaphysical declaration would 
quickly gain widespread acceptance in early modern thought. For example, Isaac Newton 
asserted that nature is mass in time and space following mathematical laws,342 while 
René Descartes offered a fully mathematical cosmology.343 Considering early modern 
philosophy's geometrizing space and mathematizing the laws of nature,344 historian of 
science Alexandre Koyré considers the two main characteristics of early modern natural 
philosophy to be (a) the geometrization of nature itself and (b) the geometrization of what 
would become modern “science.”345 (It should be noted that Koyré has been criticized for 
(a) underemphasizing the empiricism of and (b) overemphasizing the role a priori 
physics played in the early modern natural philosophers. Rather than taking sides on this 
issue, the issue will be avoided since it has minimal relevance to the topic at hand.) 
 At first glance, this shift from a qualitative to a mathematized view of nature 
would seem to lead to an intensified interest in formal causation. As Koyré notes, Galileo 
himself saw the task of natural philosophy as investigating the very constitution of the 
universe,346 and goes so far as to think he had experimentally proven Platonism.347 After 
                                                 
341 See E.A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science; a Historical Critical 
Essay (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company Inc., 1925), 64f, for a wider treatment. 
342 Burtt, 237. 
343 Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (New York: Harper Torch 
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all, a mathematized universe implies that the physical realm imitates a higher, truer 
reality (the mathematical realm).348 However, history took a very different turn, and its 
outcome resulted in the complete abandonment of formal (and final) causation in natural 
philosophy. 
 Tracing this abandonment requires taking a closer look at how Galileo and other 
proponents of a mathematized universe argued for the mathematical nature of nature. As 
Koyré recounts the history, one of the key arguments against a mathematical view of 
nature came from Scholastic Aristotelianism, which said that nature does not fit into a 
mathematical mold because physical reality is much more complex than geometric 
reality, and therefore abstract: mathematical bodies are not the same as real, physical 
bodies.349 Aristotle and the Scholastics certainly acknowledged the validity and 
importance of geometric proof, but they questioned whether the structure of reality is 
ultimately mathematical.350 They concluded that mathematics demands a degree of 
precision that no reasonable person can expect to find in physical reality—close to a 
geometric shape is not close enough.351 Geometric bodies belong in geometric space, 
while real bodies belong in physical space.352 Any application of mathematics to nature 
will never be exact but always more or less.353  
                                                                                                                                                 
347 Koyré, Galileo Studies, 207. 
348 Ibid., 203. 
349 Ibid., 103. 
350 Ibid., 202. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Koyré, Metaphysics and Measurement, 28. 
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 More to the point, Aristotelians argued, people find qualities everywhere in their 
experience, and qualities, by their very nature, cannot be quantified.354 Because of the 
qualitative nature of experience, mathematics not only is largely irrelevant, but more 
importantly, it is downright dangerous to treat mathematics as real because doing so 
ignores the changing and qualitative variety of Being as found in actual experience.355 
For the Aristotelians, experience trumps mathematical abstraction because experience 
grasps reality as it is, whereas mathematical abstraction, indifferent to experience, forces 
reality into a preconceived mathematical box.356 
 Galileo could have responded to this critique in a variety of ways, and he offered 
a bold and original answer to his Scholastic critics: the quantitative/qualitative 
distinction.357 Galileo explained away the problem of qualities by relegating them to the 
world of subjectivity.358 Galileo agreed with the Aristotelians that the qualitative 
character of experience cannot be quantified, and so, to paraphrase Koyré, condemns it as 
unreal.359 As E.A. Burtt puts it, according to Galileo, the real world is objective, absolute, 
and mathematical, whereas the world of illusion and opinion is subjective, relative, and 
sensible.360 One can imagine bodies without their qualitative properties, but no one can 
imagine bodies without their mathematical properties—therefore, mathematical 
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properties constitute the real essence of bodies.361 (It should be noted that Burtt has been 
criticized for overplaying the role of mathematics in early modern natural philosophy.362 
However, this point is debatable. In any case, this chapter aims to show the 
multidimensional shift that occurred from the premodern to the modern era. Mathematics 
was undoubtedly important, but so were other issues.) 
 Importantly, the belief that qualities must reduce to quantities applies not only to 
Galileo, but also to the other key architects of early modern natural philosophy such as 
Newton, Descartes, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes.363 Koyré worries that Newton 
replaced the world of qualities and sense perception with a geometric world of precision 
and determinism.364 As Burtt interprets Newton, Newton reduced the sensible world of 
qualities to mathematics.365 Newton's empiricism prevented him from completely 
reducing nature to mathematics,366 but this did not stop his successors, who readily 
slipped from “bodies are masses” to “bodies are nothing but masses.”367 Next, Descartes 
(like Galileo) declared qualities subjective and banished them from nature: he argued that 
only intellectual (by which he means a priori) knowledge is real knowledge, and that data 
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from the senses involves only select quantitative properties.368 Material things exist only 
insofar as they are objects of pure mathematics.369 That is, material things really do exist, 
but what really exists about them reduces to the quantitative. As for Locke, he argued that 
qualities must reduce to quantities in order for there to be demonstrative knowledge,370 
although he did allow that some qualitative ideas may possibly yield demonstrative 
knowledge (e.g., morality371).372 Finally, Hobbes took the quantitative/qualitative 
distinction to the next level: even space and time are but phantasms of the mind because 
all that is real is that which is subject to geometry (which for Hobbes meant only 
extension and motion).373 
 The quantitative/qualitative distinction evolved into what has become known as 
the “primary-secondary quality distinction.” The driving force behind the primary-
secondary quality distinction was to determine what is real (in the things themselves) 
versus what is merely in the mind. Locke, for instance, made exactly this point,374 adding 
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that secondary qualities are mere byproducts of primary qualities375 via imperceptibly 
small particles.376 Descartes made the primary-secondary quality distinction as follows: 
the true nature of bodies consists in nothing detectable by the senses (e.g., hardness) but 
only in extension: one can picture bodies without such sensible properties (e.g., one can 
imagine a body without even touching it, thus that body's hardness is not necessary to 
imagining its reality), but one cannot imagine a body without extension.377 In other 
words, like Galileo, Descartes reasoned that the true or “primary” qualities of bodies are 
those that one cannot possibly imagine bodies to lack.378 Unlike Galileo, Descartes added 
the criterion of “clear and distinct” ideas in order to ensure further a proper delineation 
between primary (which are clear and distinct) and secondary (which are not) qualities.  
 With the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in mind, what 
exactly are primary qualities? While answers differ by thinker, there are more similarities 
than differences between them. Descartes, in his Second Meditation, famously put wax to 
fire in order to discover which properties are “really” in the wax and which properties 
only appear to the mind to be in the wax.379 He concluded that size (i.e., extension in 
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three dimensions380), shape, position, motion, duration, substance, and number are real, 
but data from the five senses are not (in fact, he has a special term called “material 
falsity” to connote when ideas represent a non-thing as a thing).381 Galileo’s list of 
primary qualities of a corporeal or material substance consisted of: being bounded, shape, 
size, place, time, motion/rest, touching/not touching some other body, and being one or 
more in number;382 Locke's list was not much different.383 
 Newton took a more nuanced approach to the primary-secondary quality 
distinction. Contra Descartes's rejection of all properties of bodies except extension, 
Newton argued that extension is insufficient: bodies must possess properties that give 
them the capacity (a) to stimulate their qualities in the mind, and (b) to transfer their 
actions to other bodies—otherwise, he says, everything reduces to empty space.384 Put 
more simply, bodies must have a property that allows (a) human minds to detect them, 
and (b) them to affect other bodies; extension alone does not guarantee this. Descartes 
equated body with extension385 whereas Newton gave extension its own mode of existing 
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(it is neither substance nor accident).386 Additionally, in his Third Rule for natural 
philosophy, Newton offered a more inclusive definition of primary (what he calls 
“universal”) qualities than Descartes: the universal qualities of bodies are those that 
cannot be increased or decreased and that have been seen to belong to all bodies in 
experiments (e.g., extension).387 In other words, as Koyré sees it, Newton’s primary 
qualities of bodies are those that do not admit of degrees, are found in all bodies, and are 
confirmable by experiment—thus, they are extension, duration, impenetrability, and 
gravitation (although universal, this is not an essential quality).388 Newton said that the 
primary qualities of matter are hardness, extension, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia 
because these are empirically given and can neither increase nor diminish.389 Finally, he 
argued that space and time must exist390 because no being can exist without some relation 
to them.391  
 By the process of elimination, whatever is not a primary quality must be a 
secondary quality. Without producing an exhaustive list, some important secondary 
qualities include color, sound, smell, and taste; a body does not necessarily resemble 
these qualities, but they exist only subjectively.392 Since they exist only within 
                                                 
386 Newton, De Gravitatione, 21. This difference will have a significant impact on the issue of 
materialism—see below. 
387 Isaac Newton, Principia, trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman, ed. Andrew Janiak, in 
Philosophical Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 87. 
388 Koyré, Newtonian Studies, 267. 
389 Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, 173. 
390 Newton, De Gravitatione, 26. 
391 Newton, De Gravitatione, 25. 
392 Descartes, Sixth Meditation (81-82). Galileo, The Assayer, 274. See also Koyré, Galileo Studies, 
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consciousness of the mind, secondary qualities are unreal (Newton, too, agreed with 
this—he merely disagreed as to where to draw the line393). For Locke, secondary 
qualities could produce simple ideas, but they are not real because they depend on fleshly 
origins, i.e., they depend on perception, and so pain is not “in” fire but only in the mind 
of a perceiver, and the same applies to light and heat (they too are unreal).394 Since 
secondary qualities are not real, ideas of them are so unlike anything in the object that 
there is a greater chasm between idea and object than resemblance.395 All simple ideas 
agree with the reality of things, but only those of primary qualities are images of what 
actually exists.396 Not surprisingly then, Locke concluded that only primary qualities 
really exist in the things themselves397 and have real existence,398 while secondary reduce 
to primary qualities399 (specifically, in terms of minutest parts, which, when seen, 
secondary qualities would altogether vanish400). In general, proponents of the primary-
secondary quality distinction met the task of explaining away secondary qualities in terms 
of primary qualities. 
 Descartes must satisfy an additional demand of his own making: because he said 
that primary qualities are those that are “clear and distinct,” it would seem that he must 
                                                                                                                                                 
179. 
393 Burtt, 233. Kepler may have had a different stance on the reality of secondary qualities—see Ibid., 74. 
394 Locke II.xxxi.2.  
395 John Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 112. 
396 Locke II.xxx.2. 
397 Locke II.viii.15. 
398 Locke II.viii.17. 
399 Locke II.viii.18. For examples, see 19-21. 
400 Locke II.xxiii.8, 11. See more on “atomism” below. 
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admit color, pain, smell, etc., as primary qualities because the mind has clear and distinct 
ideas of them. Descartes satisfied this demand by arguing that one can have clear and 
distinct ideas of color and pain, but only as sensations, and thus one is unable to 
conceptualize them as something beyond the mind.401 Figure, motion, duration, number, 
and the situation of parts are clearly perceived in all bodies and so are identified 
differently than pain, smell, or taste because they are known with far greater clearness.402 
For example, when one perceives color, one ignorantly thinks that the object itself has 
color, but what one actually perceives is nothing other than the primary qualities of said 
object, and it is these primary qualities that cause a perceiver to see color, and not 
because the object actually has color in itself.403 At best, sense perceptions can give 
knowledge only as to whether external objects are harmful or beneficial to the union of 
mind and body—they do not present the objects as they are in themselves except 
accidentally.404  
 Overall, for the sake of mathematizing reality, early modern natural philosophers 
split the world into two, the primary and the secondary, and, further, denied the reality of 
the latter by denouncing it as subjective.405 This new “empiricism,” aided by the language 
of mathematics, sought to replace Aristotelianism's flexible and semi-qualitative concepts 
                                                 
401 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, I.LXVIII. 
402 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, I.LXIX. 
403 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, I.LXX. 
404 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.III.  
405 Koyré, Newtonian Studies, 23. 
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of interpreting reality with rigid and quantitative ones,406 thereby abstracting all 
properties away except for spatio-temporal information.407 The advantage of removing 
sensations and sense qualities from the cognitive domain was that natural philosophy no 
longer had to account for them.408 Historian of science Stephen Gaukroger observes that 
the idealized (i.e., mathematized) phenomena became the primary explanandum and the 
secondary were excluded entirely.409 As he provocatively puts it, the primary-secondary 
quality distinction works by reducing the explanandum to the explanans.410 
 Less provocatively, the primary-secondary quality distinction introduces 
something new, something not found in classical Neoplatonism. Whereas Neoplatonists 
argued that sensations and the physical world were less real than the world of Forms, the 
early modern natural philosophers, with their primary-secondary quality distinction, 
argued that sensations and the qualitative world were unreal. One can begin to see why, 
despite by beginning with appeals to Neoplatonic thought, early modern natural 
philosophers did not necessarily have to tread down a Neoplatonic path. While that path 
certainly remained open,411 the primary-secondary quality distinction also opened the 
door for new, non-Neoplatonic (and non-Scholastic) approaches, three of which will be 
discussed: materialism, atomism, and mechanism. It should be noted that in spite of the 
discrete treatment to follow, during the early modern period, a natural philosopher could 
                                                 
406 Koyré, Metaphysics and Measurement, 90. 
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409 Ibid., 324-5. 
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espouse any combination (or lack thereof) of these three approaches.412 
Materialism 
 First, building off of the quantitative/qualitative distinction, many early modern 
natural philosophers advocated for materialism in varying degrees. Descartes, employing 
his method of skepticism, argued that even if sensible things do not exist, their 
quantitative properties (e.g., extension) do.413 As seen above, besides extension, the 
simple natures (by which he means the primary qualities414) of bodies include shape, 
quantity (i.e., size and number), place, and time.415 In the end, however, as Koyré 
interprets Descartes, everything for Descartes seemed to reduce to matter and motion416 
because he said that one can divest bodies of all sensible qualities except for extension.417 
Descartes equated extension with material substance, reasoning that the nature of bodies 
is the extension of substance and extension can only be conceived (and therefore exist) in 
terms of material substance.418  
 Importantly, Descartes did not ultimately reduce everything to matter and motion: 
                                                 
412 See Gaukroger for an in-depth analysis. 
413 Descartes, Fifth Meditation, (63-64). 
414 Burtt, 100. 
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418 Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, 101. 
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he equates extension and matter quite literally—matter reduces to extension. As such, 
Koyré argues that Descartes denied the final reality of the material world:419 the material 
world exists not because the senses detect it and live in it but only because of a priori 
argumentation.420 The material world is a lesser reality—only the mathematical is truly 
real. In his own system, Descartes uplifted the mental substance as superior to the 
material, but, in positing his mental-material substance dualism he (unintentionally) 
paved the way for true materialism: all one has to do is instead uplift the material 
substance.421 Because he affirmed mind-body dualism (with the exception of reducing the 
material world (matter) to the world of pure reason (extension)), if one separates matter 
from extension, this completes the severance of mental from material substance, leaving a 
free-standing material world and a possibly superfluous mental world. 
 Newton made precisely this separation (without intending to affirm materialism of 
course). He contrasted extension and matter: extension is eternal, immobile, infinite, 
immutable, uncreated, and uniform, while matter is the exact opposite in each case.422 
Further, Newton asserted that extension (along with all the other primary qualities of 
bodies423) is known only by the senses.424 In fact, Newton considered, but ultimately 
abandoned, a fifth rule for natural philosophy: anything not taken from external senses or 
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the sensation of internal thought is hypothesis.425  
 In the end, though, the difference between Descartes and Newton over which 
qualities should be counted among the primary qualities amounts to very little. As seen, 
Newton’s list of primary properties nearly matches Descartes’s: it consists of hardness, 
extension, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia.426 At times, Newton seemed less 
metaphysical about this list than Descartes, such as when he said he has “a suspicion” 
that all phenomena depend on forces acting upon the particles of bodies (implying 
materialism),427 or when he said all bodies “seem” composed of hard particles (again, 
implying materialism).428 However, elsewhere he went so far as to say that his ideas of 
body involve, confirm, and explain the “principle truths of metaphysics,”429 thereby 
elevating his primary qualities from a mere “suspicion” to metaphysical truths. 
Metaphysically, then, Newton’s world consisted of matter, motion, space, and attraction 
(but this is not a physical but a “mathematical stricture”)..430 If materialism explains 
everything by the locomotion of material,431 then both the Cartesian and Newtonian 
worlds (inadvertently) affirm materialism—unless one takes the extra step, as Descartes 
did, and insist that the mental world grounds the material world. Again, Descartes himself 
was not a materialist, but it is easy to see how quickly his world could slip into 
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materialism if one separates matter and extension. For Newton, material substance is a 
primary quality because it is known by the senses and does not vary in degree, but, for 
Descartes, material substance is a primary quality only insofar as there is no difference 
between materiality and extension, for it is extension that is the true primary quality 
(material substance merely follows from it). 
 Locke offered a compromise between Descartes and Newton, although he 
essentially sided with Newton on the issue of materialism. As seen above, for Locke the 
primary qualities are figure, extension, motion (or rest), solidity, and number because 
these are inseparable from bodies regardless of how bodies change.432 Again, only these 
primary qualities really exist in things433 and have real existence,434 and all other qualities 
are secondary and so reduce to primary qualities.435 Locke explicitly denied being a 
materialist,436 but his own reasoning does not allow him to avoid it.437 He argued against 
innate ideas, and, therefore, all ideas come either from the “sensation” of external objects 
or from “reflection.”438 By “sensation,” Locke meant data received from one or more of 
the senses,439 and by “reflection” he meant reflection upon sense data.440 Thus, for Locke, 
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sense data ultimately provides the only source of ideas because the alternative source, 
reflection, itself depends on sense data. Consequently, this leads to materialism because 
the physical senses, by definition, can only detect material substances—all ideas, then, 
derive from material substances. And because according to Locke ideas form the 
materials for knowledge441 (i.e., ideas from perception are the materials of all 
knowledge442), material reality has a monopoly on real knowledge. Locke’s philosophy, 
even though he did not want or intend it to, saw reality as matter in locomotion and all 
knowledge as coming from the senses, and thus the only real knowledge is knowledge of 
the material world. Locke himself may not like the implications of his metaphysics, but 
many of his followers had no issue accepting them.443 
 The same applies to the other thinkers: Newton had strong spiritual beliefs and 
Descartes placed mental substance over material substance. But, as with Locke, their 
philosophical systems allowed for the exclusion from reality of all but the material—if 
not by strict logical necessity in their own time, then certainly by the 19th century 
materialism becomes a powerful line of thought because of how later thinkers 
appropriated their predecessors’ philosophies, culminating in logical positivism. Again, 
Descartes, Newton, and Locke would have not have agreed with the conclusions of the 
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logical positivists, but ideas have a life of their own. 
 In contrast to Descartes, Newton, and Locke, all of whom wanted some 
semblance of immaterial reality, Hobbes purified natural philosophy by ridding it of all 
dualism, unabashedly arguing for a world that consists solely of matter in motion.444 For 
Hobbes, all substance is material, and an incorporeal substance is impossible.445 Only the 
corporeal is real because only extension (or body) has no dependence on human thought, 
and thus is a thing subsisting of itself.446 As for motion, Hobbes reduced the five senses 
to matter in motion.447 Consistent with his previous claims, Hobbes said that colors, 
shape, etc. are not in the object itself but in the perceiver and, as such, would not exist 
without perceivers, and thus are but apparitions caused by motion (they require a species 
both intelligible and visible).448  
Atomism 
 Second, some early modern natural philosophers took the quantitative/qualitative 
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distinction in the direction of atomism, or the doctrine that the behavior of macro-level 
processes fully reduces to micro-level processes.449 Atomism could act as mere 
methodology, that is, as a way of doing natural philosophy without implicating the nature 
of nature in atomism, or metaphysics, wherein indeed the nature of nature would be taken 
as atomic. 
 Francis Bacon argued for atomism based on its utility (i.e., methodologically). He 
stated that the goal of natural philosophy is to dissect nature into its simplest parts.450 For 
Bacon, one could make a complex structure apparent by seeing how its various 
homogenous parts fit together.451 In other words, he prescribed treating nature like a 
machine: to understand it, break it down into its simplest parts, at which point the natural 
philosopher will understand the whole. Every natural action depends on things infinitely 
small.452 Hence, Bacon's axioms: the first states that, for the transformation of bodies, 
treat them as a collection of simple natures; the second axiom states that, for the 
discovering of latent processes (i.e., that which is behind manifest motion), use 
compound bodies.453 Putting the two axioms together: reduce compound bodies to their 
simple natures and reduce that which is behind manifest motion(s) to compound bodies 
(which, following the first axiom, reduce to simple natures). For the sake of being a good 
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natural philosopher, Bacon said that the true configuration of a complex body should be 
subtle, exact, and distinct, and, by using reason, induction and experiment, a natural 
philosopher can compare it with other bodies, and thereby reduce it to its simple natures 
and laws.454 
 While Bacon saw atomism simply as a solid guide to natural philosophy 
(although, as will be seen below, he redefined “truth” in terms of utility, which in turn 
would seem to make his interpretation of nature metaphysically atomistic), others see it as 
a guide because they argue that nature in herself is atomic. Locke's penchant for atomism 
has already been seen above. For Newton, all real change takes place at the atomic 
level.455 Many of his primary qualities, specifically hardness, extension, mobility, 
impenetrability, and also the force of inertia of the whole, all arise from the matching 
primary qualities of their parts.456 As such, he reasoned that properties found in the whole 
are found in its parts,457 thus are universal properties, and these universal properties of 
the parts give rise to the properties of the whole. According to Burtt, Newton treats the 
world solely as a world of atoms that behave according to mathematical laws, and 
extends atomism to such an extent that “rationality” itself means only accepting 
explanations that are in terms of simplest parts.458 Descartes, setting aside the fact that his 
doctrine of “clear and distinct” ideas effectively reduced complex wholes to clear and 
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distinct parts (and hence his tenet of “clear and distinct” ideas is a form of atomism), 
explicitly made the point that while eyes, head, hands, etc., may be imaginary, their 
simples are true because simples are what make up composites (regardless of whether the 
composite itself is true or false). He also extended this reasoning to academic disciplines: 
those that depend on composites (e.g., astronomy) are less certain than those dependent 
on simples (e.g., geometry).459 Descartes's atomism, then, applied not just to natural 
philosophy, but also to all of philosophy and reality. Finally, Hobbes argued that the parts 
or “singulars” of bodies are what are more known to nature herself, while the wholes or 
“universals” are more known to humans.460 In other words, nature in herself is actually 
made of parts, but these parts are not readily knowable to natural philosophers, who, by 
implication, should investigate them. In fact, Hobbes defended the use of geometry in 
physics by arguing that one must know what motions are in the smallest parts of bodies 
(and thus physics comes after geometry).461 Not surprisingly, all sensation in Hobbes's 
system reduces to the motion of internal parts.462 
 Whether methodologically or metaphysically, atomism appealed to a variety of 
early modern natural philosophers. A large part of the appeal, as Gaukroger observes, 
stems from atomism's ability to adapt to virtually every kind natural philosophy 
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(including Aristotle's).463 As such, atomists need not be materialists, and vice-versa, 
although given the justifications for atomism (especially those of Locke, Newton, and 
Hobbes), atomism certainly synergizes with materialism. 
Mechanism 
 Besides materialism and atomism, another early modern approach for treating the 
quantitative/qualitative distinction is mechanism. Mechanism interprets nature as a 
machine to be dissected in terms of moving parts rather than in terms of atomic parts (as 
mentioned above, one could certainly adhere to both atomism and mechanism, but the 
two approaches could also end up opposed to each other464).  
 Isaac Beeckman broke new philosophical ground by offering the first fully 
mechanical natural philosophy. Beeckman reduced all natural phenomena to corpuscles 
whose behavior he modeled after simple machines.465 After seeing the power of human 
machines to transform nature, Beeckman thought of no reason why this technique would 
not be the technique of nature herself. Indeed, it must be. Beeckman rejected other types 
of explanations of nature, and argued that one must explain nature with microscopic 
mechanisms.466  
 As Gaukroger describes it, Descartes combines Hobbes's467 reductionist 
redefinition of phenomena with Beeckman's reduction of processes to mechanistic 
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collision to provide a complete reductionist cosmology.468 With Descartes's tripartite 
division of substance into Divine, mental, and physical, he could readily treat the entirety 
of physical substance as a machine made of figures in motion.469 In other words, 
Descartes provided an example of a natural philosopher who exemplifies all of the above 
approaches: he embraced materialism for the world of physical substance, accepted only 
clear and distinct ideas (atomism), and saw physical nature as a machine. Combined in 
this way, mechanism posits an independent universe, and allows for corpuscles to be the 
ultimate explanation for physical processes.470 
 In short, mechanism offered unparalleled power to unify disparate elements of 
early modern natural philosophy.471 Since mechanism is not a type of inquiry but a set of 
rules for how the world is to be explained (all causes are from the communication of 
motion via touch), it does not necessitate a particular approach to physics.472 
Furthermore, it rivaled Aristotelianism in terms of scope, and hence empowered 
Descartes to provide an alternative ultimate explanation of nature.473 Critically, 
mechanism depends on the primary-secondary quality distinction: otherwise, it could not 
bear the load placed on it of functioning as ultimate explanation because it provides no 
focus, and it loses contact with the physical world because it only applies to idealized 
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(i.e., mathematized) circumstances.474 By reducing the explanandum to the explanans,475 
a fully realized mechanical philosophy (such as Descartes's) could provide a complete 
explanation of the physical world. 
Philosophical Reforms 
 With this new explanation of the physical world came new reforms to philosophy. 
The standard natural philosophies required significant change, if not complete revision, in 
order to accommodate the quantitative/qualitative distinction, its concomitant primary-
secondary quality distinction, and the various approaches to natural philosophy that 
stemmed from that (especially materialism, atomism, and mechanism). While a 
systematic overview of how the new natural philosophy displaced the old Scholastic 
philosophy would take a treatise in itself, three changes relevant to the rise of efficient 
causation warrant attention: changes to knowledge, Forms, and teleology. Seeing how 
each of these changed in light of the quantitative/qualitative distinction will facilitate both 
explaining efficient causation's importance in early modern natural philosophy in this 
chapter, and comparing efficient causation to formal causation in the next chapter. 
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Knowledge 
 Just as many natural philosophers tailored the explanandum to the explanans, so 
too did many tailor the meaning of “knowledge” to their natural philosophy, thereby 
limiting knowledge's scope to their natural philosophy. Knowledge changed in terms of 
both its purpose and meaning. With regard to knowledge's purpose, whereas the ancients 
considered wisdom and happiness to be the goals of knowledge,476 natural philosophy 
could achieve neither;477 and so natural philosophy was reconceived in terms of truth and 
utility.478 For the natural philosopher, this leaves truth and utility as the goals of 
knowledge. However, some natural philosophers collapsed “truth” into “utility,” leaving 
utility as both the goal and meaning of knowledge. 
 For instance, Bacon argued that fruits and works are the most certain and sure 
signs of a true philosophy.479 In other words, he wanted informative truths—“truths” that 
are productive, useful, and produce new works,480 but, by “productive” and “useful,” 
Bacon meant “control over nature.” He said that his method would allow natural 
philosophers to dissect nature “in very truth,” but he really meant increased 
understanding and power over nature.481 And even “understanding” fades into the 
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background because Bacon also stated that the driving force of natural philosophy is not 
understanding nature but simply control, and its goal is nothing more than to endow 
human life with new discoveries and powers (he tellingly made no mention of truth).482 
For Bacon, the goal of natural philosophy begins and ends with commandeering nature to 
serve humanity.483 Indeed, he leveraged natural philosophy's control over nature in order 
to justify natural philosophy,484 and set the debate over the value of natural philosophy in 
terms of its usefulness (i.e., its utility).485 As for “producing new works,” Bacon 
advocated for replacing Aristotelian demonstration with the reproduction of the discovery 
in question, thereby making all natural philosophy practical and productive.486 He also 
rejected the Neoplatonic goal of contemplation for the same reason.487 
 Such a rejection would lead one to expect the self-proclaimed Platonist Galileo to 
be horrified at reducing truth to utility; however, in his fervor to refute Scholasticism, he 
came close to doing just that. In seeking to safeguard his experiments against the 
Scholastic objection that “true conclusions can have false premises,” Galileo argued that 
no reasons, experiments, or arguments can be found in favor of false propositions.488 In 
other words, if it works, then it is true—there cannot be a case such that an experiment 
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succeeds yet supports a false proposition.489 Seen another way, he argued that one cannot 
achieve a particular effect while lacking knowledge of its true cause.490 Hence, since the 
reason why a particular effect cannot be reliably reproduced is that one does not know its 
true cause, achieving a particular effect implies knowing its true cause. Again, if it works, 
then it is true. While Galileo did not completely reduce truth to utility as Bacon does, he 
still connected the two by suggesting that wherever one finds utility, so too one will find 
truth and knowledge. 
 Of course, not every early modern natural philosopher approved of this 
association between truth and utility as the route to knowledge. Newton famously 
rejected hypotheses and, unlike Descartes, refused to make use of fictions.491 As Koyré 
describes them, Newtonian experiments aimed to disclose the true and sufficient causes, 
not merely to establish numerical and functional relations.492 While Newton's first edition 
of the Principia accepted the traditional definition of “hypothesis,” later editions 
considered hypothesis as a gratuitous, extra-scientific, and unprovable assertion—a 
fiction in other words.493 G. W. Leibniz went even farther than Newton, denying that 
mathematical entities such as derived force, motion, velocity, impetus, conatus, and urge 
are real in nature but are merely useful for mental abstractions and calculation.494 
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 Newton, Leibniz, and others aside, historically speaking, Bacon succeeded in 
transforming natural philosophy so that its aim became change in “behavior,” and this 
“behavior” that measures the success of natural philosophy is control over the 
environment.495 Natural philosophy's value consists of its utility not truth.496 Indeed, not 
just Bacon, but also Galileo, Descartes, Boyle, and most of the Royal Society sought to 
secure objectivity, not truth, as the path to knowledge.497 Such an approach agrees 
perfectly with the mechanists whose criterion of philosophy is results.498 In short, natural 
philosophy would be measured by success. 
 As Alfred North Whitehead notes, this emphasis on the success of natural 
philosophy proved to be a huge boon for it. He argues that science’s general success 
makes it impervious to criticism.499 From the science side, once an experiment works, 
physicists cease to take interest in philosophy.500 And, from the philosophy side, when an 
abstraction is successful, philosophy’s role as a critic of abstractions becomes 
obscured.501 Thus, if Whitehead is correct, the conflating of truth and utility bolsters the 
credibility of science in two ways: first, by encouraging physicists to ignore the 
Aristotelian objection of “true conclusions can be validly derived from false premises,” 
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and, second, by diminishing philosophy's role as a critic of the abstractions created by 
science.502 
Forms 
 Conversely, a diminishing role of critiquing abstractions also meant a diminishing 
role in defending abstractions when necessary. In time, natural philosophy became 
nominalistic—it rejected Platonic Forms conceptually.503 Not all of the founders of early 
modern natural philosophy subscribed to nominalism (e.g., Galileo504), but, as the new 
science (and modernity more generally) matured, nominalism became the ontological 
norm.505 That is, thinkers work within a nominalist framework and then wrestle over the 
issue of the ontic priority of God, nature, and humanity in a nominalist world.506 
 Locke quite clearly favored nominalism.507 He stated that only particulars exist,508 
and since only particulars exist, general words do no more than abstract particulars.509 
Likewise, universals do not exist because they are nowhere to be found in the world.510 
More than that, they actually contain less reality than particulars because, as abstractions, 
they can only contain a fraction of a more complex idea.511 Contra Platonism, where 
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universals have more reality than particulars,512 Locke reasoned that as ideas increase in 
abstraction they decrease in reality (i.e., they become less real).513 For Locke, universals 
have no real existence but arise as an artifact of language.514 And, for good measure, 
Locke argued against the very possibility of Platonic participation: things that partake of 
the same essence cannot have different properties, and so, for instance, birth defects 
would be impossible under Platonism.515 
Locke’s historical influence, especially in the English-speaking world, should not 
be underestimated. As the historian John Yolton puts it, Locke “…defined the area of 
problems for his successors and specified the terminology in which those problems were 
to be discussed.”516 Even Locke’s critics unwittingly absorbed his doctrines and his 
metaphysical framework.517 By the 18th century, the creed of science had synthesized 
Locke’s philosophy with Newtonianism.518  
The same goes for Bacon: the 17th and 18th centuries held him in high esteem, 
praising him as the “father of experimental philosophy.”519 Bacon explicitly developed a 
method for leading people away from universals to particulars,520 and he condemned 
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Aristotle for his realism521 (Plato is obviously a lost cause). He derided belief in “abstract 
forms” as superstition.522 Yet, Bacon did not abandon the notion of “form” completely; 
instead, he redefined it as the fixed law that governs particulars.523  
Hobbes also unambiguously argued that humans impose names on bodies—
names are just names and indicate nothing more.524 Likewise, principles are nothing but 
verbal definitions.525 As such, he concluded that those who say that anything can be 
moved or produced by Form or incorporeal substance (or other “empty words” of the 
Scholastics) speak to no purpose.526 He argued that Forms fail to solve the problem of 
individuation because Forms lead to the dilemma of possibly having two distinct bodies 
with the same Form, which is absurd.527 For example, according to Hobbes, if one repairs 
a ship, replacing every plank, then recovers all of these planks and reconstructs the ship, 
there would be two different ships with the same exact Form. Thus, Form fails to 
individuate reality.528 
Galileo opposed nominalism, Locke, Bacon, and Hobbes fully embraced it; and 
Descartes tried to pave a middle way. On the one hand, Descartes rejected Scholastic and 
Aristotelian Forms, and so would seem to adhere to nominalism, but, on the other hand, 
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he also rejected the uncertainty inherent in nominalism in favor of a new science founded 
on indubitable truths.529 To resolve this ambiguity of whether Descartes was a nominalist, 
“nominalism” will be defined as the metaphysical assertion that only individual, 
particular entities metaphysically exist, and that universals or Platonic Forms reduce to 
language. With this clarification, Descartes safely falls into the nominalist camp: he 
stated that numbers and universals are nothing more than modes of thinking,530 and 
explicitly said that universals arise merely from making use of the same idea for like 
individual objects.531 Certainly since the 18th century, especially after the death of the last 
of the Cambridge Platonist (John Norris), nominalism has enjoyed unbridled influence in 
modern thought.532 
This shift to nominalism should not be surprising: with the primary-secondary 
quality distinction in place, explanation must derive from primary qualities. As long as 
Form is not considered one of the primary qualities, at best, natural philosophers need not 
employ it in their explanations, and at worst, they can reduce it to something else or 
ignore it altogether. Again, by contrast, materialism, atomism, and mechanism all offer 
explanations in terms of primary qualities. Furthermore, with the reshaping of knowledge 
and truth into utility, Forms offer no practical or productive power, and so are 
superfluous.533 
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Teleology 
  As Michael Allen Gillespie realizes, the rejection of Forms also necessarily 
entails the rejection of final causes: a world without universals is a world without 
universal ends to be actualized (and thus nothing is directed towards the Good).534 That 
said, historically speaking, the path to the rejection of final causes began with debates 
over whether final causation properly belongs in natural philosophy.  
 Against the appeal to final causes in natural philosophy, Descartes derided them 
as utterly useless in physics.535 For Descartes, final causation has no place in natural 
philosophy because it has no place in mathematics: Koyré goes so far as to say that 
Descartes's God created not a qualitative world but one of pure geometry.536 However, 
simply because Descartes rejected final causation in natural philosophy does not mean he 
rejected it altogether. According to Gaukroger, Descartes accepts extrinsic goal-
directedness, but considers this to be outside the scope of natural philosophy because he 
believed that God is the only final cause.537 For Descartes, God is so transcendent that 
God is not present in nature (hence extrinsic goal-directedness), and thus it is impossible 
to discover purpose or design in nature.538 In other words, God is the only final cause, but 
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God is also radically transcendent, rendering final causation effectively impotent. 
Descartes extirpated all intrinsic goal-directedness via mechanical philosophy: 
mechanical philosophy rejects Forms and thereby rejects the notion of a natural state.539 
By replacing intrinsic goals with extrinsic ones,540 Descartes hoped, on the one hand, to 
say that a process can be described in terms of a goal while denying goal-directedness 
any real explanatory power,541 and on the other, to see goals as necessary for why 
something develops as this rather than that.542 Put another way, Descartes wanted to keep 
final causation for the sake of solving the problem of determinacy without making it 
suitable for human endeavors (since humans cannot know God's purposes).   
 Bacon took the rejection of final causation a step further: he did not even allow 
for God to be the only final cause but rejected all final causes as purely subjective. As 
with formal causation, Bacon considered final causation superstitious.543 He saw that 
final causes involve only the nature of humans, not the nature of the universe,544 and 
therefore final causation corrupts natural philosophy because it applies only to human 
action, not to nature herself.545 Similarly, Hobbes recognized only material causes (which 
he defined as the sum of motions that are in the thing moved) and efficient causes (which 
he defined as the sum of motions that move) universally, and rejected final and formal 
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causes for natural objects, affirming them only for beings with reason and will.546 
Generally speaking, humanists rejected teleology because they agree that there are no 
natural ends.547  
 In contrast to its critics, final causation's perhaps most famous defender was 
Newton. Newton accused Cartesianism of materialism because it banished final causation 
from nature and so reduced everything to blind necessity. For Newton, true natural 
philosophy accounts for the purposeful structure and variety of the universe, and these 
require non-mechanical explanation.548 Its value in natural philosophy aside, Newton 
accepted final causation because nature displays marks of design—meaning that final 
causes offer the best argument for God's existence.549 On the Continent, Newton found an 
ally in Leibniz, who argued that final causation is useful in physics because God acting 
for an end is precisely where to look for the principle of all existing things and the laws 
of nature.550  
 In short, while the value of final causation was contested during the early modern 
period, in time, like Forms, it fell out of favor with natural philosophers and philosophy 
in general. As with Forms, teleological explanations struggled in a world interpreted by 
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the primary-secondary quality distinction: since telos is not a primary quality, it can be 
none other than a secondary quality (and thus unreal and subjective). Materialism, 
atomism, and mechanism all offer alternatives to teleology that are in line with the 
primary-secondary quality distinction. However, in order to replace final causation 
outright, one must substitute it for another type of causation, and here the power of 
efficient causation comes to the fore. 
Efficient Causation and Its Monopoly in Natural Philosophy 
 Efficient causation, unlike formal and final causation, survives the revolution of 
the primary-secondary quality distinction, and comes to monopolize natural philosophy. 
This can be seen in how the primary-secondary quality distinction affects early modern 
thinking about causation. 
 Descartes followed Beeckman, who argued that motion alone is the principle of 
all natural change.551 Beeckman rejected immaterial causes as unintelligible and hence 
useless in natural philosophy, because it requires concrete not abstract processes,552 and 
he further argued that no one who works with machines appeals to teleological or 
immaterial forces but to a clear picture of the structure and interaction of parts.553 As 
such, a natural philosopher can only talk about effects if he or she can imagine how they 
are produced—the exemplar being machines that control nature at the macroscopic 
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level.554 In other words, the only legitimate causes are mechanical ones, and hence the 
only legitimate type of causation is efficient causation. Incorporating Beeckman into his 
own system, Descartes agreed that the only motion that exists is local motion, i.e., action 
by which a body changes place.555 More precisely, motion for Descartes is the 
transporting of matter (or body) from the vicinity of matter (or bodies) where there is 
immediate contact to somewhere else.556 Since, as seen above, Descartes accepted 
nominalism and relegates teloi to an otherworldly realm, he must explain all motion in 
terms of efficient causation (physical space and physical touch). 
 Descartes aside, Hobbes offered perhaps the most complete early modern 
treatment of efficient causation because he took the Cartesian system and rid it of its 
multiple types of substances. Hobbes argued that the only cause of motion is a body 
contiguous and moving.557 For Hobbes, there is only one kind of change: local motion 
caused by the impact of bodies.558 Thus, the cause of universals (if they did exist) must 
be motion: motion is caused only by motion (and from motion comes the variety of 
figures and sense perceptions).559 Universals, sensations, and even geometry, according 
to Hobbes, come from motion (e.g., a line comes from the motion of a point).560 Rest is 
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nothing and has no efficacy—again, only motion gives rise to motion.561 Having 
purposefully cut off all other types of causation, Hobbes accepted the conclusion that the 
power to produce motion reduces to motion itself.562  
 Additionally, Hobbes reduced “power” and “act” to “cause” and “effect.” The 
“power” of an agent is having the accidents necessary to produce an effect in a patient (a 
“patient” is the body in which motion is generated, whereas an “agent” generates 
motion563), and since these accidents constitute efficient cause itself, the power of an 
agent is simply efficient cause (the only difference between efficient cause and power is 
time: “efficient cause” refers to the past, “power” to the future).564 In this context, 
Hobbes accepted material causation as the passive power of the patient (likewise, the 
difference between material cause and passive power is time). In other words, while he 
used the phrase “material cause,” material cause for Hobbes reduces to the receiver (the 
“patient”) or effect of efficient cause. Thus, all active power consists in motion—efficient 
causation.565 In this way, Hobbes combined materialism and nominalism to the triumph 
of efficient causation,566 and now, going forward, explanations must consist of particular 
bodies in particular motions.567 Historically, efficient causation not only became 
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prominent but also replaced final and formal causation,568 and the philosophical reasons 
as to why efficient causation came to eclipse final and formal causation warrant further 
exploration. 
Efficient over Final and Formal Causation 
 Regarding final causation, as mentioned above, Beeckman rejected teleological 
causes because no one who works with machines appeals to them (but only to a clear 
picture the of structure and interaction of parts).569 Beeckman set the precedence for the 
mechanists in general: they reject teleology (and natures) and posit an independent 
universe, thereby allowing for corpuscles to be the ultimate explanation for all physical 
processes.570 All cause takes place at the corpuscular level, without exception, for this is 
the fundamental level, and thus teleology is explained away as a byproduct of more 
fundamental, more real processes (a natural outcome given the primary-secondary quality 
distinction).571 Once again, Descartes took his cue from Beeckman, and put Beeckman's 
mechanical philosophy into a larger philosophical cosmology. Descartes said that 
philosophers should seek only efficient, not final, causes because to do otherwise is to 
presume to partake of the Divine Council.572 Since Descartes removed final causes from 
the range of human knowability, he naturally rejected them and he explicitly replaced 
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them with efficient causation. This move certainly makes sense in his system: efficient 
causes need only extension and motion (both of which Descartes accepted as primary 
qualities), whereas final causes depend on a nature, essence, or Form (which is the telos) 
and as such are neither explainable in terms of primary qualities nor are clear and distinct.  
 As seen in the previous chapter, the classical reason for affirming final causes was 
to solve the problem of determinacy. Removing final causation leaves early modern 
thought with the problem of “why?” Two solutions emerged to resolve this problem.573 
First, Galileo's solution was simply to ignore the question. Galileo wanted to know how 
not why things happen—he wanted simple, brute facts.574 As Burtt puts it, Galileo 
abandoned the question of “why” and replaced it with the question of (a mathematical) 
“how.”575 After all, for Galileo, whatever is not a primary quality is a figment of the 
human mind, and, since telos is not a primary quality, it therefore can be nothing other 
than a figment of the human mind. Consequently, there is no reason to take final 
causation seriously—it can be safely and legitimately ignored.  
 Second, Hobbes took a different approach. Rather than ignoring the question of 
“why,” he argued that efficient causation is capable of answering it. He defined 
“accident” as that which answers the question, “Why is a body this way rather than 
that?”576 He then defined “effect” as the accident generated in the patient.577 Finally, he 
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defined “efficient cause” as the aggregate of accidents in the agent(s) necessary to 
produce the effects.578 Putting the pieces together, efficient cause is precisely the 
combination of “why's” sufficient to explain the determinate state of its effect. Matter in 
motion is nothing less than a collection of phenomena which explains determinacy, and 
the task of the natural philosopher is to determine which matter(s) in motion (efficient 
causes) are relevant for a given effect. While Galileo neglected the question of “why,” 
Hobbes had efficient causation subsume the explanatory work of final causation, thereby 
wholly replacing it.  
 As for formal causation, needless to say, if one rejects Forms and accepts 
nominalism, then one also rejects formal causation. The widespread rejection of Forms 
has been shown above, where many early modern thinkers did little more than dismiss 
Forms as “unintelligible.” Fortunately, Hobbes provided more thorough reasons for 
rejecting them.579 As with final causes, Hobbes reduced formal causes to efficient 
cause.580 He argued that formal causation is unintelligible because the essence of a thing 
is the same as that thing (the two are, in fact, one), and so formal causation collapses into 
tautological thinking (e.g., “to be rational is the cause of humans” simplifies to “human is 
the cause of human,” where “rationality” is the essence of humanity).581 The essence of a 
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thing is, by definition, what that thing is, and so to appeal to a thing's essence as the cause 
of that thing amounts to little more than saying “it is what it is.” Efficient causation, by 
contrast, offers real explanatory power (hence, Hobbes had it replace formal causation). 
 As with final causation, formal causation in its classical context answered a 
metaphysical question—in this case, “what?” Unlike his response to the problem of 
“why,” Hobbes rested content to abandon the question of “what” and replaced it with the 
question of “how.”582 Indeed, ignoring the question of “what” becomes so common that, 
by the 18th century, thinkers habitually become content with accepting phenomena (e.g., 
gravity, attraction) as purely factual.583 Bacon too prescribed seeking how things come 
together and are transformed, rather than what they are made up of and consist of (thus he 
said that Aristotle's natural philosophy is not false but looks for the wrong things).584 
Newton also consistently abstained from the question of what something is.585 For 
instance, as Koyré points out, Newton could describe gravity without saying what it is.586 
Even Galileo, a Platonist, refused to answer this question of whatness.587 
 While formal causation is rejected because both Forms as well as the question of 
“what” in general are rejected, formal causation still could have persisted in mathematical 
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garb. After all, a mathematized universe is a Platonic universe where an inferior physical 
reality reflects a higher mathematical reality.588 As mathematical formulae, Forms could 
potentially live on as causes in the world. Yet, for better or for worse, very few saw 
mathematics as causally efficacious. Kepler was virtually alone in thinking that what 
causes celestial bodies to occupy a physical location is geometrical.589 As Descartes 
argued, a geometrical account does not provide an explanation of physical phenomena 
because it does not identify its causes.590 In other words, mathematical formulae are 
insufficient because they are not causal—they have no agency. Mathematics can be the 
language of nature without being its author, just as English is the language of this text 
without being its author. Since mathematics is not causally effective, a great debate arose 
in the early modern period as to where the agency of matter came from, specifically, 
whether matter was passive (matter's agency came from outside itself) or active (matter 
provides its own agency). If passive, the agency was commonly attributed to God, and if 
active, God need not be in the picture (hence the rise of deism591). Regardless, the 
underlying premise of this debate was that the mathematical description of phenomena 
does not account for the physical agency of said phenomena. While natural philosophers 
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could have attributed mathematical formulae with causal powers, with the exception of 
Kepler, they did not, and instead looked elsewhere for them. 
 With the spread of materialism, atomism, and mechanism, they presented 
themselves as alternatives for accounting for agency. Importantly, all three of these 
alternatives excluded formal (and final) causation. Materialism by definition denies the 
existence of Forms and teloi. Atomism requires finding causes at the micro-level, but 
neither Forms nor teloi have a “micro-level” or are found at the micro-level (both are 
abstract, high-level metaphysical notions that will never be found by a microscope592). 
Finally, mechanism presupposes that explanation requires complex substances capable of 
being broken down into mechanical parts rather than simple substances (which are not 
capable of this by definition), but Forms and teloi are simple, and therefore cannot 
function mechanically. Thus, regardless of one's particular approach to the primary-
secondary quality distinction, be it materialism, atomism, and/or mechanism, one would 
be naturally led to reject formal (and final) causation in favor of efficient causation, 
which by contrast is compatible with and favored by materialism, atomism, and 
mechanism.  
 Yet, even the rejection of formal and final causation from natural philosophy 
would have been little more than an interesting historical note had not the success of 
natural philosophy given it license to apply elsewhere and to ask whether there is any 
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other way besides itself to perform legitimate cognitive inquiry.593 Following the 
primary-secondary quality distinction's relegation of all it considers secondary to the 
realm of the subjective and unreal, formal and final causation must be just as Hobbes 
said: occurring only in the imagination of the human mind, without any basis in reality. 
With formal and final causation disposed of, efficient causation gains a monopoly in 
natural philosophy, if not contemporary philosophy in general. Given the importance of 
formal and final causation in Dionysius's theology, one wonders whether his theology is 
at all compatible with the modern scientific worldview, and if not, what can be done 
about that? 
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CHAPTER 4: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION 
O my beautiful universe: dream of Reality and Reality will tell you everything. Admit the 
Reality, of which you are a dream, and you will awaken, and will no longer ramble about 
beauty, but will be Beauty. There is only one Reality and only one Beauty, and it is the reason 
for your dream. 
Do not tell me, children, about the beauty of the stars. If the Lord withdrew Himself from the 
stars, your mouths would be struck dumb. Stand in the thick darkness by my lake and try to 
sing to it. Truly you will be struck dumb and remain silent until the sun dawns, until the 
sun pours its beauty over the lake and gives your speechless throat its voice.594 
 
 One of the most cherished ideas of modernity is the idea of “progress.” 
“Technology is getting better.” “Knowledge is getting better.” “The human race itself is 
getting better!” Against the backdrop of this mentality, the modern mind, upon 
considering the mere possibility of a conflict between modern and ancient thought, 
inclines towards the former: surely newer is more advanced, more developed, and 
therefore “better.” At the very least, the newer should be preserved while the older should 
adapt accordingly. Swimming against the currents of modern thought, this chapter will, 
first, argue that Dionysius's theology (with its dependence on formal causation) and 
contemporary natural science (with its rejection thereof), conflict over the issue of formal 
causation in a serious, as opposed to a superficial or avoidable, way. Second, three 
attempts at reconciling Dionysius's theology with modern scientific notions of causation 
will be offered: (a) a modern approach that reduces formal and final causation to modern 
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scientific notions of causation, (b) a postmodern approach that takes neither science nor 
theology too seriously, and (c) a traditional approach wherein scientific causation belongs 
to a larger metaphysical system. Third, in order to decide which amongst these three 
approaches has the strongest argument, the arguments for and against the primary-
secondary quality distinction, nominalism, and teleology will be considered. Fourth and 
finally, these three approaches will be weighed against each other, and it will be shown 
that (a) the modern approach ultimately collapses into either the postmodern or the 
traditional approach, and (b) the traditional approach best reconciles formal and modern 
scientific causation, at which point (c) a Dionysius-inspired option will be offered—one 
that keeps the strengths of the traditional approach while shedding its weaknesses.  
Conflict 
 As seen at the end of the previous two chapters, Dionysius's theology, with its 
deeply rooted dependence on formal causation, and modern science, with its rejection of 
formal causation, appear to conflict. Unfortunately, this conflict subsists of more than 
mere appearance. Due to the centrality of formal causation in Dionysius's thought, his 
theology cannot persist without formal causation because it would lose at least five 
foundational doctrines: theophany, God, creation, sacrament, and hierarchy.  
 First, recall that Dionysius saw reality as a theophany: via formal causation, that 
which is beyond being is made manifest in and through beings. Could reality still be a 
theophany without formal causation, via some other means? The additional rejection of 
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final causation595 leaves only efficient and material causation (assuming the only types of 
causation that exist are Aristotle's four). Via efficient causation, God could create the 
cosmos, but God would not be directly revealed in the cosmos. God would instead create 
materials, or reshape previously created materials, and form a universe according to 
God's Intellect. Yet the materials themselves would not be divine—they at best could 
reflect the Wisdom of the Creator, but they would not be that Wisdom in material garb. In 
other words, a cosmos created via efficient causation tends towards deism: God and the 
world exist separately, practically independently, with nothing stopping the imagination 
from envisioning God as a distant tinkerer leaving His machinations to their own devices.  
 Perhaps the doctrine of theophany could be reconstructed via material 
causation.596 In this case, in order for the cosmos to be a manifestation of God, God 
would have to create with the Divine Essence. The creation would indeed be divine, but 
there would not be any separation between God and creation. The creation itself would be 
the Divine Essence simpliciter, rather than a hierarchical differentiation of the 
Undifferentiated. Material causation, by definition, involves the material a thing is made 
of, and in order to have ontological differentiation requires, by definition, a difference in 
material. While reformulating theophany on the basis of efficient causation tends toward 
deism, reformulating it on the basis of material causation tends toward pantheism: God is 
simply immanent without being transcendent. Or, seen another way, the creation is God. 
The point is not to argue against pantheism (or deism for that matter) but simply to show 
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how they are not conceptually equivalent to theophany. 
 In a last-ditch effort, one could try to save the doctrine of theophany in a world 
without formal causation by some non-metaphysical means, e.g., through a dogmatic 
appeal to Scripture or any other kind of appeal to brute fact. Such a person could argue 
that it requires faith to believe what feeble human reason fails to grasp. This approach, 
rather than tending toward deism or pantheism, tends toward superstition.597 To appeal to 
faith in order to override cognitive dissonance is superstitious at best and blasphemous at 
worst. Ultimately, accepting the contradiction and refusing to resolve it is simply that: 
accepting contradiction. Given the metaphysical acumen of Dionysius, this is not a 
reasonable solution. 
 Second, what becomes of Dionysius's doctrine of God when formal causation is 
jettisoned? Sans Forms, God can be neither beyond being nor made manifest in the 
Divine Activities of the Divine Names, but can only be a being. As a being, God by 
definition could be neither the archē nor telos of all being, and certainly would not be 
found when intellects look inward. Again, a kind of deism emerges where God and the 
creation exist independently of each other, much like architects exist independently of 
their buildings. At this point, rather than being a precondition for existence itself, God 
exists in the sense that any other being exists, and thus God's existence demands 
argument. Of course, one could define God's “being” as radically unlike any other notion 
of being, but this effectively renders God indistinguishable from nothing. Even if one 
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then tries to appeal to Aristotle's otherness/difference distinction, God has still effectively 
been removed from the world. As before, the point is not to argue against such an appeal, 
but only to show how whatever doctrine of God one ends up with when one rejects 
formal causation, it is not that of Dionysius. 
 Third, Dionysius's notion of what it means to be a creature likewise changes. 
Without theophany, creatures no longer are ontological symbols of God, whose ultimate 
reference is God, but exist autonomously in the world. Instead, what is seen is all there is 
to creation—there is no depth. Unless one turns to pantheism, the creation loses its divine 
nature, and faith in God becomes optional—a matter of private opinion—because 
existence is seen to persist without any need for, or connection to, God. Clearly, a 
doctrine of creation where creatures (a) have ontological independence from God, (b) are 
not symbols of God, and (c) can conceive of a cosmos without God, is utterly 
incompatible with the theology of Dionysius (and the appeal to pantheism fares no better 
for surprisingly similar reasons). 
 Fourth, the aforementioned change in the doctrine of creation has radical 
consequences for Dionysius's sacramentology. In effect, Dionysius's cosmology is 
inherently sacramental by virtue of every existent being a symbol of God; sacraments for 
him are simply a special case involving a deeper, more intense participation in God. But 
with the loss of formal causation, and its corresponding loss of the doctrine of theophany, 
the universe is not inherently sacramental but secular. Any doctrine of the sacraments 
must now posit a radical change in reality from the secular to the divine. That is, rather 
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than sacraments being an intensification of an already divine reality, they must instead 
alter reality from something it is (secular, independent of God) to something it is not 
(divine). Efficient causation offers only literal “engagement,” which cannot be said to be 
“engagement” at all because the category “literal” precludes the transcendent, which is 
necessary for any engagement. For example, if limited to efficient causation, the bread 
and wine of the Eucharist would have to become Body and Blood in terms of both 
substance and accidents (i.e., literally), but such an occurrence would be appalling, and 
hence would bar any transcendent engagement by virtue of the obvious fact that people 
would be distracted by masticating human flesh and blood. The sacramental nature of the 
Eucharist would be lost. Pantheism (via material causation) leads to the opposite 
problem: since all of reality is already perfectly divine and so is already on the highest 
ontological plane, transcendence, by definition, is denied because there is no higher plane 
to which to transcend. Again, engagement is impossible. 
 Fifth, Dionysius's cosmic hierarchy, where the higher levels of the hierarchy 
contain the contents of the lower more perfectly, makes little sense without formal 
causation. With formal causation, the lower is the unfolding of the higher into 
multiplicity, while the higher is the enfolding of the lower into unity, resulting in a 
relational schema where higher beings move lower beings to God. Without formal 
causation, the metaphors of “unfolding” and “enfolding” cease to have coherent meaning. 
Formal causation makes it possible for contents to be unfolded and enfolded, but neither 
efficient nor material causation operate in this manner. Efficient causation requires that a 
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subject have power over an object such that the object can be shaped as the subject sees 
fit—not only is this not unfolding and enfolding, but it would lead to a horrific, 
downright terrifying, hierarchy since the object (effect) is utterly at the mercy of a 
powerful and foreign subject (cause). As for material causation's pantheism, monism 
precludes hierarchy by definition. 
 Thinking in broad terms of a world without formal causation, one may finally ask, 
“What is left of Dionysius's theology?” Certainly not his Divine Names, for, as seen, there 
cannot be an equivalent doctrine of Divine Names if one denies Dionysius formal 
causation. His Celestial Hierarchy and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy could no longer describe 
their explicit topic (hierarchy), detail how the hierarchy is a theophany, expound 
angelology (at least, not without devolving into superstition), or explain the cosmic 
significance of the Church's ecclesiology (at least, not without dogmatism). As for his 
Mystical Theology, which depends heavily on God being beyond being (hence the Divine 
Darkness), it would become little more than a book of the occult. Perhaps a few of his 
epistles could be salvaged, but, even then, one will encounter various metaphysical topics 
whose plausibility requires formal causation. Whatever would be left of Dionysius's 
theology, it would not be much. 
Three Attempts at Reconciliation 
 If modern scientific notions of causality imply the abolition of formal and final 
causation, then indeed there is a conflict between Dionysius's theology and modern 
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science. There are at least three ways to resolve this conflict: the modern way 
(reformulate formal and final causation such that they are compatible with modern 
scientific notions of causation, and then rebuild Dionysius's theology with this 
reconstituted formal causation), the postmodern way (reject both science and theology 
with equal vigor), or the traditional way (maintain that formal and final causation are 
superior to scientific notions of causation, thereby denying science a monopoly on the 
notion of causation). Each will be explained before being contrasted and considered. 
A Modern Approach Offered: Terrence Deacon 
 Representing a modern approach to reconciliation is Terrence Deacon, a 
biological anthropologist and neuroscientist who forcefully argues that science must start 
taking teleological phenomena seriously. In its current state, he writes, science lacks an 
explanation for seemingly simple matters. For example, how do sentences refer to objects 
in reality?598 Or what is a scientific explanation of “purpose?”599 Shovels, for instance, 
exist for the purpose of digging holes, yet current scientific analyses of shovels (their 
density, materials, efficiency, etc.) completely omit a shovel’s entire point—to dig 
holes.600 Typically, scientists would exclude phenomena such as “purpose” as 
irrelevant,601 but Deacon argues that science should not ignore such phenomena because 
purpose, along with meaning and consciousness, are materially causally relevant even 
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though they are not materially embodied.602 In other words, science should be concerned 
with teleology because, teleological phenomena, while immaterial, have a causal effect 
on the material world. Furthermore, the biological sciences in particular can hardly opt 
out of teleology: simply treating organisms as machines implies a telos because otherwise 
they would be a collection of mechanical interactions rather than a machine.603 
 The task, as Deacon sees it, is to account for teleology, and in the process to 
account for Forms, in terms of modern science. That is, while he considers dismissing 
teleology outright as disingenuous (partially because materiality alone lacks sufficient 
causal power604), he also considers that accepting it as fundamental (or metaphysical) is 
akin to accepting magic.605 Teleology is real, but only insofar as modern science can 
account for it. He finds that final causation, as traditionally conceived, is literally 
incoherent because the material future cannot determine anything in the present.606  
 Having abandoned what he takes to be the traditional bases for teleology, Deacon 
begins the task of reconstructing teleology on the basis of science by comparing 
teleological phenomena to the concept of zero—they are tokens of something absent.607 
For example: ideas, information, function, purpose, meaning, intention, significance, 
consciousness, and value are all defined by their incompleteness.608  
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 Beginning a series of neologisms, Deacon defines “ententional” phenomena as 
phenomena where something is intrinsically incomplete because it is about and/or for the 
sake of something non-intrinsic (he rightly notes that this directly relates to the issue of 
nominalism609).610 Thus, ententional phenomena are organized by a non-existent state of 
affairs, and so, from a material perspective, it is initially unclear how they can have any 
causal influence.611 Put another way, in what he calls “absentialism,” teleology is about 
something less,612 i.e., the whole is less than sum of its parts, and less than what the 
whole's interrelationship of parts can potentially realize—ententional properties imply 
that something is missing (again, in the sense that zero is “missing”).613 
 Deacon realizes how against the grain his approach is: modern science demands 
mechanical explanations,614 and he counters by pointing out that such explanations 
quickly become circular by both assuming more primitive ententional phenomena and 
failing to reduce the absential to the mechanical.615 The emergence of ententional 
properties from non-ententional properties should not be explained with the standard 
scientific reductionism;616 that is, ententional properties, while they come from non-
ententional properties, have their own autonomous existence that does not simply reduce 
to the non-ententional. As a way forward past science's mechanical reductionism, Deacon 
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observes that not all math or computer science problems can be broken down into parts, 
and that sometimes the whole cannot be understood one part at a time; hence, there is a 
difference between “reduction” (which simply identifies subdivisions) and 
“decomposition” (which is a type of reduction in which parts maintain the same 
properties they have in the whole, even if they are independent of it).617 For instance, 
analyzing an eye would be an example of reduction but not decomposition, because, 
while the eye is clearly a subdivision of the body, it does not have the same properties 
connected to the body as disconnected from it (e.g., disconnected from the body, it 
receives no blood or signals from the brain). 
 With this distinction in mind, he returns to ententional properties, saying that they 
are not decomposable.618 They exist outside of computation, and thus are parasitic on 
general non-ententional properties.619 In other words, ententional properties are 
irreducible—they do not consist of the mere sum of their parts. The same applies for 
organization in general: organization need not reduce to a relationship among 
components,620 and, in fact, all material entities themselves depend on organization 
(implying that organization may be a fundamental determination of physical causality).621 
Deacon continues to broaden this point by arguing against atomism: smaller does not 
always mean simpler or more fundamental, and furthermore, especially in the field of 
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quantum mechanics, scientists cannot determine what exactly the “smallest” parts are.622 
These reasons limit bottom-up causality (and reductionism in general).623 According to 
Deacon, teleology provides the key to moving beyond both bottom-up causality and 
reductionism, while also supplying a robust scientific explanation of the world via 
emergentism. 
He argues for a type of emergentism in four main phases. The first phase Deacon 
calls “teleonomy,” which refers to behavior oriented toward an end state without an 
explicit representation of that state.624 More concretely, teleonomy involves “constraints,” 
which Deacon defines as a state that is restricted within certain bounds. By establishing 
bounds, constraints make certain states absent, which in turn actually makes the capacity 
for work possible.625 For example, no one could do work such as digging a hole without 
the constraints of gravity, natural laws to govern how a shovel interacts with dirt, 
properties of said dirt, etc. Work is only possible in an environment that has constraints, 
that is, has bounds or laws that allow one to interact with it in a predictable manner. Seen 
another way, constraints involve causality because they create the capacity for work.626 
Naturally, putting one constraint in place limits what additional constraints can be put in 
place afterward, and this process can snowball into what Deacon calls “constraint 
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propagation.”627  
From the first phase of constraints and constraint-propagation follows the second 
phase, “homeodynamics.” Homeodynamics describes a process whereby a system of 
constraints spontaneously reduces to the minimum number of constraints (i.e., 
redundancies are weeded out), and thereby more evenly distributes an ententional 
property.628 With homeodynamics, redundant constraints are eliminated so that what is 
being constrained is constrained in a streamlined fashion, and, because of this, the 
constraint will spread. For instance, if an immune system had three ways of destroying a 
hostile bacterium, and one of the three included the other two, the other two would add 
nothing to said immune system. Since these other two are redundant, their loss is 
inconsequential, and their elimination would streamline the immune system. 
Homeodynamics enables Deacon to make a distinction between what he calls 
“orthograde” and “contragrade” change: orthograde change occurs intrinsically and 
spontaneously, whereas contragrade change is extrinsic, forced, and counter to orthograde 
change, while at the same time being the result of conflicting orthograde processes, 
where one orthograde process imposes upon another.629 Rephrased in terms previously 
coined: orthograde change refers to a homeodynamic system of constraint optimization 
and propagation, whereas contragrade change refers to actions that work against such a 
homeodynamic system. For example, cancer, considered within itself, is an orthograde 
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process. However, cancer lives within a larger homeodynamic system, namely, a body. As 
such, in the context of the body, cancer is a contragrade process because it works against 
the system of constraints the body tries to impose (in this case, limiting how many cells 
of a particular type should exist at any given time). 
The distinction between orthograde and contragrade change gives rise to two 
types of causality:630 formal causation (orthograde change) and efficient causation 
(contragrade change).631 Just as contragrade change depends on orthograde change (and 
only makes sense within it), so too efficient causation depends on formal causation.632 
The third phase, morphodynamics, describes a process whereby a system 
spontaneously becomes more orderly.633 This happens when two conflicting 
homeodynamic systems are made part of a larger system, called a “morphodynamic” 
system. Homeodynamic systems tend towards simplicity, but if one system can only be 
simplified at the expense of another, then the seemingly small factors of either system 
may be amplified, resulting in changes to larger-scale factors, and these factors can be 
decisive in determining which system “wins out” or how the competing systems reach 
equilibrium (either by a system amplifying its own properties, or by one system's 
properties placing constraints on the other's).634 In this way, there is a hierarchy of 
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causality.635 Deacon offers the example of a snowflake.636 Here there are multiple 
homeodynamic systems at work (the molecular structure of water, weather, temperature, 
etc.), and the net result is not a chaotic mess, but a neat, orderly structure (a snowflake). 
To put the matter more technically, competing homeodynamic systems can lead to 
asymmetries, which appear as the emergence of order. 
Fourth and finally, opposing morphodynamic systems can be put together in a 
complementary relationship to form what Deacon calls a “teleodynamic” system.637 
Teleodynamic systems exhibit end-directed behavior—they seem to work as if they have 
a purpose in mind. More precisely, they are organizing causal processes who have, as part 
of their own function, their own self-organization; with this self-organization, these 
processes have a normative and evaluative character, hence they seem to work for a 
purpose, having something like a self.638 Teleodynamics is the realization of final 
causality because teleodynamical systems are self-propagating: a new realm of 
orthograde dynamics emerges that is enigmatically “...a consequence-organized dynamic 
that is its own consequence.”639 While morphodynamics propagates and amplifies 
constraints, teleodynamics preserves them.640 Deacon believes he has dodged the bullet 
of reductionism with his notion of teleodynamic systems because each part of such a 
system exists due to its contribution to the whole, and because each part is reciprocally 
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both ends and means;641 thus, there can be no one-to-one mapping of teleodynamics to 
mechanical relations—the path from teleodynamics to mechanics must be bridged by 
morphodynamics.642  
With non-reductionistic teleodynamic systems in place, Deacon can proceed to 
explain formal causation. To do so, he introduces the term “autogenesis,” which refers to 
any self-encapsulating, self-repairing, and self-replicating system that is constituted by 
reciprocal morphodynamic processes.643 A physical entity that acts by autogenesis is an 
“autogen,” which has the additional qualification of being a minimally teleodynamic 
system.644 Autogens are Forms645 because they are determined by the continuity of 
dynamical constraints.646 For Deacon, Forms are purely negative,647 and so an autogen 
is ultimately defined by what is missing (again, like the concept of zero). For example, a 
bacterium will self-repair in order to maintain its homeostasis.648 Cellular repair occurs 
because of interrelated morphodynamic systems that spontaneously act to correct the 
damage. Teleology is seen in absence: damage is not permitted. The organism has 
systems in place to constrain damage so that damage has no place in it. Additionally, 
Deacon defines “causal power” as the emergent capacity to reorganize natural processes 
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in ways that would never spontaneously occur.649 Putting the pieces together: the 
autogen, or more generally the Form, has causal power because it reorganizes natural 
processes through orthograde dynamics. Returning to the bacterium example, the 
intricacies of cellular repair would never spontaneously occur by chance, and they 
automatically reorganize nature in a way counter to entropy (i.e., towards more 
organization and away from dissolution). Hence, the concepts of “work,” contragrade 
change, and efficient causation in general, depend on a background of orthograde change 
and formal causation (e.g., the background environment of a bacterium).650  
As for formal causation itself, it is nothing more than these constraints imposed 
by orthograde dynamics, and new formal causes can occur when these constraints are 
restructured, resulting in a change to orthograde processes, which in turn results in new 
kinds of efficient causation.651 For Deacon, although the universe is closed, it is yet open 
to new formal and hence new efficient causes.652 Contra nominalism, Forms (as 
constraints—determined negatively) can be both causal determinants of other general 
properties and the loci of causality via constraint propagation.653 The efficacy of Forms is 
an attribute of life itself—the constraints that constitute teleodynamic processes are not 
isolated but are a recursive perpetuation of absences that can have physical consequences 
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(e.g., life).654 In short, for Deacon, formal causality is real.  
That said, Deacon quickly points out that it is fallible to think that a thing belongs 
to a class of universals, and asserts that human mental categories do not passively receive 
Forms but actively structure categories and adapt them to the world—nominalism, he 
says, is supported by the “ubiquity of human error.”655 Thus, while Deacon rejects 
nominalism in the sense that he affirms that Forms possess efficacy and reality (qua 
absence), he accepts nominalism in the sense that humans created Forms, Forms 
themselves being useful mental categories to help humanity survive in the world. Forms, 
for Deacon, are both objective and a byproduct of the human brain. 
A Modern Approach: Reconciliation 
With Deacon's reconstruction of formal causation in mind, one can begin a 
modern approach to reconciling Dionysius's theology with modern notions of scientific 
causality. The following reconciliation will trace the five points of conflict outlined 
above: theophany, God, creation, sacraments, and hierarchy. 
First, the doctrine of theophany would likely have to be radically reduced in 
scope. Theophany presupposes that Form is more real, more fundamental than matter, but 
Deacon's notion of formal causation begins with explaining ententional properties in 
terms of non-ententional properties—matter is still more fundamental than Form, even if 
Form is ultimately irreducible. Unless one posits a material God, most of creation (its 
material parts) would not be manifesting God. Since theophany entails that all of creation 
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manifests God, if anything real is found that is not a manifestation of God, then this 
contradicts theophany. Deacon's formal causation results in most of creation not 
manifesting God—for Deacon, matter is independent of Form.656 At most, God could be 
made manifest in creation through ententional properties, but these consist of only a part 
of the entirety of creation (again, unless one posits a material God, in which case one 
ends up with pantheism, not theophany). 
Second, Dionysius's doctrine of God, as already suggested, would have to 
undergo alteration. As seen, unless one accepts pantheism, God's immanence would have 
to be limited to Forms and so would not be present in matter. By contrast, God's 
transcendence could perhaps be entirely salvaged. For Dionysius, God is beyond being, 
but with Deacon's conception of Forms, the classical sense of “being” would likely have 
to be abandoned for several reasons. First, Deacon's Forms have only the function of 
telos not of archē, and “being” in the Neoplatonic tradition depended on the latter as 
much if not more than the former. This leads to the second reason: with the abandonment 
of Forms as archē, being would be indistinguishable from nothingness, which fits 
perfectly well into Deacon's theory of Forms as what is missing, absent, and akin to the 
concept zero. Whereas, in Dionysius's thought, formal causation plays a key role in 
delimiting being from nonbeing (viz., the Good encompasses both while Being belongs 
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only to being), in Deacon's thought, no such distinction could be made because Forms 
only refer to nonbeing. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Deacon wavers on the issue 
of nominalism. Forms are not infallibly true, but useful mental categories—they hardly 
refer to a greater fullness of reality. In Neoplatonism, Being is the fullness of all being, 
not a mental category that merely names beings; the very taking of Forms to be little 
more than names is precisely the meaning of “nominalism.” If this third reason is pressed, 
one winds up with a Demiurge or a Whiteheadean God that is a being who applies the 
Forms to matter. Even if Deacon announces his full agreement with realism, God would 
be either (a) sheer telos beyond telos, which Deacon would likely disagree with because 
it would give an ultimate telos to everything, or (b) sheer nothingness beyond 
nothingness. Here at last, with option b, one could reasonably reconstruct a transcendent 
God.657 So while God would no longer be transcendent as the fullness of all reality, God 
could nevertheless be transcendent as the ultimate ground (nothingness) of all reality (to 
be clear, Deacon himself does not make this move). 
Third, Dionysius's understanding of creation would require several modifications 
under Deacon's notion of formal causality. On the one hand, creatures make God manifest 
insofar as they partake of Form; on the other hand, creatures have being, whereas Form is 
absence and God is nothingness, and this complicates how God could be both the archē 
and telos of all beings. In fact, as already seen, God cannot be archē, since (a) creatures 
get their substance from matter, not Form, and (b) being itself must be reconceptualized 
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as nothingness not substance. Creatures, then, at best would be only partial symbols of 
God, for they would be symbols only insofar as they partake of Form (assuming that 
God, as nothingness, grounds all Forms). Conversely, creatures would also have partial 
independence from God insofar as they are matter.  
While the notion of archē under Deacon has already been excluded for reasons 
previously examined, the task remains to show how God as the telos of all creatures is 
still viable, despite Deacon disagreeing with it. The difficulty arises from Dionysius's 
strong link between telos and archē, between procession and return—one cannot exist 
without the other. Still, “difficult” need not mean insurmountable. Since God could be 
conceived as sheer nothingness (again, this move makes Deacon's case as strong as 
possible for formal causation—Deacon himself does not say this), creatures would realize 
their telos not via the realization of the fullness of their Form, but via experiencing 
oneness with nothingness (God).658 Since absence (nothingness) grounds all Forms, this 
includes the Forms of creatures, and since for Deacon Forms are inherently teleological, 
one could conceivably bridge the gap between the realization of Form and teleology via 
nothingness (i.e., both point to nothingness). Of course, how one might account for the 
non-ententional properties of creatures (matter) would remain an open question, but it 
may be sufficient for the problem at hand that the ententional properties to possess 
teleological orientation, without worrying about non-ententional properties. At the very 
least, the mere presence of creatures having non-ententional properties does not a priori 
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exclude the possibility of creatures having a telos that is God. 
Fourth, sacramentology presents a challenge to applying Deacon's formal 
causality to Dionysius's theology. Sacraments, for Dionysius, provide real presence of a 
higher, fuller reality, but Deacon's philosophy requires that Forms denote absence, not 
presence. How, then, could sacraments exist? They exist by providing orientation in the 
reverse direction: towards absence. Sacraments, insofar as they have Form, can provide 
participation in nothingness. The outstanding issue then becomes: do sacraments provide 
participation by possessing a greater degree of absence than their participants? The 
answer would seem to be Yes, and this issue leads directly to the doctrine of hierarchy. 
Lastly, hierarchy, if it can be maintained at all, would require reconceptualization 
under Deacon. Clearly, whatever hierarchy may mean, it would not consist of the most 
unified, most full beings at the top towards which all other beings move. Instead, 
hierarchy could only mean that the higher beings would participate more in absence; 
alternatively, one could argue that absence, by definition, mandates that all beings are 
equidistant from God, abolishing hierarchy entirely.659 Completely ditching hierarchy 
would void Dionysius's celestial and ecclesiastical theology, but it would certainly fit 
well within modernity's ideology of equality. That said, the opportunity remains open to 
reinterpret hierarchy around nothingness and absence rather than unity and fullness. 
Overall, with Deacon in charge, Dionysius's theology would require serious 
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modification but would not have to be discarded altogether. By forcing Dionysius's 
thought into a science-driven reformulation of formal causation, the modern approach 
offers the advantage of being more or less readily palatable to a modern audience while 
maintaining a reasonably sophisticated theology. 
A Postmodern Approach Offered: Friedrich Nietzsche 
 A second avenue towards reconciling Dionysius's theology with modern scientific 
notions of causality is simply to dismiss the entire “problem” out of hand. Science 
certainly does not offer any grasp on objective reality—for there is no such thing—and 
theology laughably even less so. Friedrich Nietzsche provides a compelling case for this 
second avenue through what might be described as a postmodern approach.660 
 Nietzsche critiques not only folk theology, but also classical theologies such as 
Dionysius's (he explicitly mocks mystical explanations as “not even superficial”661). He 
fully realizes and embraces the consequences of his critique. Nietzsche famously declared 
the death of God:662 we killed God, although most do not realize that God is dead, and 
are living in God's shadow.663 Abstractly, God had to die because God saw everything: 
humanity's depths, ultimate grounds, concealed disgrace, ugliness, etc., and because 
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God's pity knew no shame, humanity could not bear that such a witness should live.664 
More concretely, the modern mind simply no longer experiences the world as having 
divine significance.665 The classical notion of God, like Christianity itself, has become 
distasteful to modern tongues, and so this notion had to go.666 For Nietzsche, the 
Christian God (the God who is Spirit) is a “contradiction of life,” is “nothingness 
deified,” and the “will to nothingness sanctified.”667  
 Nietzsche associates God with nothingness because he realizes the classical 
connection between God and Being, and so critiques the very notion of being itself. He 
calls Christianity “Jewish” for choosing being over nonbeing: Jews, he writes, chose 
being at any price, including truth, reality, and naturalness, and in fact have defined 
“being” as counter to these and thus as the antithesis of natural values.668 Being is an 
“empty fiction,”669 and is actually derivative of will (as are unity, identity, cause, 
materiality, substance, and duration—humans err here because of a prejudice for 
reason).670 Philosophers in particular err because they hate history, and so make it into a 
dead concept (being), and yet cannot explain why being eludes them.671 Against this bias 
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for dead, stagnant concepts, Nietzsche says that it is an error to think that enduring things 
are the things that are real.672 Instead, becoming has “deeper meaning and greater value” 
than being.673 
 In the wake of the death of God (Who is the sanctification of nothingness) and the 
concomitant destruction of ontology, Nietzsche celebrates that reality has now lost its 
measure. Apart from God, humanity is neither given its qualities nor does it make itself, 
but humanity is a necessity (its qualities are fated), and so there is no measure of 
humanity's “being.”674 Without God grounding and measuring reality, humans lose their 
traction on reality as a whole:675 one cannot speak of an essence behind the appearance 
because all appearance is like a dream (i.e, there is no objective reality676)—“knowledge” 
merely preserves and continues the dream.677 Nietzsche finds that the human brain 
evolved to survive, not to grasp reality; the human “capacity” for truth and logic evolved 
to aid in survival, and nothing more (he argues that there may have been other species 
with faculties better attuned to reality-as-becoming than humans, but the fictions of logic 
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yield a survival advantage, hence these others did not survive).678 Since all humans have 
the same brain structured around survival and herd instinct,679 it comes as no surprise that 
Nietzsche should write that all humans share this same dream of appearances, and that 
philosophers only exacerbate this illusion by speaking of “knowledge.” Humans have no 
organ for knowledge, only organs that are useful for the herd.680 “Logic” is but human 
logic.681 Humanity desires knowledge, but regardless of this desire, it cannot take what 
does not belong to it.682 Nietzsche challenges his readers to subtract every human 
contribution from an appearance if they can—if they can forget their humanity and 
animality—and since they cannot, there is therefore no objective reality.683 Given that 
reality has no substance or measure, Nietzsche consequently emphasizes that what 
humans call things are more important than what they are: appearance becomes essence 
(hence he calls reality a “delusion”).684 
 Not surprisingly, the loss of objective reality entails the loss of objective truth. 
The cure to Plato and Christianity, says Nietzsche, is Thucydides: there is no reason (or 
morality) in reality.685 Instead, “man's truths are his irrefutable errors.”686 Again, the 
human brain, as much as it would like to, does not belong to the realm of knowledge. 
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Mere human agreement about something shows little more than the similarity of brains 
evolved for survival—certainly not arriving at “truth.” Hence, what appears to be true to 
all is an “irrefutable error.” Truth, if such a thing exists, is unobtainable, and the belief 
that it is discoverable is an error.687 In fact, error and delusion are conditions of human 
“knowledge.”688 As such, “thoughts are shadows of feelings [or sensations689],” that is, 
thoughts are but simplified, emptier expressions of something sensed, something more 
primitive.690 Likewise, the “thinker” is one who makes reality more simple than what it 
is.691 At bottom, knowledge is not understanding but an interaction of instincts such as 
laughter, lamentation, and detestation—the nature of “knowledge” is in unconscious 
thinking.692 “Truths” are like a skin that cover over these deeper cognitive processes.693 
All refutation and proof, then, is but an “intellectual masquerade,” and the actual reason 
for why people believe what they believe is something irrational: a change in taste (from 
which reasons are invented in order to justify this change of taste).694 Thus, the modern 
opposition to Christianity no longer comes from reasons but from a change in taste.695  
 Furthermore, following nominalism, actions are ultimately unknowable because 
                                                 
687 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §94. See Kaufmann, 147n37. 
688 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §107. 
689 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff, ed. Bernard Williams (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Further quotations from The Gay Science are from 
the Kaufmann translation. 
690 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §179. See also Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §1. 
691 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §189. 
692 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §333. 
693 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §307. 
694 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §39. 
695 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §132. 
152 
every action is irretrievably unique.696 In short, people have interpreted the world as 
being rational, but this is simply because they have interpreted it according to their 
humanizing needs, surely not because the world is rational (or divine or just).697 Put 
positively, Nietzsche sees the rejection of objective reality and truth as liberating: 
homogeneity is slavery, and knowledge, just like religion and the arts, should not be 
homogeneous because none of these come in a one-size-fits-all package.698 
 Nietzsche's extirpation of God, ontology, objective reality, and truth inevitably has 
implications for science. He critiques scientists for having faith that nature has its 
measure and equivalent in human thought and valuation—a “world of truth” that 
humanity's little reason can somehow master completely and forever.699 Such faith 
degrades existence by reducing it to calculation.700  
 On the one hand, to say, with the aim of justifying science, that the only justifiable 
interpretation of the world is mechanistic, and so to permit only seeing, weighing, 
touching, calculating, and counting, is crude, naïve, and idiotic—the scientific 
interpretation of the world is perhaps one of the stupidest because it is the poorest in 
meaning, for an essentially mechanical world is an essentially meaningless one.701 In 
other words, to reduce the world to calculation and quantification leaves the world 
without essence, without meaning, and therefore leaves the world utterly empty and 
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colorless (hence, this interpretation of the world is crude and stupid). Nietzsche provides 
the example of music: if one gives a scientific treatment of music, in the end, one still 
knows nothing of music.702  
 On the other hand, a mechanical interpretation of the universe does it too much 
honor because it presupposes that the universe was constructed for one purpose (since 
this is the nature of machines).703 Nietzsche asserts that the world “is in all eternity 
chaos.”704 Therefore, scientists should not impose order on the world, or form, beauty, 
wisdom, heartlessness, or unreason on it for that matter—all of these are 
anthropomorphisms.705 Likewise, the world does not eternally create and nothing 
eternally endures, and in this respect, “matter” is as much of a conceptual mistake as 
“God.”706  
 A reader of Nietzsche should note that his critique of an orderly universe 
immediately follows a declaration that God is dead, and that the West continues to live in 
God's shadow, thereby insinuating that scientists who believe in an orderly universe are 
living in God's shadow (because they assume an objective reality, which requires 
ontology, which in turn requires theology).707 Nietzsche himself draws out this 
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connection: he critiques, as presupposing God, the notions of both accidents (in the 
colloquial not Aristotelian sense) and laws of nature.708 In a godless universe, science is 
little more than the attempt to humanize everything (i.e., learning to describe humanity), 
not the discovery of something objective about reality.709 The same applies to science's 
handmaiden, mathematics: mathematics does not yield objective knowledge but only 
human relations to things—it is “merely the means for general and ultimate knowledge of 
man.”710 A scientist may object by arguing that science works and therefore it is true, to 
which Nietzsche would answer that faith in science does indeed come from its utility—
and untruth is useful.711 
 Besides these critiques of science in general, Nietzsche also provides a critique of 
causation in particular. Appealing to the feebleness of the human mind, Nietzsche 
concludes that cause-effect duality—a human invention—likely does not exist in nature 
herself, for there are an infinite number of processes in between the supposed “cause” 
and “effect” that escape human reach.712 Again, the human mind came into existence to 
survive, not to grasp reality. Human notions of causation offer no real explanation but 
merely describe the fact that one event precedes another.713 
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A Postmodern Approach: Reconciliation 
 Nietzsche's postmodern approach to “reconciliation” reconciles by dissolution: 
theology, scientific realism, and any grip humans may have on causality are all equally 
rejected. The problem of how to integrate Dionysius's theology and formal causation with 
modern science and scientific notions of causality ceases to be a problem at all because 
the entire project is seen as mistaken. Thus, Nietzsche offers reconciliation in the form of 
abolition: the conflict's presuppositions concerning theology, science, and causation 
concomitantly are abolished. Given the nihilistic direction of Western thought in the past 
century, it would be foolish to ignore this brutal but honest response to the conflict 
between ancient and scientific causality. 
A Traditional Approach Offered: Perennial Philosophy 
 The third and final approach to be considered for reconciling the formal causation 
found in Dionysius with the type of causation found in modern science is the traditional 
metaphysics of perennial philosophy. Whereas the modern approach prioritized modern 
science's notion of causality over Dionysius's notion of causality, and the postmodern 
approach disregarded both parties, the traditional approach prioritizes traditional notions 
of causality (such as Dionysius's) over modern ones. More precisely, the traditional 
approach asserts that modern ideas of causality are subordinate to ancient ones—modern 
notions of causality are valid but limited, and, in fact, are more limited relative to those of 
formal causality. 
 Wolfgang Smith provides a helpful overview of the core tenets of perennial 
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cosmology: (1) cosmic reality has qualitative aspects, (2) there is an ontological hierarchy 
structured such that the corporeal domain is the lowest tier, (3) humans are a microcosm 
of the universe (thus there exists “factual anthropomorphism” because humanity and the 
cosmos share the same blueprint),714 and (4) humans can ascend to higher planes of 
reality.715 If these tenets seem superstitious, it is only because, as Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
argues, “superstition” is literally something from which the ground has been removed, 
and thus the destruction of traditional metaphysics renders the traditional cosmology that 
stemmed from it superstitious.716 On the contrary, he says, traditional cosmology is not a 
superstitious or primitive version of modern science but has profound knowledge of the 
formal and qualitative aspects of the corporeal world that are irreducible to quantity.717 
 In defense of perennial cosmology, perennial philosophers often critique key 
metaphysical assumptions of the modern worldview. Smith characterizes modernity by its 
reduction of the cosmos to the lowest hierarchical plane and the epistemological premise 
that enables this reduction.718 Smith identifies this epistemological premise as “Cartesian 
bifurcation,” which is the belief that bodies have no sensible qualities, and thus, since 
bodies are imperceptible, all sensible qualities must be private phantasms of the mind; 
hence, the term “bifurcation,” for the perception of anything really is twofold, real and 
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unreal.719  
 To Smith's observation of Cartesian bifurcation, Nasr would add that Descartes 
makes what would have traditionally been seen as the illusory self the foundation of 
ontology and epistemology,720 and so now the subject is trapped in a world of reason 
without Intellect or revelation.721 In other words, detached from Intellect and revelation, 
modern thinking reduces reason by secularizing it, but secularized reason can only see the 
profane.722 Secularization, or what Nasr dubs the “Promethean Revolt,” occurred due to 
Descartes's excessive separation between one's consciousness (“I”) and the cosmos (not-
“I”).723 Other factors driving the Promethean Revolt include the destruction of the unity 
and hierarchy of knowledge, the quantification of science's esoteric content, the ideology 
of skepticism in general, and the loss of knowledge based on certitude (this loss came 
from reducing Being to a mental concept).724 This all started, according to Nasr, with an 
excessively rigid Aristotelianism via the misinterpretation of Ibn Rushd,725 which 
resulted in exteriorizing the process of knowledge, depleting the cosmos of its soul and 
qualitative nature, making humanity mechanical, and culminating with Hegel turning 
permanence into change (his dialectic), humanizing the Divine, and infinitizing 
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humanity's finite consciousness.726 
 These sweeping intellectual shifts had a significant impact upon scientific 
thinking. As Nasr summarizes the change, Galileo changed the language of nature from 
that of Dante to that of mathematics (and not in the Pythagorean sense, which was 
concerned with beauty rather than technical proof727).728 Modern scientific thinking 
becomes obsessed with quantity. For Smith, following René Guénon, “quantity” is but 
the residue of an existence emptied of everything that constituted its essence, and by this 
definition of quantity, the materia secunda is the signata quantitate,729 for what remains 
when all content is gone is the container (which by this definition is quantity).730 
Critically, Smith denies that the Forms of objects are mathematical—otherwise, he 
argues, one would actually see a mathematical structure when one sees reality.731 
Furthermore, no one has ever directly perceived a mathematical structure but determines 
them via abstraction.732 In other words, the essence of what a thing is, imaged by its 
Form, is completely devoid of mathematical and quantitative properties. 
 Smith applies his sharp dichotomy between quantity and Form in his distinction 
between the corporeal and the physical: corporeal reality is directly known by sense 
perception whereas physical reality is indirectly known via some scientific (corporeal!) 
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instrument that interacts with some physical object and registers the result in a 
perceptible state.733 Smith explains what he means by “physical” with an analogy: just as 
a Euclidean plane, qua substratum, carries with it a mathematical structure constituted by 
Euclidean properties (enabling the existence of particular geometric shapes, which 
themselves express the mathematical structure carried by the plane),734 so too the proto-
physical plane (the materia secunda) carries with it a mathematical structure (the signata 
quantitate) constituted by physical objects.735 Thus, the laws of physics unveil the 
mathematical structure of the materia secunda underlying the physical domain.736 That is, 
in terms of ontological hierarchy, physical objects belong below the corporeal and above 
the materia secunda—the physical is to the corporeal as potency is to act.737 Since 
physical objects are potency waiting to be actualized in a corporeal entity, they are not 
things and have no essence, but instead are purely relational, for they are defined by the 
intentional use of a corporeal instrument.738 The physical is a secondary, participatory 
reality, while the perceptible or corporeal is the primary reality.739  
 Moving further up the hierarchy, everything essential that is found in the lower 
levels also exists in the higher levels, but the lower add something non-essential not 
found in the higher levels: the quantitative. The quantitative is (a) rooted in the material 
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substrate, (b) revealed as potentiae at the physical level, and (c) actualized at the 
corporeal level, though does not extend beyond the corporeal.740 In other words, the 
difference between corporeal and higher planes is that only the corporeal is subject to 
quantitative conditions and bounds (e.g., a pot of water divides what was undivided and 
unbounded, and introduces quantitative determinations, yet no change has been made to 
the water's substance, which exists the same on both ontological planes).741 The 
quantitative does not convey essence but separates and externalizes, thus the quantitative 
excludes earthly things from the inner world, and it is the quantitative, according to 
Smith, that will be destroyed in the apocalypse for it is quantity that bestows 
materiality.742 At most, space, time, and matter could exist in the intermediary plane in a 
higher mode.743 
A Traditional Approach: Reconciliation 
 This traditional approach reconciles formal causation with modern scientific 
causation by limiting the scope of the latter. Physics, says Smith, is basic (because it 
descends to the material substrate) but inessential (for the same reason), and since there 
are essences above the level of proto-matter and physical objects, physics can know 
nothing about them.744 The real world is known by essences, which in turn are known by 
cognitive sense perception, for only cognitive sense perception gives access to the 
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corporeal domain (for Smith, knowledge is ultimate and irreducible).745 Even then, the 
corporeal domain is no more than the outer shell of the cosmos.746 Thus, physics is blind 
to qualities and essence because it sees only what is ontologically outermost.747 The 
primary characteristics of the corporeal plane derive from the Fiat of God, and so physics 
deals with the container not the content.748 Smith takes his distinction between the 
corporeal and physical so far as to assert that physics can only give the age of the 
physical not the corporeal world.749 Again, knowledge in physics is “basic but 
inessential” because it does not grasp quiddity, and thus is not true knowledge but 
“pragmatic” or “operational” knowledge.750 
 From Smith's traditional perspective, the conflict between formal causation and 
modern science's causation has its origins in the attempt by modern science to reduce the 
corporeal to the physical.751 Against this reductionism, Smith argues that not only does 
everyone already know the difference between the corporeal and the physical (e.g., 
between an instrument and a quantum cloud),752 but quantum mechanics itself insists on 
this distinction.753 The physical is in-between the corporeal and the materia secunda—the 
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corporeal is like a Form (non-mathematical) to the physical, giving it whatness.754 A 
chair, for example, does not reduce to quantum particles because no one can sit on 
quantum particles, and so chairs must have substance.755 (This also explains the sense in 
which Smith means by his claim that tables are not made of molecules.756) Science has its 
place (an inessential one), and the futile attempt to reduce the essential to the inessential 
accounts for the conflict between formal and scientific causation. 
 As such, the traditional approach proposes no major alterations be made to 
Dionysius's theology. His doctrines of theophany, God, creation, sacraments, and 
hierarchy stay exactly as they are, without modification. Instead, what changes is how 
science interacts with theology. For these traditional thinkers, science is (as Smith puts it) 
“basic but inessential” meaning that science has nothing to do with essences, whereas 
theology does. The conflict between Dionysius's formal causation and modern scientific 
notions of causation resolves because the latter has been removed from the role of 
determining essences, leaving the former to stand as is. 
Weighing the Options 
 In order to select which among the modern, postmodern, and traditional 
approaches best resolves the conflict, the underlying philosophical issues must first be 
elucidated; only after that can the three approaches be compared directly. To reiterate: the 
modern approach reformulates formal causation in order to conform to notions of 
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causation as determined by modern science; the postmodern approach dissolves the 
problem entirely by rejecting theology, metaphysics, ontology, science, causation, etc.; 
and the traditional approach subsumes modern scientific notions of causation under 
formal causation. As seen in the previous chapter, the main philosophical issues at stake 
surrounding causation are the primary-secondary quality distinction, nominalism, and 
teleology. Each issue will be treated in turn. 
The Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction 
 The main argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction is that primary 
qualities are metaphysically primary because objects cannot be imagined without them, 
while one can imagine objects without their secondary qualities. Thus, the argument for 
the primary-secondary quality distinction is rooted in a priori argument rather than 
empirical observation.757 Interestingly, given that primary qualities do not come from the 
senses, Hobbes argues that any such qualities must be unreal precisely because they do 
not depend on the senses.758 In other words, the basis for the primary-secondary quality 
distinction must be some form of a priori knowledge, and therefore cannot be empirical. 
 While this observation means little to most advocates of the primary-secondary 
quality distinction, it substantially undermines Locke's approach, as Locke rejected innate 
ideas. As such, for him, primary qualities could only be known by the senses, but then he 
lost the ability to distinguish between, for example, shapes (for him a primary quality) 
and heat (for him a secondary quality)—both ideas are ultimately had in the same way 
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(the senses). The mind has no rational basis by which it can declare one “primary” and 
the other “secondary” because this requires some sort of a priori knowledge whereby 
“primary” and “secondary” are already known and then matched to sense perceptions. 
For instance, if one says that heat is a secondary quality because a thing's temperature can 
be changed without changing the thing itself, while shape is a primary quality because a 
thing's shape cannot be changed without changing the thing itself, the a priori criterion 
here is “changelessness”—and a particular definition of changelessness at that (for it 
could be argued that a change in temperature does change water in a fundamental way, 
and a change in shape does not (e.g., changing the shape of ice does not cause it to cease 
being ice)). To eliminate the a priori altogether—that is, to employ a purely empirical 
approach such as Locke's—faces great difficulty in making the primary-secondary quality 
distinction plausible. 
 By contrast, Descartes's and Galileo's versions of the primary-secondary quality 
distinction are unabashedly a priori, and so they do not run aground in the same way. 
Descartes and Galileo agree that primary qualities are those without which nothing can be 
imagined, and Descartes adds the additional argument of primary qualities being the 
permanent qualities of all objects. Opposing the latter argument, E.A. Burtt points out 
that color and resistance also have permanence in objects, yet Descartes considers them 
secondary.759 If Descartes truly believed that permanence determined whether a quality 
were primary or secondary, he would have posited a wide range of primary qualities, such 
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as color. Descartes's inconsistency in applying his “permanence” criterion suggests that 
permanence is not really the criterion at work in delineating the primary from the 
secondary. Even if one were to attempt to revive Descartes's criterion of permanence by 
applying it more consistently, Plotinus argued that permanence in and of itself in no way 
indicates real or primary being, for shadows have permanence yet are privations of 
light.760 In other words, “permanence” fails to delineate between “primary” and 
“secondary” reality, and therefore cannot be a criterion in the primary-secondary quality 
distinction. 
 Still, the main argument for the primary-secondary quality distinction, the one that 
wins Galileo's approval as well, remains untouched by the critiques of Burtt and Plotinus. 
While color indeed is permanent, one can easily imagine objects without any color 
whatsoever, as in fact the blind do all of the time. However, such an appeal puts 
Descartes and Galileo in an awkward position. If they argue that human disabilities can 
prove that a property is secondary, what of dyscalculia? They certainly would not admit 
that dyscalculia proves that numbers are secondary qualities—some people lack the 
proper faculties to grasp numbers, but this does not prove that numbers are unreal. But 
without appealing to the disabled, Burtt's argument would continue to stand, for sighted 
people indeed cannot imagine physical objects without attributing color to them. Simply 
because a human may be barred from detecting some quality via a disability does not 
imply there was not a real quality to be detected in the first place.  
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 Furthermore, the argument of Descartes and Galileo for the primary-secondary 
quality distinction is a non sequitor: that qualities are found in all bodies does not at all 
imply that they are the only real qualities of all bodies. For example, hair is found on all 
human bodies, but no one would argue for that reason that, therefore, hair is one of the 
primarily real qualities of human bodies. A quality can be universally found yet be non-
essential. Thus, even granting Descartes and Galileo their premise that no body can be 
imagined without their proposed primary qualities, this would hardly imply that those 
qualities are in fact primary in any metaphysical way. They could perhaps respond to the 
“hair” counterexample by saying that not only the criterion for a primary quality but also 
the primary quality itself must be abstract, but then “abstraction” becomes the real 
criterion and begs the question as to whether a legitimate primary-secondary quality 
distinction can be had a priori in the first place. 
 Most problematically, unless one appeals to Cartesian dualism, neither knower 
nor knowledge itself is a primary quality, meaning that all knowledge is ultimately 
illusory (because knowledge would have to be a secondary quality, which, by definition, 
is a mere byproduct of more fundamental primary qualities). But the primary-secondary 
quality distinction is a claim about the nature of knowledge, and thus it falls into a 
reductio ad absurdum: if the primary-secondary quality distinction is true, knowledge is 
an illusion, meaning that knowledge claims, such as the primary-secondary quality 
distinction, are also illusions. 
 Perhaps one could try to revive the primary-secondary quality distinction by 
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returning to what initially inspired it: the mathematization of reality. Historically, the 
early modern revival of Neoplatonism led to the mathematization of reality, but here the 
original Neoplatonists betray their early modern followers. For Plotinus, quantity could 
not possibly be a “primary quality” for he argued that not every thing has quantity.761 For 
instance, quantity itself does not have quantity, and that which does have quantity 
participates in quantity—for Plotinus, quantity is a Form. Seen in this way, whatever 
does not participate in quantity is without quantity (e.g., all bodiless natures).762 Plotinus 
elsewhere argued that neither number nor magnitude are primary genera because number 
comes from (a) the Primary Genera of Being, Movement (which is the life of Being), 
Rest, Sameness, and Otherness, and (b) itself (e.g., 2 comes from 1); magnitude is merely 
the number in a particular thing.763 That is, number initially comes from the primary 
genera (the number 1 is from Sameness), and then after that it comes from itself (1 + 1 = 
2, which leads to 3, etc.). Since magnitude is a subset of number, neither number nor 
magnitude are primary. Likewise, the quantitative in general is not a primary genus.764  
 At best, one could say that the early modern followers of Neoplatonism adhered 
to the projectionist school of mathematical objects, which asserted that geometry is a 
“projection” from a higher realm, the realm of Forms,765 but then these thinkers would 
have missed the key point: that geometry, numbers, quantity, etc. are not fundamental but 
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come from a higher realm, the realm of Forms. 
Nominalism: Forms 
 Of course, deriving quantitative properties from Forms means nothing if Forms 
are unreal. As seen in the previous chapter, Hobbes argued for nominalism because 
Forms fail to solve the problem of individuation: if one repairs a ship, replacing every 
plank, then recovers all of these planks and reconstructs the ship, there would be two 
different ships with the same exact Form (Locke made a similar argument766). Several 
responses to Hobbes's argument are warranted. First, as G. W. Leibniz767 correctly 
pointed out, the problem of individuation cannot be solved on materialistic principles 
(such as Hobbes's), for then there is no difference between two atoms of the same size 
and shape.768 A world of strict materialism and nominalism falls, counter-intuitively, into 
a world without individuation because the same arrangement of matter means the same 
exact reality—precisely the dilemma Hobbes wanted to charge realism with! Leibniz 
realized that individuation, in order to escape this dilemma, must presuppose some notion 
of infinity because there are an array of factors about a thing that are imperceptible, yet 
necessary, in order to know that thing's principle of individuation (in this way, Leibniz 
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affirmed metaphysical relationality—everything in some way reflects everything else).769 
As such, something infinite (like Form) is necessary. Second, as Perl argues, any 
principle of individuation requires unity and identity by definition, and this is exactly 
what formal causation provides (but what matter cannot provide).770 Any individual being 
must possess unity (in order to be a being at all) and identity (in order to be individual), 
both of which are given exclusively by Form. Third and finally, it should be noted that 
Hobbes appeared to be working with an overly narrow understanding of Form, one that 
sets up a straw man rather than taking the Neoplatonic tradition seriously. He seemed to 
think that Form is radically separate from matter, rather than matter being the reality of 
Form in multiplicity (even in the Scholastic tradition, which he was more familiar with, 
when matter is completely devoid of Form it is prime matter, and thus is utterly 
unintelligible). 
 Hobbes aside, Locke argued that if realism is true, then monsters should not exist, 
for how can two things partake of the same Form and yet one be deformed and the other 
not?771 Responding directly to Locke, Leibniz reasoned that (a) monsters do not disprove 
universals because universals force one to look at the internal nature beyond external 
appearance—simply because one does not know whether a particular internal nature 
exists in monsters does not mean there is no internal nature at all; (b) if there is no 
internal nature, every monster would have to be a new species because one has only 
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external appearances to go by; and (c) monstrous children exhibit reason at the same age 
as healthy children, indicating that there is indeed an internal nature, so there is little 
justification for saying otherwise for non-human species.772 A fourth argument could be 
added: (d) the very notion of “monster” only makes sense in the context of an objective 
measure, that is, a Form. Monsters are literally de-formed. Without Forms, “monster” 
would be an entirely invalid concept because there would be nothing by which to judge 
or to know that a being is deformed (a monster) in the first place. According to 
nominalism, every being is a unique individual, in which case every being must be taken 
as face value, and thus no being can be said to be deformed in a strong, normative sense. 
At best, the nominalist could appeal to a statistical bell curve, but the mean of the curve 
has no normative or regulative power—it is purely descriptive. 
 Locke could still appeal to the classic argument for nominalism: Form reduces to 
name (hence the term “nominalism”). Locke argued: “Now, since nothing can be a man, 
or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name 
man stands for, nor anything be a man, or have a right to the species man, but what has 
the essence of that species; it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name stands, 
and the essence of the species, is one and the same.”773 In other words, according to 
Locke, Forms fail to do any real metaphysical work; whatever work one wants them to do 
is in fact done by names. As before, Leibniz opposed Locke, effectively saying that 
nominalism puts the cart before the horse: ideas do not depend on names, but rather 
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names name already existing ideas.774 Leibniz provided several answers to Locke: (a) 
while the historical discovery of a notion proceeds from the sensible and concrete to the 
abstract, the natural origin is in the reverse order (i.e., being moves from the abstract to 
the concrete);775 (b) one cannot speak in purely individual terms (proper names) but one 
needs universals formed upon real similitude;776 or, seen another way, (c) even if the 
names given to natures were not grounded on anything, natures still have something 
internal in common (whatever that nature is), and so are still grounded in the real species 
itself because these internal commonalities are real.777  
 Leibniz's argument regarding the need for real similitude and internal 
commonality echoes the traditional argument for realism as found in Plato: Forms are 
necessary for knowledge. Plato argued that, in order for knowledge of the physical 
(changing) world to exist, knowledge must be grounded in something unchangeable 
(Forms).778 If only changeable entities exist, then there is no “is,” for everything is 
always in the process of becoming, and nothing actually is.779 Hence, the knowledge of 
entities known by the senses does not reduce to sense perception (the world of change) 
but requires Forms such as Sameness, Difference, Existence, etc.780 Since each of the 
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senses gets its data from a different sense organ, there must be some higher function that 
takes all of this data and declares that it all refers to the same object.781 For instance, 
looking at a table comes from the eyes, touching it comes from the hand, smelling it from 
the nose, etc., yet a person knows that all of these independent sensations refer to one, 
unified object (the table). The Sameness of the table, then, comes not from the senses but 
from the intellect which discerns the Form Sameness. 
 As such, humans do not know by the senses but through them: knowledge only 
comes about when one reflects upon one's sense data,782 and this requires the Forms of 
Being, Identity, Sameness, Difference, Unity, and Plurality.783 For example, stating that 
two dogs are of the same breed is not a claim knowable directly by the senses, but 
requires comparing sense data via a higher level of analysis, and, in this case, the 
partaking of Sameness and Difference. “Sameness” and “Difference,” by definition, are 
not particulars—they represent abstract universals that transcend the material realm. If 
they do not really exist (if only particulars exist as nominalism asserts), then Sameness 
and Difference do not refer to anything real, and therefore knowledge of the physical 
world becomes impossible because one cannot move beyond the level of particularity. 
That is, knowledge claims concerning the physical world consist of stating that sense data 
are similar or different—that is, actually similar or different. Having read Plato, Leibniz 
would insist that the axioms of identity and contradiction, as well as experience, must be 
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first principles, for otherwise there is no truth or falsity.784 This is another way of saying 
that Sameness and Difference are necessary for knowledge. 
 Further, even casting aside the Forms of Sameness and Difference, a concept such 
as truth (or falsity) depends on individual entities participating in their Forms.785 Without 
Forms, it makes little sense to posit generalities (e.g., “fire is hot”) because all that would 
exist are particulars—everything that is is simply what it is and nothing more (hence why 
Leibniz says that one cannot speak purely in individual terms). Generalities under 
nominalism would be useful linguistic tools for categorization, but have no traction on 
reality. Forms provide a universal that really exists, and so fire, hotness, coldness, 
standing, sitting, dogs, cats, etc. have not only a particular component (this dog) but an 
unchanging universal component (dogness). Without unchanging dogness, there can be 
no knowledge of dogs—there is simply nothing to know. Leibniz would add that, in order 
to conceive the similarity of things, one must already conceive of more than the particular 
things in question, and this is all universality is: argument cannot exist without universal 
truths, and particular propositions are always comprised of universals, for every 
particular truth can be made into a universal (e.g., Peter is some disciple).786 
 Finally, Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, argued that knowledge must be in a 
mode graspable by the human intellect.787 The mind grasps knowledge by abstraction.788 
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Now, if abstractions do not refer to anything in reality, then an infinite chasm erupts 
between what the mind can know (which are only abstractions) and what actually exists 
(which, under nominalism, would be only particulars). Thomas parted ways with 
Aristotle after this point: whereas for Aristotle the Form itself constitutes knowledge, for 
Thomas the Form “is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect 
understands.”789 Either way, in order for the mind to have knowledge, knowledge must 
(a) be abstract (so that the mind can grasp it), and (b) refer to reality; but in order for 
abstractions to refer to reality (and not be merely a generalization of particulars, which is 
always dependent on particulars), nominalism must be false. 
 If knowledge requires Forms, then nominalism falls into two reductio ad 
absurda.790 First, nominalism makes knowledge claims about the world (everything is a 
particular), but knowledge is not possible under nominalism—thus, if nominalism is true, 
then nominalism is false. Second, the statement “everything is a particular” makes a 
universal claim and presupposes the Form of Difference (because nominalism states that 
everything is different),791 and so requires something beyond particulars—again, if 
nominalism is true, then nominalism is false. In the first argument, nominalism collapses 
because it presupposes knowledge; in the second, it collapses because it presupposes 
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Difference. One could try to defend nominalism by accepting its radical skepticism, but 
the claim that “there is no knowledge” is itself a knowledge claim, and leads the 
nominalist to a dead end.792 
 Realism is often caricatured as rendering sense knowledge impossible, or as 
outright negating it. However, far from contradicting or undermining sense data, as 
mentioned in chapter two, Forms provide the only basis by which sense data can yield 
true knowledge. Forms are eternal and unchanging because, unlike their instances, they 
do not exist in time. A terrier and a Labrador are breeds of dog that have a limited 
existence in time, but the Form dog persists regardless of the fate of these two particular 
dogs. As eternal and that by which things are, Forms are the measure of reality793 and 
guarantee the truth of reality.794 By instantiating or imaging Forms, sense objects shadow 
reality and thereby yield knowledge. In other words, for there to be objective knowledge, 
knowledge by its nature must be timeless and measured, and, in order for the senses to 
detect this timeless knowledge, the sense objects they detect must participate in this 
timeless knowledge. In this way, Forms ground the validity of the senses. 
 Leibniz went so far as to argue that Form (or substance795) is necessary in order 
for key scientific ideas to be coherent. At first, this may seem inappropriate given that 
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Leibniz outright said that Forms are useless in physics but vital only in metaphysics.796 
However, modern distinctions between “physics” and “metaphysics” can lead to 
misunderstanding, for Leibniz later argues (to oversimplify his argument) that since 
motion in itself is purely geometrically relative, only the immediate cause or force of 
motion is ultimately real because force, unlike motion, is not purely relative.797 Instead, 
force belongs to one body and cannot be reduced to motion, size, shape, or extension. 
Thus, force requires Forms, for, while any particular natural phenomenon can be 
explained mathematically or mechanically, the general principles of corporeal and 
mechanical nature are metaphysical (not geometrical), and they relate to Forms as the 
cause of appearance (not materiality).798 At first glance, Leibniz seemed to deny that 
Forms properly belong to science, but given how science has changed since he wrote, 
topics he considered proper to metaphysics (e.g., force) in contemporary thinking belong 
to physics. 
 In any case, Leibniz furthered the grounds for realism by arguing that the nature 
of body cannot reduce to extension because size, motion, shape, and other such properties 
can never yield a substance.799 He illustrated this point by noting how extension depends 
on contact,800 and so would lead to absurdities if it were treated as a substance. For 
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instance, triangles and squares have different substances, but two touching triangles can 
make a square.801 Mere touch cannot plausibly change the substance of something, and 
therefore corporeal substance does not reduce to extension.802 Furthermore, since 
extension comes only from contact, body cannot be a substance but must be an aggregate 
of substances (which exacerbates the problem because each would face the same 
absurdity).803 Leibniz provided additional reasons for why extension cannot be the basis 
for substance: (a) there can only be as much reality as one's ingredients, (b) substance 
must be indivisible (e.g., soul) but extension by definition is infinitely divisible, and (c) 
extension cannot yield any sort of complete being because it only describes the present 
state, not the past or future, and thus one cannot get any action or change from it (as is 
required of a substance).804 
Nominalism: Formal Causation 
 If Forms are necessary, then so too is formal causation. As Plotinus argued, the 
starting point of all reasoning is “what a thing is.”805 Before reasoning can even get off 
the ground, one must know what one is reasoning about. It is simply impossible to 
discuss a topic or subject without there being a topic or subject to discuss (i.e., without 
there being a what). Forms provide whatness, and formal causation accounts for how an 
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object receives its whatness. Thus, every kind of reasoning, including reasoning about 
causation, requires Forms and, in order to make sense out of a particular thing's Form, 
formal causation. 
 To Plotinus's argument, Leibniz would add that formal causation is necessary to 
explain how the same idea can be expressed in different media. He argued that different 
internal constitutions or arrangements can result in the same appearance or idea.806 For 
example, the word “dog” printed on paper, and the word “dog” spoken have different 
material constitutions yet refer to the same idea. Hence, mere matter or efficient causation 
is insufficient: after matter in motion is accounted for, there remains leftover the 
appearance that the matter in motion made manifest. From this perspective, material and 
efficient causation are subordinate to formal causation: the former are the mere means by 
which the latter appears. Just as theories are more than the materiality of ink and paper or 
the motion of a pen or printer, so too reality is more than whatever given medium (matter 
in motion) it is expressed with at any given time. 
 Still, the modern mind, so ingrained to think only in terms of scientific causation, 
struggles to see the necessity of formal causation. Yet, it is this parochial vision that leads 
to philosophical quandaries and radical skepticism. As Michael Wagner notes, efficient 
causation accounts for only particulars interacting temporally, and so if the only tool one 
has is efficient causation, then causation is reduced to nothing more than a sequence of 
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particular states.807 This echoes Leibniz's point about extension alone being insufficient 
for activity, change, or persistence, and which is precisely David Hume's critique of 
causality. For Hume, matters of fact cannot be known a priori because they are never 
logically impossible (e.g., it is equally logically possible that the sun rises or does not rise 
tomorrow; by contrast it is not equally logically possible that 1 + 1 = 2 and that 1 + 1 = 
3),808 and therefore they must be known by the relation of cause and effect.809 
Problematically, humans believe in a necessary relation between cause and effect due to 
the irrational factors of custom and habit in everyday affairs, not because they can 
actually state what this necessary relation is.810 In fact, an effect can never in principle be 
discovered in its cause because the two are entirely different, and thus any connection 
between cause and effect must be arbitrary.811 
 This seed of doubt that Hume planted leads to radical skepticism: all matters of 
fact are founded on causality, but causality is learned through experience qua experience, 
that is, not through any process of reasoning or understanding.812 Why? Because 
experience, which must mean past experience, can only inform a knower of particular 
objects at a particular point in time, and “...why this experience should be extended to 
future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance 
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similar; this is the main question on which I would insist.”813 Hume demanded to know 
the chain of reasoning that allows one to jump from “I have found that such an object has 
always been attended with such an effect,” to “I foresee, that other objects, which are, in 
appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects.”814  
 Not satisfied with merely this negative argument against any connection between 
cause and effect, Hume proceeded to make a positive argument as to why any such 
connection is impossible in principle. He said that there are two branches of knowledge: 
demonstrative reasoning (by which he meant relations between ideas) and moral 
reasoning (by which he meant matters of fact).815 The former cannot justify a connection 
between cause and effect because, as seen, the former only applies when the contrary 
implies a logical contradiction, which never occurs in the case of cause and effect, and 
the latter cannot justify the connection without falling into circular reasoning: “We have 
said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and 
effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all 
our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be 
conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, to prove this last supposition by 
probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a 
circle, and taking for granted, which is the very point in question.”816 
 Hume practically made a mockery of trying to rationalize a connection between 
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cause and effect with his eggs example.817 Everyone admits that eggs appear identical to 
each other, yet no one for that reason assumes that they in fact do taste the same. That is, 
in the case of cause and effect, one wants to justify their connection by appealing to a 
past “cause-effect” link and applying it to a present one on account of the past's and 
present's similarity, but here, in the case of eggs, no rational person would move from 
“similarity in appearance” to “identity in reality.” Astonishingly, as Hume realized, the 
rational process that expects eggs to taste differently in spite of their similar appearance is 
the same “rational” process that wants past “cause-effect” pairs to match future ones on 
account of their similar appearance. That is, the same process of reasoning leads to 
opposite conclusions! No wonder Hume wrote, “I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such 
reasoning.”818 Whatever is behind causation consists of Hume calls a “secret power” 
inaccessible to human perception.819 And whatever leads people to think they “know” 
this secret connection certainly is not reason, for even infants learn from experience not 
to touch a candle, and they are not yet of the age of reason—that is, the fact that they can 
“learn” of causality without possessing reason shows that this “learning” of causality has 
nothing to do with reason at all (and the same could be said of beasts).820 
 Hume furthered his critique of causation by arguing that outward sensations can 
never yield a necessary connection.821 He reasoned that all anyone ever discovers about a 
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cause and its effect is that the effect follows sequentially from its cause as a sheer matter 
of fact, and no one ever discovers what binds an effect to its cause.822 For example, he 
considered the motions of billiard balls: the mind feels no inward impression regarding 
how the motion of the first ball will impact the motion of the second, and so, solely from 
the motion of the first (without the appeal to past experience), the mind cannot know the 
motion of the second; but if the mind could know the connection between the two, then it 
would know the effect by pure reason (without experience).823  
 As Hume summarized his argument: “So that, upon the whole, there appears not, 
throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion, which is conceivable by us. All 
events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never observe 
any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.”824 Hume suggested 
that the only way out of this dilemma is to understand causation as nothing more than the 
connection that the human mind draws between two independent objects—the connection 
is subjective not objective.825 
 What is missing that causes one to fall into Hume's trap, says Wagner, are 
necessary relations between states and beings,826 without which causation itself becomes 
a human illusion lacking any sort of rational defense. Wagner goes so far as to argue that 
efficient causation by itself has no explanatory power and explains nothing about 
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beings827 (the example he gives is that of the motion of a sculptor: this motion is only 
intelligible under craftsmanship and cannot be explained otherwise—again, to recall 
Leibniz's argument, the medium is no more than that, a medium, and what matters is the 
whatness). Indeed, given the strength of Hume's critique of causation, something that 
transcends time and particular objects is necessary in order to defeat it (assuming one 
does not want to embrace his radical skepticism). Put another way, without formal 
causation, Hume's critique wins the day, and therefore there is no causation at all. There 
is either formal causation or no causation. 
 The reason why formal causation solves Hume's dilemma is that formal causation 
is atemporal, and because it is atemporal it is the cause of time and actions that occur 
within time. Since (a) the cause of time and actions that occur within time (in other 
words, that which grounds efficient causation) by definition must not itself be subject to 
time (it therefore must be atemporal); (b) only two types of causation are atemporal, 
formal and final causation; and (c) formal causation has priority over final causation,828 
formal causation is the cause and foundation of all efficient causation.829 Put more 
succinctly, as Wolfgang Smith explains it, natura naturans acts by vertical causation.830 
Nature transcends space and time, yet generates events within space and time (of course, 
efficient effects can come from efficient causes, but they also can come from formal 
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causes831).832 This satisfies Leibniz's concern that activity, change, and persistence 
require something that transcends the present time. In other words, Form makes activity, 
change, and persistence possible because it transcends temporality. Knowledge, too, 
becomes possible because knowing itself transcends both the mere sequence of events 
and temporality, and thus can latch on to truths (which are eternal by nature).833 Likewise, 
causation, contra Hume, becomes possible and rational because the temporal cause-effect 
relations found in efficient causes are grounded by the eternal cause-effect relations of 
formal causes. 
Teleology 
 With the case for formal causation made, the task remains to analyze its 
complement: final causation.834 Due to Form functioning as both archē and telos, any 
treatment of formal causation would be incomplete if it only considered Form as archē. 
All beings also return to their Form, which is their telos. As such, the viability of final 
causation in light of modern scientific causation is of great importance, second only to 
formal causation itself. 
 Classical teleology, as explained in chapter two, is concerned first and foremost 
with determinacy, and, contrary to its modern critics, is only secondarily concerned with 
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“forcing” anthropomorphic purposes upon the natural world.835 Thomas Aquinas directly 
addressed how teleology applies to nature in the article “Whether it is proper to the 
rational nature to act for an end?” Importantly, the real issue at stake is whether only the 
rational nature acts towards an end. That is, does teleology apply only to intelligent 
agents? Thomas, following Aristotle, answered with a resounding No: 
On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that “not only mind but also 
nature acts for an end.” 
 
I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of 
causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, 
be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of 
which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an 
agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not 
move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to 
some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently 
in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to 
some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is 
effected, in the rational nature, by the “rational appetite,” which is called the will; 
so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the 
“natural appetite.”836 
 
In other words, all reality, not only rational agency, acts towards an end. Natural 
agents have what Thomas called a “natural appetite” in that they move towards some end 
or another (ultimately toward God). A rock floating in space in a particular direction can 
be said to be moving towards an end (wherever it is heading), because to say that it is not 
directed towards any end is to say that its movement is indeterminate. That is, in order for 
that particular rock in space to be that particular rock in space, it must be directed toward 
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its own end; otherwise, it could not be a particular being at all. At best, one could say that 
“the nature of rocks in space is to move in space,” but this generality does not account for 
any particular rock moving in space—that requires determinacy. 
The problem of determinacy is no small matter: why is an object in one place 
rather than another? Why are there determinate states of being rather than all of existence 
being in an indeterminate state? Modern, scientifically-minded thinkers tend to process 
such why questions with how answers. Going back to the rock in space example, modern 
thinkers would not think in terms of ends, but in terms of a mathematical equation that 
will determine where the rock will go given certain vector forces. From a traditional 
perspective, this does not at all answer the question. Knowing the resulting output from a 
given input does not explain why the input is what it is or where it came from. Again, it is 
akin to knowing the nature of rocks in general but not explaining any rock in particular. 
One can say that a given input x yields an output y, but that is not the question at hand. 
The question is why is it y rather than a, b, or c, and answering with x simply creates an 
infinite regress: why x rather than d, e, or f? And, further, why that formula, which is also 
determinate? No mathematical formula can answer this question because it is a 'why' 
question not a 'how' question, and mathematics explains how a given input is transformed 
into a given output, not why there are inputs or formulae in the first place. In other words, 
mathematics is about answering 'how,' and requires determinate input in order to do so. 
Another modern instinct is to dismiss 'why' questions as pseudo-problems: 
teleology is a mere anthropomorphizing of the universe not worthy of serious intellectual 
187 
inquiry. But the problem can be easily asked in a non-anthropomorphic way: “Why is 
there determinacy in the world,” or “Why does the world appear determinate?” Surely no 
one can think the world really is somehow indeterminate, or that the world must be 
determinate by logical necessity. One could argue tautologically that the world must be 
determinate because no one could live in an indeterminate world, but this clearly is of 
little help. 
Classical teleology offers an elegant answer to the problem of determinacy: 
determinacy exists because everything in the world is directed towards an end; that end 
causes its object to be determinate. Thus, atoms, molecules, macro objects, human 
behavior, or anything and everything determinate moves towards an end, and, in turn, that 
end explains why its object is determinate. Determinacy is a metaphysical problem and 
classical teleology offers a metaphysical answer.837 
To dismiss final causation not only removes determinacy from the world but also 
intelligibility. As Alfred North Whitehead suggests: “It is a great mistake to conceive this 
historical revolt [the Scientific Revolution] as an appeal to reason. On the contrary, it was 
through and through an anti-intellectualist movement. It was the return to the 
contemplation of brute fact; and it was based on a recoil from the inflexible rationality of 
medieval thought.”838 Applied to the topic at hand, final causation offers an escape from 
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“brute fact,” an escape from the appeal to stubborn or irreducible facts. Employing a rock 
example again, imagine a rock sitting still on a plain. To the modern mind,839 this rock 
rests where it does as a matter of fact which requires no further explanation. When faced 
with the question of “Why does this rock continue to sit there and persist in its 
existence?”, modern thinking wants to dismiss the question as superfluous: once the 
physics of a rock has been explained, the rock persists as sheer fact. That is, physics 
explains that a rock is composed of atoms, with a certain strength of atomic bonds, which 
in turn explains the rock staying together. But why do the atomic bonds persist? Why do 
the atoms persist? Whatever explanation is given will then face the same objection as to 
why it persists. Description cannot substitute for explanation. At best, physics can 
describe how one determinate state transforms into another—it explain why there is 
determinacy, or determinate states, in the first place. Modern thinkers have faith that one 
day science will be able to answer 'why' questions, but they fail to grasp that 'why' 
questions by their nature cannot be satisfied with 'how' answers or with brute facts—and 
these are the only tools science has. Ultimately, modern thinkers respond to such 
questions by ignoring them: “the fact is that rocks, atomic bonds, atoms, etc., do indeed 
persist, and such facts are considered irreducible.” 
The problem with this response, as Whitehead intimates, is that it is anti-
intellectual. It asserts the unintelligibility of nature in order to silence inquiry. The appeal 
to the unintelligibility of nature is a dangerous one because it inserts and accepts 
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irrationality at the heart of nature herself. If, after all reasoning has been exhausted, 
nature remains irrational, this seriously undermines any “rational” theories about nature, 
for they ultimately stand on nature's irrationality (if they do not pathetically try to mask 
it). For example, if atomic theories about rocks ultimately are grounded and depend on 
the irrational fact of rocks' persistence, then whatever these theories try to make rational 
is undermined because built into these theories themselves is the admission that the topic 
they try to explain is beyond their comprehension and competence. Rocks persist because 
of atoms, which persist simply as a matter of fact—but why not simply apply that fact of 
persistence to the rocks themselves? Why the superfluous middle man? In which case, the 
atomic theory of rocks becomes a subjective enterprise, an imposition of order by the 
human mind unto nature, who in herself is unintelligible.840 One could respond that the 
atomic model offers more granularity than the more primitive “brute fact of rocks” 
model, but the question is whether this “granularity” is not simply hiding a deeper 
ignorance about the nature of rocks, or, worse still, satisfying criteria that exists only in 
the prejudices of the human mind and not in nature herself. 
Furthermore, if a “rational” theory of atoms depends on the irrationality of brute 
facts, in what sense is it actually rational? It concedes that all of its building blocks are 
irrational, and then naively pushes forward as though it could build a fully rational 
structure. Again, subjectively, the modern human mind can interpret this structure as 
rational, but it must always confess that objectively, in itself, the structure is irrational 
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because of its irrational, unintelligible foundations. The rational cannot be coherently 
built upon the irrational because the latter will always render the former superfluous and 
subjective. 
The remedy is to refill the universe with teleology and therefore with 
intelligibility, in which case there are no brute facts. Nature is intelligible through and 
through because every determinate state is not a dead, static brute fact, but a live, 
dynamic, currently-being-realized telos. Instead of interpreting natural objects as set in 
stone, they are in a sense organisms, “living” entities that constantly “strive” (to risk an 
anthropomorphism) to realize their telos. They persist for a reason (their telos), and 
because they persist for a reason, by definition their persistence is not irrational, and thus 
they themselves are finally intelligible. A rock, then, persists because it is actively 
“pursuing” (to risk another anthropomorphism), in the present moment, its telos, a telos 
humans can grasp, and one that makes the rock intelligible. The rock is dynamic, not 
static, and this is neither pan-psychism nor pan-vitalism. 
As Leibniz argued, physical substances cannot be conceived without activity—
activity belongs to their essence.841 Matter alone is inherently incomplete because it lacks 
a source of action, and, when impressed, only remembers the previous moment.842 What 
is needed is to see nature as active, as “alive,” as pursuing a telos. And this telos is 
precisely a being's Form. For Leibniz, bodies act because of Form and they are acted 
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upon and are resisted because of matter.843 That is, Form alone acts,844 whereas extension 
alone merely resists; in this sense, neither motion nor time really exist because only that 
which has coexistent parts truly exists: time and motion by themselves lack such unity.845 
As seen, Forms transcend time and provide such unity, and now it is clear how they also 
provide the source of a being's activity, change, and permanence by which that being is 
dynamic and determinate, and determinate precisely because it is dynamic (i.e., actively 
pursuing an end). As archē and telos, Forms provide intelligibility. 
Unlike physical explanations of persistence, which face an infinite regress 
problem and force them to appeal to brute facts, classical teleology does not face the 
same problem: the ultimate telos of every nature is God, Who is exclusively irreducible. 
Critically, God is not irreducible in the sense of “brute fact” but because God is beyond 
being and beyond intelligibility. That is, God's irreducibility comes not from 
“unintelligibility” in the sense of irrationality, but “unintelligibility” in the sense of the 
fullness and overflow of that unfold as Intellect. God is supra-rational not irrational. This 
difference means that the human intellect can objectively engage with nature, for nature is 
rational and ultimately more-than-rational (because it is a theophany, pointing beyond 
itself), as opposed to nature being irrational, which forces the human mind to engage it 
subjectively by imposing its own intellectual prejudices. 
This analysis of teleology, along with the analyses of the primary-secondary 
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quality distinction and nominalism, all suggest that one must choose between Plato or 
Nietzsche. That is, since some type of Neoplatonism is necessary for any intelligibility 
whatsoever, the intelligibility of the world is either affirmed (leading to Plato) or denied 
(leading to Nietzsche). At least, so it would seem. Further analysis must properly evaluate 
the modern, postmodern, and traditional approaches to reconciling the conflict between 
ancient and modern scientific notions of causality. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
Your face pours beauty over all creation. The universe swims in Your beauty as a boat swims 
in the sea. 
And when You bend over cold ashes, the ashes are transfigured and receive a face. 
Bring my heart to its senses, my Lord, so that it may not be captivated by mortal beauty but 
by You, my Immortal Beauty. 
O my only Beauty! 
Allow me to see Your Face, just more and more—of Your Face.846 
 With the major philosophical issues weighed (the primary-secondary quality 
distinction, nominalism, and teleology), the main approaches to resolving the conflict 
between Dionysius's dependence on formal causation and modern scientific notions of 
causation can now be evaluated meaningfully. To summarize, the primary-secondary 
quality distinction was found to be untenable for a variety of reasons; nominalism could 
not be sustained without losing the possibility of knowledge, and this indicated the 
necessity of Forms and formal causation for knowledge; and teleology, the natural 
supplement to Form, was determined as necessary in order to preserve the determinacy 
and intelligibility of the world. As will now be argued, (a) the modern approach 
ultimately collapses into either the postmodern or the traditional approach, (b) the 
postmodern approach is irrefutable, and (c) the traditional approach provides the best 
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framework for effectively reconciling the two notions of causation. Finally, building on 
the traditional approach, a Dionysius-inspired approach will be offered. 
A Modern Approach Considered 
 Deacon undoubtedly provides a creative and insightful, if not brilliant, approach 
to formal and final causation. Unfortunately, his approach leaves causation in a volatile 
state—so much so that his modern approach collapses into either the postmodern 
approach or the traditional approach. 
 While Deacon rightly rejects the primary-secondary quality distinction, his 
reconstructions of formal and final causation fail to recapture their metaphysical 
purposes. Recall that formal causation provides whatness or quiddity to reality, but in 
Deacon's conception of Forms, Forms occur only in specific instances, not in reality as a 
whole. As such, he is content to allow matter to fulfill the role of providing whatness, but, 
as seen, matter is incapable of doing this because it cannot provide unity or substance. 
Even where Deacon does affirm Forms, he treats them not as full of content but as 
markers of absence—nothing! Thus, where Forms do apply there is no content, and 
where Forms do not apply there is no content. Objective reality has vanished altogether. 
Suddenly, Deacon's modern approach appears identical to Nietzsche's postmodern 
approach, with its gleeful rejection of any so-called “objective” reality. Remove every 
contribution of the human mind from reality, and nothing is left.847 Furthermore, as 
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argued, without formal causation, causation itself falters under Hume's critique, a critique 
that Nietzsche could not agree with more (again, for Nietzsche, causation is description at 
best).848 Conversely, if Deacon desires an objective measure of reality or wants 
causation, he needs traditional formal causation, for traditional formal causation does not 
fall into the same trap of skepticism because it relies on a notion of God Who is beyond 
being. As such, the only method for escaping postmodern consequences is some form of 
the traditional approach. 
 The same result applies to Deacon's philosophy of final causation. 
Metaphysically, final causation provides determinacy and intelligibility, but Deacon 
limits final causation's scope to select instances, going so far as to say that an 
intentionless universe is not only possible but that he believes “in fact... the entire 
universe was in just such a state.”849 However, a purely intentionless universe, one devoid 
of all telos, is a perfectly indeterminate one, and so no universe at all. Without teleology, 
the universe is unintelligible, and Deacon exacerbates this by conceding that the human 
brain evolved to aid in self-persistence and reproduction, not for general information 
processing.850 This echoes Nietzsche's argument that the human mind evolved for 
survival, not for grasping truth.851 Again, the only alternative for Deacon to avoid a 
complete collapse into the postmodern approach is, instead, to collapse into the 
traditional approach that accepts final causation metaphysically. 
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 Recall that Deacon rejects the traditional view of final causation because he 
considers it magical and because the material future cannot possibly affect the material 
present. Regarding his charge of magical thinking, this amounts to little more than an ad 
hominem attack, whose origins, as traced in chapter three, go back to Francis Bacon. 
Simply deriding an idea as magical and denying it as fundamental, hardly makes either 
declaration true. In fact, Burtt, a philosopher without any inclination towards magical 
thinking, argues that teleological explanations are indeed fundamental (in the sense of 
“irreducible”)852 because every object of the human mind is a means for some other end 
(i.e., there are relations between objects such that one object serves to further the end of 
another, and this relationship cannot be reduced to some third object but must be taken at 
face-value—it must be taken teleologically).853 Ends, or teloi, cannot be removed from 
reality. Of course, Deacon agrees that ends are irreducible, fundamental, and perhaps 
even irremovable, yet he chides as “magical” any thought that takes the next step in 
stating that teloi do not require explanation in other terms (by which he means scientific 
terms). As for his criticism that the material future cannot affect the present, this is a 
straw man argument: no serious thinker thought teloi were material or temporal. Teloi 
function not from the future but from eternity, which is ever present in the eternal now.854 
 Deacon's modern approach, as discussed, could potentially provide a radically 
modified basis for Dionysius's theology, but there is no reason why it should be preferred 
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over the postmodern or traditional approaches. In fact, by removing whatness, causation, 
determinacy, and intelligibility from existence, Deacon's modern approach looks no 
different than Nietzsche's postmodern approach, and their reassertion requires a 
traditional approach. If one would seriously consider Deacon's modern approach, one 
should follow its metaphysical implications, and thereby consider Nietzsche's 
postmodern approach. 
A Postmodern Approach Considered 
 Nietzsche's postmodern approach dissolves the conflict between formal causation 
and modern scientific notions of causation altogether. There is no concern for saving 
nature's intelligibility, because, for Nietzsche, nature is “in all eternity chaos.”855 As seen, 
he dismisses order, unity, etc. (the very concepts that formal and final causation try to 
make sense of), effectively leaving formal and final causation with no purpose. Indeed, 
he rejects the rationality of causation itself. 
 Plato offers perhaps the best response to Nietzsche in his argument against 
Protagoras's claim that “man is the measure of all things.”856 Plato realized that, in order 
for Protagoras to maintain that what seems true to someone is in fact true for them, by 
“seeming” Protagoras must mean “perceiving.”857 For example, the same wind may feel 
cold to someone and warm to someone else—in order for each person to be the measure 
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of the wind, however they perceive it must be true (i.e., must be knowledge).858 There are 
several problems with this crude empiricism. First, dreams, diseases, insanity, etc., can 
cause illusions and false perceptions,859 but false perceptions imply that the perceiver is 
not the measure of all things. Second, since perception depends on three motions (the 
motion of (a) the object perceived, (b) the medium by which it is perceived, and (c) the 
perceiver), perception is inherently about becoming, not being, and thus nothing is or is 
one.860 Third, as a corollary of the previous point, the same thing can never be perceived 
twice, but every perception is utterly unique.861 Fourth and finally, if perception led to 
knowledge, then simply hearing a language spoken would immediately lead to knowing 
what was spoken, but clearly this requires knowledge of grammar and interpretation862 
(which are imperceptible). 
 The commitment to a crude empiricism aside, Plato had other critiques of the 
doctrine that “man is the measure of all things.” He asked why a pig or baboon should not 
also be the measure of all things since they too have sensation.863 And why did 
Protagoras bother arguing for his opinion if everyone's opinion was equally valid?864 
Plato proceeded to point out that by Protagoras's own standard, his “man is the measure 
of all things” doctrine is false even to himself: he must grant that anyone's opinion is true 
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to himself or herself, and thus must accept as true anyone's (such as Plato's) assertion that 
Protagoras's doctrine is false; but now Protagoras himself must agree that his doctrine is 
false, otherwise he would be contradicting himself by not allowing everyone's opinion to 
be equally true.865 In other words, Protagoras must accept his doctrine as false, or at best, 
as relativized only to himself, neutering it of any application.  
 Furthermore, Plato argued that Protagoras, in practice, did not believe his own 
doctrine for he did not consider everyone's opinion equal; for example, in matters of 
health, he preferred a doctor's.866 Likewise he did not consider every politician and every 
law of the state as equally advantageous, just, or pious.867 The underlying issue was the 
future: not everyone's opinion is equal because different people have different capabilities 
of bringing about future states.868 For example, if a doctor diagnoses someone with a 
fever but the patient feels that he or she does not have a fever, it is absurd to think that the 
patient will become feverish to himself or herself and simultaneously not feverish to the 
doctor (two examples of future states).869 Again, the predictions of a farmer and a lyre-
player regarding the sweetness or dryness a particular batch of grapes will yield when 
pressed into wine are not equally valid;870 neither does a musician and a gymnastics 
teacher have equal skill in tuning unplayed instruments—in fact, if the musician tunes it, 
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it will seem in-tune to the gymnastic teacher too!871 Protagoras's measure is so absurd 
that he himself could not consistently maintain it. 
 However, while Plato's reductio ad absurda assumed that his opponent was 
looking for truth, Nietzsche does not consider the animal human mind capable of such an 
endeavor. Plato was surely right in that, if “man is the measure of all things,” then all that 
is knowable is the world of becoming, not being, and hence not truth. Nietzsche can 
concede not only this point, but even Plato's larger point that one must first grasp being 
before one can attain truth.872 As seen, Nietzsche rejects being in favor of an ever chaotic 
becoming, and rejects truth because he sees the same connection Plato made between 
being and truth. Plato's arguments depend on an opponent who is after truth, but 
Nietzsche finds no such truth for one to go after. He can readily laugh at any reductio ad 
absurdum: “Man's truths are his irrefutable errors.”873 There is simply no way to refute 
Nietzsche's position because he can effortlessly undermine any ground by which one 
would try to stand on in order to criticize him. At best, an opponent of Nietzsche may try 
to appeal to beauty,874 but any appeal to human rationality ignores Nietzsche's core 
insights. Of course, under this postmodern solution, neither theology nor science remain 
intact—both are pounded to dust by the philosopher with a hammer. 
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A Traditional Approach Considered 
 Given the arguments against the primary-secondary quality distinction and 
nominalism, and the arguments for classical teleology, it would seem that the traditional 
approach best harmonizes with these conclusions. After all, it affirms the doctrines of 
Forms,875 theophany,876 hierarchy,877 etc. It reconciles the conflict with modern science 
by putting science in its rightful place, as a limited way of knowing, and one that 
becomes illegitimate when divorced from traditional metaphysics.878 In fact, modern 
science's aesthetics (e.g., unity, symmetry, mathematical elegance) point to principles of a 
higher order than science itself.879 It is this “higher order” that ultimately demands 
attention, for, as Smith says, once one realizes the limited scope of science, one can 
attend to more important matters: the pursuit of divine ascent.880 
 While all of the aforementioned accords beautifully with Dionysius, upon closer 
examination, some other points raised by advocates of the traditional approach are in 
discord with Dionysius. To return to Smith, recall that he denies that Forms have any 
mathematical or quantitative properties at all,881 that quantity belongs only to the lower 
orders of the hierarchy,882 and that quantity is but an essenceless container883 that will be 
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destroyed in the eschaton.884 However, as seen in chapter two, for Dionysius, Forms are, 
in some sense, quantitative because they are principles of unity and principles of oneness. 
That is, the Forms of Identity, Sameness, Unity, etc. cannot be separated so easily from 
the quantitative because Forms all involve oneness, an inherently quantitative principle. 
Smith claims that “substance need not entail quantity,”885 but if it is one substance, a 
substance that has identity and unity, then it must entail quantity in some sense. Far from 
being destroyed in Armageddon, beings return to the One precisely by their unity, that is, 
by their kinship to oneness. The One cannot be the One, not even in the sense of measure, 
without some notion of quantity; it is precisely because of mathematical reasoning that 
makes the “One” such an attractive and true Name of God.  
 Equally problematic, Smith ends up making metaphysical distinctions based off 
of scientific experiments and current scientific limitations (historically a recipe for 
disaster) rather than building a perennial metaphysics that is truly perennial and fitting 
science within it. Smith's corporeal-physical distinction heavily depends on the inability 
of physicists to replicate quantum properties in visible objects.886 Likewise, his view of 
the Fall depends on evolution being false.887 In order to have a consistent traditional 
approach, the sciences should depend on metaphysics, not vice-versa. History is replete 
with failed “God of the gaps” approaches to reconciling theology and science, and so any 
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“God of the gaps” argument, no matter how sophisticated, should cause alarm, especially 
among perennial metaphysicians. 
 Dionysius and Smith aside, Robert Cummings Neville has critiqued Nasr's 
perennial philosophy on several fronts: hierarchy, Forms, and symbols. First, regarding 
hierarchy, Neville argues that there are two types of perennial philosophy: hierarchical, as 
espoused by Nasr, and non-hierarchical, which emphasizes the immediacy of the act of 
creation ex nihilo and the “equiprimordial” partnership of the One and the Many.888 That 
is, the non-hierarchical approach takes the One and the Many to be correlative: there is no 
unity without a multiplicity to unify and no multiplicity without unity.889 The important 
distinction in this approach is between determinate being and absolute nothingness, not 
between different types of determinate being (the unified and the many).890 With unity and 
difference made two sides of the same coin, every determinate being comes directly from 
nothingness, meaning that no being is closer to God than any other.891 Neville does not 
deny the differences of unity, importance, value, etc., between beings, but points out that 
such differences are divorced from hierarchy because every being is equidistant from the 
divine.892 The divine nature itself only arises within creation, for the divine will is prior to 
the divine nature.893 Even granting the hierarchical model of perennial philosophy, 
Neville criticizes philosophies that have higher levels intervene in the affairs of lower 
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levels; the “genius” of hierarchy, he says, is that it allows each level to have its own 
independence and integrity.894 
 Nasr responds to Neville by countering that hierarchy does not destroy a being's 
direct link to God, and neither does creation ex nihilo necessarily destroy hierarchy.895 As 
seen in chapter two, it is actually hierarchy that expresses a being's direct relationship to 
God. Hierarchy does not impose mediators between a being and God, but instead 
indicates the degree to which a being participates in God. Additionally, hierarchy reveals 
the communal nature of all creation moving towards God, and its loss opens the door for 
an isolated, individualistic relationship with God.896 Nasr correctly notes that perennial 
philosophy can encompass both of Neville's interpretations—creation is both in God and 
by God.897  
 As for Neville's charge that the genius of the hierarchy consists of the non-
interference among its levels, Nasr responds by saying that the interpenetration of the 
natural and supernatural is necessitated by the very nature of things, and the supernatural 
in no way takes away from the nature of the natural.898 Indeed, the vertical dimension of 
reality relates to the ordinary at every moment, and, for example, defines what it means to 
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be human.899 The denial of the interpenetration of the various levels of the hierarchy not 
only denies the communal nature of all reality striving towards God, but would seem to 
deny formal and final causation altogether, for both of these depend on higher levels of 
reality acting as (vertical) causes on lower levels of reality (to be fair, perhaps they could 
be interpreted non-hierarchically, but it is not clear exactly how or whether this could be 
done). 
 To Nasr's reply it could be added that Neville's argument against hierarchy begins 
with a non-traditional interpretation of what is meant by “One.” Neville takes both “One” 
and “Many” to refer to determinate being, but, as explained in chapter two, “One” is not 
“one” in the sense of number (which is determinate) but in the sense of measure (which is 
not). The One and the Many, as conceived Neoplatonically, are not two sides of the same 
coin, but the former measures the latter. Consequently, differences in unity, value, etc., 
must imply ontological hierarchy, for these differences only come about because different 
beings are measured by the One, and their measurements are different. That is, 
differences in unity imply differences in One-likeness, and since the One is the measure 
of reality, these differences in unity imply differences in reality itself—hence, hierarchy. 
Seen another way, given that the One is the measure of reality, that which has more unity 
is more one, and thus better holds up to the measure of reality (the One), the very 
measure that determines what is real; more unity equals more reality, and thus differences 
in unity among beings means those beings possess different levels of reality. While true 
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that every being comes directly from the One, not every being is equally like the One (a 
statement Neville agrees with), and this inequality in likeness of the One results in 
hierarchy because the One is the measure of reality. 
 Next, Neville critiques the traditional notion of Forms.900 He argues that truth 
cannot be the repetition of the Form of the object in the mind of the knower: one would 
have to be able to stand outside both object and knower to compare Forms.901 
Furthermore, things have Forms different from the Forms with which minds think about 
them, and, therefore, it is better to say that something is known when what is valuable 
about it is grasped.902 
 Neville's critique of Forms is perhaps valid against certain types of Scholastic 
understandings of Forms but not against Neoplatonic understandings. Recall from chapter 
two that it is precisely the problem of being unable to stand outside of subject and object 
in order to compare them that made the representational theory of knowledge so 
problematic according to Plotinus, to which Plotinus responds with his theory of Forms. 
The identity theory of knowledge denies the subject-object distinction with a triadic (not 
dyadic) unity of intellect, intellection, and the intelligible. A subject does not stand 
outside of itself and its object in order to make a comparison to test the accuracy of its 
knowledge because there is neither subject nor object in knowledge. A Form is not 
repeated in a knower's mind—a knower's mind is the Form. Neville tries to impose the 
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subject-object distinction on Forms, the very problem they dodge. Additionally, it is 
difficult to interpret what Neville intends by his critique that “we know many things as 
having forms different from the forms which we think about them”903 since this would 
seem to presuppose the outside comparison of Forms that he rightly rejects. 
 Finally, Neville argues against the immediacy of symbols.904 He reasons that 
certainty comes not from immediacy but from the directness of the engagement of 
interpreting ultimate matters with finite symbols.905 For Neville, more important than the 
issue of which symbols are best is the fact that they open up “dimensions of reality that 
otherwise would be opaque,” and so the modern soul first needs to be transformed in 
order to be competent in the symbols of perennial philosophy—otherwise, moderns 
cannot be secondary referents (i.e., how a symbol operates inside an interpreter906).907  
 In response to Neville, Nasr seems to be largely in agreement. Nasr says that 
symbols can never be mistaken, for mistakes come from symbols' interpreters (e.g., if 
someone denies that salt tastes salty, this does not make salt any less salty).908 but this is 
precisely what Neville means by “secondary referents”—yes, it is the modern interpreter 
who is at fault for failing to engage and grasp the symbols properly. Neville does not 
deny the certainty of symbols, but questions whether this certainty has to do with the 
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immediacy of the engagement or the directness of it. Nasr replies to Neville by saying 
that symbols are based on the nature of things not on human collective agreement.909 that 
everything is symbolic to the extent that it is real (only Ultimate Reality is not a 
symbol).910 and that there are degrees of certainty due to greater or lesser penetration into 
a symbol.911 but Neville does not dispute any of these points. 
 Perhaps an area of dispute between Nasr and Neville here would be the role of 
hierarchy: traditionally, symbols work because they participate in higher levels of reality 
and thereby draw their interpreters into that higher level of reality. Although he denies 
hierarchy, Neville can still achieve the same end result by doubling-down on his assertion 
that there can be differences among value, unity, etc., without those differences ever 
resulting in a difference of degree of reality. In this way, symbols could continue to 
perform their traditional function (e.g., drawing their interpreters into a higher level of 
value) without there necessarily being an ontological hierarchy. 
Another Approach Offered: Dionysius vs. Dionysus 
 With the modern approach to resolving the conflicting notions of causation 
melting into either the postmodern or traditional approach, and with the postmodern 
approach dissolving rather than resolving the conflict between ancient and modern 
scientific conceptions of causation, the traditional approach provides the most fertile 
ground for building an approach for resolving this conflict. Unlike the traditional 
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approach as propounded by Wolfgang Smith, an approach that follows Dionysius affirms 
that unity, that is oneness, that is number, exists at every level of the hierarchy; it is 
precisely a being's degree of unity that gives it its place in the hierarchy in the first place.  
 That said, the nature and meaning of reality's quantitative dimension should come 
from theology, not from the sciences. The sciences analyze the world of the senses, which 
Plato argued is the world of becoming, for in that world everything is in motion.912 For 
Plato, “knowledge” pertains to the world of being, “ignorance” to nonbeing, and 
“opinion” to that which is in between.913 the world of becoming.914 Science by its nature 
operates at such a low level—the world of the senses—that it yields opinion not 
knowledge. Opinion belongs to the world of change, whereas knowledge partakes of the 
eternal and unchanging. Seen another way, science studies becoming, not being. 
Concomitantly, if reality qua being is quantitative, its quantitative nature cannot be had 
from the sciences, by definition, but only from a field that studies being, namely, 
theology.915 It is theology that provides the basis for a proper understanding of quantity 
and even for scientific realism itself.916 
 Moreover, Dionysius's notions of formal and final causation can provide the basis 
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for modern scientific notions of causation. As argued above, without formal causation, 
there is no causation whatsoever: formal causation is the backbone of all notions of 
causality. This finding accords perfectly with Dionysius's theology, which depends on, 
and so heavily employs, formal causation. Hierarchically speaking, formal causation acts 
in every type of causation from “above,” making causation actually causal rather than a 
mere sequence, and bestowing unity upon it. Likewise, final causation works from 
“above,” bestowing determinacy, and, along with formal causation, intelligibility. Thus, 
every other type of causation works within the frameworks of formal and final causation. 
 At the same time, Neville is surely right to point out the integrity of each level of 
the hierarchy (although “integrity” need not necessarily mean complete independence or 
total autonomy). While, metaphysically speaking, every scientific notion of causality 
presupposes formal and final causation, scientists qua scientists need not concern 
themselves with theology. Science, analyzing the world of becoming and also being 
confined to it, on the one hand, limits the claims scientists can make about reality and 
nature, but, on the other hand, liberates them from having to concern themselves with 
metaphysics and theology. For the sake of scientific methodology, scientists can bracket 
out formal and final causation and pursue their research as they see fit, staying within the 
realm of horizontal causes. Of course, they retain the right to invoke formal or final 
causation if they so desire (as Leibniz in fact did in his science), but, ultimately, formal 
and final causes pertain to metaphysics, not to physics. 
 In sum, this approach resolves the conflict between Dionysius's use of formal and 
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final causation and modern scientific notions of causation by limiting the scope of the 
latter and metaphysically grounding the latter on the former. Unlike Wolfgang Smith's 
approach, which relies on scientific findings to reach theological conclusions, theology 
retains its rightful place as the metaphysical basis of science. Theological arguments can 
affect the scope of science's findings but not vice-versa. To reiterate, this does not, in any 
way, impact scientific methodology, but how, and with how wide a scope, the conclusions 
of science are accepted. For example, in the current case, science has nothing 
metaphysically to contribute to formal causation or final causation—at most, science can 
evaluate formal and final causation in terms of its own approach to the world of 
becoming. Simply put, the implications of scientific findings are limited to science. 
 Let there be no doubt that the approach here offered is far from without 
philosophical opponents: the elephant in the room remains Nietzsche. Perl tries to 
leverage Neoplatonism against postmodernism by arguing that nihilism occurs when 
reality is treated as autonomous, rather than as a symbol pointing to that which is beyond 
being.917 Only as symbols, he argues, can anything be known as it actually is.918 which 
would seem to imbue reality with content and thereby defeat nihilism. However, his 
argument only works against its intended target: Derrida, whose nihilism comes from the 
circularity of reference.919 Nietzsche, by contrast, does not even give the human mind 
enough credit to think through such problems. As already mentioned, the most that can be 
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said is that if one wants to resolve rather than dissolve the conflict between Dionysius's 
theology and modern science over the issue of causation, a traditional approach offers the 
best framework. If not, if one is content to annihilate the very notions of truth, reality, 
goodness, and unity, nothing more can be said. 
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EPILOGUE: TOWARDS A REVIVAL OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
  
 While some things change, others stay the same. As was true during the 
Neoplatonic, Scholastic, and early modern periods, so too in the contemporary period, the 
issue of how to prioritize and balance the relationships among theology, metaphysics, and 
natural philosophy must be faced.920 Many moderns, having dismissed theology as 
confessional, abandoned metaphysics to the occult, and replaced natural philosophy with 
science, would like to think that the West has “progressed” beyond this traditional 
problem. However, as was clear from the preceding chapters, the roles of theology, 
metaphysics, and natural philosophy are as relevant today as ever. As seen, a purely 
scientific approach to causation makes causation itself impossible, leading to nihilism. 
The solution, as argued, is to embed science within a larger theological framework, one 
that can account for metaphysics and science. 
 Yet, a piece of the puzzle remains missing: natural philosophy. Although the past 
century has seen revivals in theology and metaphysics, there has not been a revival of 
natural philosophy. From a Neoplatonic perspective, modern “science” is more akin to 
ancient “astronomy” than ancient “natural philosophy.” That is, modern science is heavily 
involved in conducting experiments, making predictions, and controlling nature. While it 
is true that theoretical sciences exist, and that many fields of sciences are more theoretical 
than they are experimental, the theories they espouse are not qualitatively different from 
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those of the experimental sciences—they are the other side of the same coin. What is 
sorely needed is a scholar who has the knowledge of, and lives in between, the theoretical 
scientist and the metaphysician—what is needed, that is, is a natural philosopher. 
 To see the need for natural philosophy, consider the role final causation played in 
Leibniz's theory of force, and then ask: “Who today would be the person to reevaluate the 
role of final causation in the phenomenon of force?” Not the theoretical scientists, for 
they already assume a certain theory of causation and have no interest in dead scientific 
theories—their interest instead is to push the boundaries of science in what Thomas Kuhn 
would describe as “normal science.”921 Kuhn would wait for the scientists themselves to 
initiate a paradigm shift, but this process is being retarded because of the lack of natural 
philosophers. To rephrase the problem with Kuhn's language: the theoretical scientist 
works within normal science; the natural philosopher is not bound by normal science and 
is on the hunt for the next paradigm shift.  
 A common misconception is that the next paradigm shift must come from a major 
scientific discovery, but, as seen in chapter three, the Scientific Revolution itself came not 
so much from scientific discoveries (although they undeniably helped), but from a 
reenvisioning of nature inspired by going back to the ancients. The appeal to the 
Presocratics and Plato as superior to the dominant Scholastic thought of the day is seen in 
virtually all of the major early modern thinkers. Whether or not they treated their 
Scholastic opponents unfairly is beside the point. The point is that the early moderns 
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sought to interpret nature using all of the tools Western thought has ever had to offer. 
Nothing is gained by limiting oneself to one's native worldview. 
 The natural philosopher, then, seeks to interpret nature with expertise not only in 
the Presocratics, Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, Epicureans, Scholastics, early moderns, 
and moderns, but also the diverse schools of thought found in Central and East Asia. With 
the ease of contemporary communication, knowledge of other cultures' philosophies 
across time and place is more accessible than ever before; yet, when it comes to the study 
of nature, scientists are content with one culture's and one time period's interpretation: 
their own. Of course, they have every right to be. As already mentioned, new discoveries 
can indeed lead to paradigm shifts. The concern is to avoid neglecting the discovery of 
paradigm shifts that come from studying a variety of interpretations of nature. Here is 
where the natural philosopher is necessary, and cannot be replaced. It is the natural 
philosopher who would discover paradigm shifts through mastery of understanding how 
the same natural phenomenon can be interpreted in multiple ways. To be clear, theoretical 
scientists have their rightful place, as do natural philosophers. 
 This returns the conversation back to the problem of how to prioritize theology, 
metaphysics, natural philosophy, and science. Following the conclusions of the previous 
chapters, a Neoplatonic answer is offered. Science, as seen, studies the world of 
becoming from a particular and narrow interpretation of nature. Natural philosophy, by 
contrast, also studies the world of becoming, but with an open and wide interpretation of 
nature. Metaphysics, studies the world of being, and theology that which is beyond being. 
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Seen another way, theology emanates metaphysics which emanates natural philosophy 
which emanates science. Just as with Plotinus's theory of emanation, each emanation is 
dependent upon that which it emanated from, and that which emanates includes 
everything that emanates from it in more perfect unity and harmony. 
 Regardless of whether one accepts this particular solution, it has been shown that, 
however one relates theology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, and science, one must 
actually relate all of them. Overly simplistic solutions operate by tossing out a critical 
piece of the puzzle for the sake of making the puzzle easier to solve. The end result is an 
incomplete picture with gaping holes in it. Hence, one cannot think of science (the world 
of becoming, in particular) without considering natural philosophy (the world of 
becoming, in general), or natural philosophy without considering metaphysics (the world 
of being), or metaphysics without considering theology (that which is beyond being). 
Such thoughtful consideration is what makes Nietzsche's arguments so powerful: he has 
thoroughly considered and rejected all of these. To leave one untouched opens the door 
for nihilism to enter (which is the problem Deacon's approach ran into). 
 The hope, however naïve, is that the trend towards a simplistic view of nature will 
cease, and that natural philosophy will undergo a revival similar to the revivals of 
theology and metaphysics. At that point, theology and metaphysics may have recovered 
their lost pride of place. Perhaps then, people will see the Beauty of God, even in a pile of 
ashes. 
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